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Language and Thought in the Theories of Port-Royal, Du Marsais,
Beauzee and Condillac.
Summary.
This study considers the four best known French theories 
of general grammar with particular reference to the relation­
ship which their authors postulate between thought and language.
The first part refers to the reasons for modern interest 
in such theories and to consequent modern discussion relevant 
to them. With the aim of placing them in historical perspective, 
a short account of the progress of the theme of universal 
grammar is provided. This includes a brief summary of the 
various theories which may be regarded as subscribing to the 
concept, and of the progression of the theme in France during 
the specific period of general grammar there.
In the second part, each of the theories is considered 
separately. Each section within this part has an introduction 
containing background information such as the role of the respect­
ive authors, the influences on their theories, details of their 
own publications and the main items in the secondary bibliography. 
In the case of the first section, on the Port-Royal theory, 
such details are more extensive, partly due to the volume of 
discussion on Port-Royal, partly to the historical position of 
the authors at the beginning of the era of general grammar in 
France. Most of the content in each of the sections is devoted 
to describing and discussing the conceptions of each of the 
authors on the nature of thought and its processes, and their 
accounts of the way in which these processes find their expression 
in language and affect grammatical theory. Attention is
particularly directed at the main aspects of the theories, 
notably, the features which are considered to be universal, 
the role of words as artificial signs, and the role of the 
judgment and its linguistic expression, the proposition.
The concluding part traces a certain progression in 
thinking which can be detected in the four theories and 
considers some of their relative advantages and disadvantages 
Also noted are salient features likely to be of interest 
in the context of modern linguistics.
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Language1 and Thought ih: the Theories of Port-Royal, Du Marsais,
Beauzee and Condillac
Part 1. Introduction and Background 
Chapter 1; Introduction.
Theories on language and grammar in France in the 17th 
and 18th centuries were largely dominated by the philosopher 
grammarians^ who considered it possible to designate certain 
elements of grammar as being common to all languages, due 'to 
the universal nature of thought, and the close connection of 
thought and language.
The concept of universal or general grammar was neither 
new, nor limited to France. But it was in France that it 
became particularly important and flourished, though not always 
with the same intensity, over a period which is generally 
regarded as beginning with the publication of the Port-Royal 
Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee in 1660 and finishing at the 
end of the 18th or beginning of the 19th century. During this 
period, although the nature of the theories changed, they all 
postulated some form of universal thought linked to its 
expression in language.
No further theories of this type were produced in France 
after the beginning of the 19th century, and, with the emphasis 
on comparative and historical linguistics in that century they 
did not persist as a focus of interest. The theories are 
sufficiently rich in themselves as subjects of study, but they 
have also been largely ignored in the present century until 
relatively recently.
1. The term ' grammairien-philosophe1 generally used in this
context in the 18th century was first applied to the followers 
of Port-Royal who attempted to show that language is a 
direct reflection of man's rational processes. (B.E.Bartlett, 
Beauzee's Grammaire Generate, 2.5).
Re-awakened interest in them is due,generally, to the
importance now attached to the history of linguistics and
particularly, to Noam Chomsky's claims that, in some respects,
the theories, especially those of Port-Royal, have features
in common with transformational generative granmar;'^ . The strong
stimulus which Chomsky's claims gave to the study of the
history of linguistics is acknowledged by R.H.Robins' comment
that he was "more responsible than any other single linguist
for the change of direction and focus in the subject from
(2)
the late 1950*s to the present day." .
Much of the discussion and the controversy which followed 
the publication of Cartesian Linguistics was concerned with 
the historical validity of Chomsky's claims. The main works 
of this nature, which mostly relate to the theories of Port- 
Royal, are listed by Charles Porset in an extensive biblio- 
graphy relevant to general grammar . He describes them as 
the principal ones among the "tres nombreuses et vigoureuses 
reactions* against "l'idee d'une linguistique cartesienne 
qui, via Du Marsais, nous conduirait en droite ligne a 
Humboldt". Of the various topics covered by these numerous 
works, those of relevance to the present study will be intro­
duced in context.
Although such publications resulted in a substantial con­
tribution towards historical facts about the philosopher 
grammarians and the history of general grammar, they could not 
be regarded as providing a comprehensive picture of the theories 
discussed, nor were they intended to do so. However, in
1. See especially Cartesian Linguistics, 1966; Language and 
Mind, 1968.
2. Foreword to E.F.K.Koerner's'Towards a Historiography of 
Linguistics’, Studies in the History of Linguistics, Volume 19, 
1978.
3. Grammatista Philosophans Les Sciences du Langage de Port- 
Royal aux Ideologues 1660-1818, Bibliographie, in La 
Grammaire Generale des Modistes aux Ideologues, presente 
par Andre Joly et Jean Stefanini, PUL,1977, p. 42.
addition to these works mainly produced in reaction to Chomsky*s 
publications, there have been specific studies on some of the 
theories of the philosopher grammarians, namely those of 
Gunvor Sahlin on Du M a r s a i s ^ , Roland Donze on P o r t - R o y a l ^ ,
f 3)
and Barrie E. Bartlett on Beauzee . Other major works which 
include much of relevance to the theories and their history 
are J.C. Chevalier*s Histoire de la Syntaxe, 19 68, and G.R. 
Padley*s Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 19 76, There are 
also indications in more recent works of a greater concentration 
on intrinsic aspects of the theories and on the considerations 
deriving from them, as, for instance in Sylvain Auroux* La 
semiotique des encyclopedistes (Paris, 1979), Daniel Droixhe*s 
La Linguistique et l*appel de l*histoire (1600-1800)(Droz,
1978), Ulrich Ricken*s Grammaire et Philosophie au Siecle 
des Lumieres (PUL, 19 78) and Andre Robinet*s Le Langage a l*Age 
Classiquer(Paris, 1978).
Together, all these studies and others which will be 
referred to in context, form a substantial contribution to 
knowledge of the theories and to discussion of their main 
features and of the implications deriving from them. Partic­
ularly in relation to criticism of Chomsky, the .
of their antecedents has been well aired. On the 
specific topic of the relationship of language to thought, a 
fair amount has also been written, but, in general, though 
Bartlett*s work is an exception in that it does provide a 
detailed account in regard to Beauzee*s theory, this has not 
been considered comprehensively as a specific subject.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^  F ’efvcTZTTTon c w <a i/ ^ o a/jj.
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais/, Paris, 1928.
2. La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee de Port-Royal, Berne, 
1967.
3. Beauzee*s Grammaire Generale, Mouton, 19 75.
The present study aims to describe four outstanding theories 
of this type in so far as they attempt to relate language 
and grammar to thought, namely those of Port-Royal, Beauzee,
Du Marsais and Condillac. By limiting the number of theories 
studied it will be possible more easily to appreciate the full 
context in which the relationship is considered.. -A • 
more general consideration of the subject throughout the period 
would risk .losing the full significance of the treatment 
within specific theories.
The four sources in question, the best known and therefore 
most discussed in the context of general grammar in France, 
may be considered as representative of the concept at their 
particular period, though not without qualification, for on 
the one hand, not only did each carry the author1s own 
particular stamp; on the other, less we'll known personalities 
made notable contributions, from which they were able to 
benefit.
For practical considerations also, the study does not 
explore the phonological or the more purely semantic aspects 
of the theories, but is limited more to the basic principles 
and the processes in accounting for the relationship
of language to thought/ and/the effect of these on grammar.
This study is not concerned with antecedents as such, but, in 
order to attempt to place the theories in their appropriate 
historical perspective, and to give some idea of the heritage 
of ideas and traditions which contributed in some measure to 
the thinking of the French philosopher grammarians, a brief 
summary follows of the main theories and concepts which may be 
regarded as subscribing to :the .notion of universal or 
general grammar.
Also included at Chapter 3, to assist in indicating the 
respective position of the four contributors in the progress 
of the theme of general grammar in France,is a short account 
of its history there during the period from 1600 to the early 
19th century.
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Chapter 2. Universal and General Grammar.
Donze noted in 1967 ^  as did S a h l i n ^  in similar terms 
almost forty years earlier, that "l'histoire de la grammaire 
generale reste a faire". Although more information on the 
subject is now available, a comprehensive major work is still 
lacking.
The term general grammar applies more specifically to 
those theories, such as Port-Royal1s,which aim to consider 
elements of grammar common to all languages. The term philo­
sophical grammar is probably more appropriate to some of the 
later theories which appeared inthe eighteenth century.
* Universal grammar* appears to be used in a more generic sense 
to refer to concepts or theories.relating language to some 
universal aspect of thought. It is consequently difficult to 
provide any definition of universal grammar which can apply, 
other than very broadly, to the various pronouncements, concepts 
and theories which can be related to the term. As Bartlett 
illustrates, universal., general, or philosophical grammar may
be said to have developed from a long history of universal
(3)aspects applied to language . Also, "The particular type of 
universal grammar in vogue is inevitably a reflection of the
(4)
philosophical or logical system underlying it" ' . One cannot 
therefore so much define it as describe its development, which 
authors writing on some aspect of it, or on some specific 
theory, tend to do, though with differing emphasis on the 
subject according to the context to which their account is 
related. Sahlin, in her work on Du Marsais, includes a short 
introductory account of universal grammar^, as does B a r t l e t t ^
1. La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee de Port-Royal, p. 35.
2. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, P.v.
3. Beauzee*s Grammaire Generale, Ch. I.
4. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 155.
5. Ch. I.
6. Beauzee*s Grammaire Generale, Ch. I.
who points out that from the times of Ancient Greece,
universalism tended to be implicit if not explicit in language
and grammar due to its association with philosophical aspects.
Frangois Thurot's Discours Preliminaire to the translation
of James Harris' Hermes reviewed historical developments
prior to the era of general grammar in Europe. A more recent
commentary is included in Padley's Grammatical Theory in
Western Europe 1500-1700, Ch. 4 ^ .  Vivian Salmon provides a
useful resume of relevant works in the century preceding
(2)Descartes
Drawing on these and other works more specific to the 
successive periods, the following commentary, necessarily 
simplified, traces the main landmarks in the progress of 
universal and general grammar.
Padley refers to the idea of universal grammar having
already been mentioned in passing by Aristotle., who regarded
the '’mental affections themselves, of which these words are
(3)primarily signs as the same for all races of men .
Also relevant to the universalism in early Greek thinking, 
and its conceptual influence on later linguistic theories, is 
Peter Salus' view that it is the Platonic notion of 'ideal 
form' realised in various (imperfect) ways in this transient 
world which gave rise to the theory of universals generally
of
and^universal grammar in particular. The universal grammar 
is the ideal abstract form from which the various (imperfect)
1. The dominant theme of this work is the Latin Grammatical 
Tradition. W.K. Percival's review (in Language, 1979, vol.55, 
pp. 679-684) commends Padley's analysis of some hitherto 
poorly known works, such as those of Scaliger and Caramuel, 
but refers to some inaccuracies of fact and interpretation
in relation to other sources.
2. Review of Chomsky, 1966, in Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 5, 
1969, pp0 165-187.
30 Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 154. This was
earlier noted by Vivian Salmon in Review of Chomsky, p. 174.
grammars of real language indirectly draw their morphological 
and syntactic notions
The broad concept of a universal mental basis to language
was thus already evident at an early period. But, as
linguistic enquiries at this early stage were not autonomous
but remained linked with the philosophical thinking of the
time, it may be said that linguistic universals as such had
not been explored, though they were implicit to a certain
extent in the association of aspects of language with philosophy
and logic. Thus,for example, the segregation of noun and
verb by Plato, the first known explicit distinction of parts of
speech, was not on linguistic, but on logical grounds, noun
being that of which some action was predicated, verb what
(2)
was predicated of it . Similarly, Aristotle's view of the
(3)
sentence as affirming or denying a predicate of its subject
(4)provided a logical basis for the sentence form . Robins 
notes that Aristotle did however introduce some formal, op 
intra-linguistic features into his scattered treatment of 
grammatical questions, but their mingling with extra-linguistic 
or 'notional* classifications "seems to give rise to many of 
his difficulties in working out his doctrines and to many of(5)
ours in clarifying the lines of his thinking on grammar" .
1. Universal Grammar 1000-1850, in History of Linguistic
Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, ed. Parret, 1976,p.87.
20 R.H. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in 
Europe, London, 1951, pp. 5, 17-18.
3. Ibid., pp. 18-24.
4. Jean Stefanini (De La Grammaire Aristotelicienne, in La 
Grammaire Generale, PUL,1977) comments on the lasting 
influence of this and other aspects of Aristotelian thinking 
in subsequent grammatical theory.
5. Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe, p. 25.
The nature of these early origins of European grammar was 
to continue to influence it through what may be described as 
two avenues of thought, though they were not always distinct.
One led to traditional grammar, which developed via the StoicsJ 
the Alexandrian School; the first Greek grammar of Dionysius 
Thrax and the later one of Apollonius Dyscolus; and the 
subsequent Latin grammars of the Romans, Priscian and Donatus, 
which followed the pattern set by T h r a x T h e  other avenue, 
philosophical, saw a recurrence, or continuation in some form, 
of certain aspects of the early philosophy from which tradit­
ional grammar had developed, and from which it was hardly 
ever completely free, at least up to the 18th century.
The next period of significance to the theme of universal
grammar was the later Middle Ages, when, stimulated by the
influence of the 'new' philosophy, namely Aristotle re-discovered,
theories were developed which brought together the two schools
of thought affecting grammatical theory, traditional grammar
and Aristotelian philosophy. The culmination of the thinking
of that period lay in the theories of speculative grammar of
the Modistae, the Mediaeval schoolmen. Their forerunners
included Peter Abelard, with his influence in dialectic,
(2 )
William of Conches and his pupil Peter Helias , whose aim.to
provide a philosophical explanation to the rules of Priscian*s
grammar seems to have been the first systematic attempt to
relate the ideas of the 'new1 philosophy to the study of
(3)grammar The Modistae were so called because their theories
of speculative grammar (speculative in the sense of mirroring
1. The main sources consulted are R.H. Robins, Ancient and 
Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, London, 1951?
A Short History of Linguistics, London, 1967, 2nd. Edn. 1979; 
and H. Arens, Sprachwissenschaft; der Gang ihrer Entwicklung 
von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Freiburg-Munchen, 1955, 
second ed., 1969.
2. Although Peter Helias has been generally assigned a leading 
role, more recent research suggests that his teacher, William 
of Conches, played a more significant part than was previously 
recognised. (R.W.Hunt, collected papers on the History of 
Grammar in the Middle Ages, Studies in the History of 
Linguistics, Vol. 5, Amsterdam, 1980).
3. Scholasticism is described as the.result of the integration 
of Aristotelian philosophy, at the hand's of such thinkers as 
St. Thomas Aquinas, into Catholic theology. (Robins, Short 
History of Linguistics, 2nd. Edn., 1979,: p 0 74).
reality) ^  envisaged different 'modes' of signifying.
(2)Roger Bacon, also an important forerunner of the Modistae , 
pointed towards universal grammar in observing two aspects of 
every language, the first kind, proper to a specific language, 
could not become the object of scientific study, but the second, ' 
common to all languages, and concerned with questions such as 
what is a noun, verb, etc., could be taught as true learning
(3)
because its object was universal . Salus considers that the
beginnings of universal grammar are most easily traced to Roger
Bacon and that both Bacon and Kilwardby owed a great deal to
Abelard, for the notion of grammar as a science grew out of his
(4)revival of dialectic . Peter Helias, contrary to Bacon, con­
sidered that there are as many grammatical systems as there 
are languages ^ .
Andre Joly and Jean Stefanini justifiably emphasise "le role
capital des Modistes dans 1 1 elaboration de la grammaire gener-
(6)ale." . Their theories envisaged a universal grammatical 
structure, with the rules of grammar quite independent, as rules, 
of the particular language in which they happen to find realis­
ation ^  .
Though in practice their system was not universal since it 
was allied to the Latin language, albeit of universal signifi­
cance to them, it may be said to have provided a formula 
which allowed for the relationship, in distinct capacities, 
of reality, the way in which the mind grasps reality and the 
way in which it is expressed, in grammar. In potential, the 
formula provided laudable scope for analysis and for separate
1. G.L.Bursill-Hall, Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages, p., 31 .
2. Arens, Sprachwissenschaft, p. 43 also mentions Robert 
Kilwardby in this capacity.
3. Bursill-Hall, Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages,^>p.3o—I.
4. Universal Grammar 1000-1850,p . 88.
5. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe, 
London, 1951, p. 77.
6. La Grammaire Generale Des Modistes aux Ideologues, p. IX.
7. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe, 
pp. 77-79.
consideration of the components. The potential was not however
exploited by the Modistae for their theory was constrained
by the traditional form of grammar and by the prevailing views
on logic. They retained more or less intact the grammatical
system of Donatus and Priscian but re-stated the parts of
speech and their accidents in semantic terms deriving from
contemporary logical theories ^  .* - Their association of
traditional grammar and logic led Robins to comment that many
of the basic principles of scholastic logic were themselves
based on the lexical and grammatical structure of some
"favourite sentence forms" of the classical languages, so that
when logic and metaphysics were used as the basis of grammar,
language was, as it were, "getting its own back1'. The Vmodi
intelligendi , relating to the mind's apprehension, and the
modi essendi ,of things were just a reflection of the modi
(2 )significandi5, relating to grammar . Moreover, the modi
essendi, intelligendi and significandi rested cn the view of
Thomist philosophy that the mind abstracts universals from
(3:)
real properties of particulars and considers them apart 
Since the abstractions, the way of considering them and the 
way of communicating them were all on an a priori universal 
basis, the theoretical potential for distinction was not 
realised in practice.
Norman Kretzmann r in pointing to late mediaeval logic 
(14th-15th century) as perhaps the most promising of all 
possible antecedents to transformational grammar, comments • 
that the mediaeval logicians of that time were engaged on 
what might fairly be described as philosophical grammar.
Among the many topics in late mediaeval logic, Kretzmann 
considers' that the exposition of propositions resembled 
concepts of deep and surface structure and of transformational 
rules^.It may be that here, too, there is an implication of
.„1. Bursill-Hall> Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages. p. a^ .
2. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical•Theory in Europe,
p. 88. .
3. Robins, Short History of Linguistics, p. 87. •
4. Transformationalism and the Port-Royal Grammar, in the
Rieux and Rollin edn. of the Port-Royal Grammar, 1975.
an underlying universality to language, but, pending further^  
information on the subject, it would appear that the theories 
of the Modistae offer the most explicit realisation,>;a± that 
period,of a universal grammar, though with the limitations 
mentioned.
In so far as the earlier period of Humanist grammar is
concerned, Padley sees an increasing tendency to use semantic
criteria, to an extent which anticipated 17th century theory.
"The semantic approach to grammar is not an invention of the
17th century, but the harvest from seeds set at the very
(2)
outset of the new learning.". . In spite of the reaction
against Aristotelian logic, some of his doctrine, comments
Padley, creeps into the grammatical theory of that time. The
early Humanist grammarians upheld "the semantic primacy of
the noun and verb*', and "as early as 14 81 the notion of the
logical proposition, so important for seventeenth-century
grammatical thelory, is already being transferred from dialectics
(3)to grammar" Against these remarks must be taken into
account W.K.Percival*s criticism to the effect that Padley's
(4)emphasis on semantic criteria is over-stated .
1. More publications have become available over the last 
10-15 years on works of the Middle Ages relevant to 
language but Louis G. Kelly (La Grammaire a la Fin Du 
Moyen-Age et Les Universaux pp. 1-10 in La Grammaire 
Generale.Des Modistes Aux Ideologues, 1977) refers to 
every bibliography of universal grammar in the Middle Ages 
being unfortunately incomplete and comments that we are 
only at the beginning of studies on.mediaeval grammar.
He lists the works.which are available. The most recent 
and comprehensive bibliography appears to be that of 
Konrad Koerner, Mediaeval Linguistic Thought, A Compre­
hensive Bibliography, Historiographia Linguistica, Vol. VII, 
1/2 1980, pp. 265-299.
2. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 1500-1700, 
p. 30.
3. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
4. Review of Padley, Language, 1979, Vol. 55, p. 676.
The major Renaissance influences in relation to general
grammar came later in the period. They were J.C.Scaliger,
1484-1558, Ramus (Pierre de la Ramee), 1515-1572 and the
Spaniard,Sanctius (Frhncisco Sanchez de las Brozas), 1523-1601.
Though their work related to Latin grammar, their emphasis
on a philosophical or logical basis to grammar anticipated
the later general grammars, as did some features of their
theories. Both J.C. Chevalier^ and P a d l e y ^  discuss the
work of each at some length and emphasise its importance to
the subsequent progress of French grammar. Features singled
out in particular in relation to Port-Royal theory are
Scaliger's view of the sign and the. proposition, and his use
(3)of the Aristotelian notion of substance and form, and 
Sanctius* use of ellipsis.
(4)
Described by Padley as the first grammarian since the
Modistae deliberately/build a theory of grammar on elements
of Aristotelian philosophy, Scaliger attempts in his De Causis
Linguae Latinae, 1540 to apply Aristotelian methods of
(5)classification to language . Causa materialis is identified 
with phonetics, formalis with the semantic aspects of language,
t c\
efficiens with the speaker and finalis with what is felt .
He uses a similar concept to that of the Modistae in viewing
(7)
words as signs of notions in the mind, mirroring reality 
Port-Royal was to use a different interpretation of the 
application of reason to language, but Scaliger's approach may 
be said to have introduced the idea of a framework or method 
for grammar founded in reason. He aims to show that a language 
functions because it is a system of reason , comments Chevalier.,
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 176-210, 246-307, 333-370.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 1500-1700, pp. 58-110.
3. Ibid., PP. u> i •
4. Ibid., P- 62.
5. Ibid., P- •
00in
6. Ibid., PP. 60-62
7. Ibid., P. 73.
8. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 2 09.
Ramus, strong advocate of delimitation of branches of 
learning, insisted that grammatical categories must be 
classified within a logical framework, though their grammati­
cal meanings are determined formally by morphological ele­
ments Grammar was envisaged on two levels, functioning
in parallel: a form of expression consisting of the order
and form of its terms, and a form related to content, cor-
(2)responding to logical analysis .
The view of a logical basis to language is evident in 
Sanctius1 use of ellipsis, applied extensively in his Minerva 
(1587) to demonstrate that each phrase can be traced back to
(3) •
a so-called logical type . Chevalier sees this work as
leading towards the formation of a syntax whose nature is
(4)other than that of morphology .
Ellipsis is not a newly noted phenomenon. It had already
(5)been evident in Priscian's work It appears however to
have been given a specific role by Sanctius and by the English 
Humanist grammarian Thomas Linacre, before him. Linacre 
envisaged a division of syntax into two varieties, constructio 
justa and constructio figurata. Justa is regarded as the 
statement in full of figurata in which all elements are not
/g\
realised . Padley describes Linacre as ifthe only early
humanist to give ellipsis an extended treatment comparable to
and even surpassing, that of Sanctius'*, though others, e.g.
(7)Despauterius also applied it .
1. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p . 9 3.
2. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 279.
3. Sahlin, Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 12.
4. Histoire de la Syntaxe,p. 366.
5. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 183.
6. Ibid., p. 54.
-  ±  -
In the seventeenth century, the theme of a universal
grammar typical of all languages became explicit in various
works throughout Europe. Vivian Salmon comments that it
was probably Francis Bacon1s German contemporary, J.H. Alsted,
who first used the term *general grammar* in the modern period
(1630), contrasting it with special grammar. Salmon also
refers to Alsted as one of the logicians who attempted to
equate logical categories representing mental discourse with
grammatical categories representing the spoken expression.
He also acknowledged the generative power of logic Padley
refers to the first self-consciously universal grammars having
appeared in such works as Christopher Helwig*s Libri Didacti,
a treatment of four classical languages prefaced by a universal
(2)grammar, 1619 . Important representatives of philosophical
grammar with universal pretensions were Tommaso Campanella
(1568-1639) and the Spanish bishop Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz
(1606-1682), both in many respects showing a return to
(3)scholastic views on universal grammar . Campanella*s avowed
(4)aim was the reconstruction of scholastic philosophy .
Defining grammar as a science, he distinguished between
fcivilis*, resting on the authority of the best authors, and
(5)'philosophica*, based on reason . (There is a similarity 
here with Bacon*s view below.) Caramuel*s Grammatica Audax 
(1654) defines speculative grammar as that which pertains to 
no particular region or people but whose *meditationes
/(T\
abstractissimae* provide laws appropriate to all languages
1. Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 5, pp. 170-176.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 157.
3. Ibid. Salmon refers to Campanella and Caramuel as probably 
the most important of Port-Royal*s predecessors. (Journal 
of Linguistics, 1969, Vol. 5, pp. 172-173),.
4. .Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 160.
5. Ibid., pp. 161-2.
60 Ibid., p. 180.
In England, Francis Bacon*s pronouncements on philosophical 
grammar distinguished between a literary or popular grammar, 
and philosophical grammar which, "should diligently .inquire 
not the analogy of words with one another but the analogy 
between words and things, or reason"; not going, so■••fair,, however 
as that interpretation which belongs to l o g i c . Padley 
refers to Bacon's suggestion being echoed in Bassett Jones1 
Herm*aelogium, 1659, in which there is an attempt to classify 
words according as they denote being, notion or quality. He 
describes Jones' standpoint, a year before the Port-Royal 
Grammaire Generale, as that of a universal grammarian.
" ... the nations differing in vocality .... do nevertheless 
in point of syntax agree as one."/2^. Another English work, 
that of John Wallis, Grammatica Linguae Anglicicanae 1653, 
is referred to,in a note to the 1780 edition of Arnauld's works, 
as providing a considerable contribution to philosophical 
grammar, earning the author a distinguished place among the 
founders of general grammar. The work was praised by Beauzde,
(3V
but seems to have been unknown to Arnauld- . .
A. Richardson' s 'Logician's Schoolmaster',. 1657, is
instanced by Padley as reflecting the growing tendency to
regard gra,mma,r as the handmaid of logic, "reason can be clothed
(4)
in diverse surface structures and remain the same" .
(5)Described by Padley as the first thoroughgbing attempt 
at a, universal grammar after Wilkins , A.Lane's Rational and 
Speedy Method, 1695, appears to include a translation of the 
Port-Royal Grammaire Gdndrale ^  .
1. Works, 4,441 and 3,401, quoted in Current Trends in 
Linguistics, Vol. 13, The Seventeenth Century, p . 286.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 156.
3. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 456-^458, 485.
4. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. .184,
5. Ibid.,. p. 208.
6. Current Trends in Linguistics, 13, p. 311, source, I.Poldauf.
Another stream of thinking, related to the question of 
universal grammar and partly arising from growing dissatis­
faction with the use of an outmoded language, Latin, led to 
schemes for universal languages. The movement was most 
marked in England where John Wilkins is regarded as the most 
important of the 1language planners1^ ^ . His Essay Concerning 
a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, 1668, is
described by H CE. Brekle as representing the most highly
(2)
developed work of its kind . Others associated with the 
movement include George Dalgarno and Francis Lodwick, in 
England, and abroad, Leibniz and the Moravian scholar
(3)
Comenius . Interest in the subject appears to have flagged
in the first part of the seventeenth century but was revived
later due to the spread of Leibniz* ideas and to consideration
of the question in France by the Ideologues, where interest
in the problem was stimulated by discussion on problems
(4)associated with the origin of language .
The close incidence of the dates of these various works of 
the seventeenth century obviously makes it difficult to 
consider them in terms of precedents or influences. To a 
certain extent they had a common European heritage and must 
also have been influenced by the thinking of the day, though 
whereas in France the rationalist influence would be marked, 
in England, the lead came from Francis Bacon's empiricism.
The incidence and number of works in Europe subsequent to 
the appearance of the Port-Royal grammar indicate that the 
theme of general grammar was dominated by the French scene/ 
especially in the eighteenth century. Padley refers to the 
influence of the Port-Royal theory on European grammarians 
being immense, but neither direct, nor undelayed, "it had no
1. . Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 184-209.
2. Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol. .13, p. 305.
3. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp./ 184-209.
4. James Knowlson, Universal Language Schemes in England and 
France, 1600-1800, Toronto, 1975. This work appears to 
be the most comprehensive source on universal language 
schemes.
appreciable effect in England before the publication of
Brightland's grammar, 1711, nor in Germany until late eighteenth
century, and by this time, the influence was no longer presented
in its original f o r m . " ^ .  Christian Wolff's Verminftige
Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen,relating
(2 )to general grammar, appeared in 1729 . Peter Salus refers
to J.S. Vater's Versuch einer allgemeinen Sprachlehre (1801)
(3)as one of the most interesting non-English works after Hermes 
In England the outstanding work of this kind was James Harris' 
Herm<
1751
mes, or a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar 
(4)
Burggraff's Principes de Grammaire Generale appeared in
(5V
1863 , but Salus refers to Sir John Stoddart's The Philosophy
of Language, 1849, as the last truly universalist work.
Stoddart describes universal grammar as a science, which 
is subject to the universal principles which govern the human 
mind; particular grammar as an art. He acknowledges his 
indebtedness to four sources, Sanctius, Vossius, the Port-Royal 
authors and Harris, and mentions Beauzee with praise, but, 
comments Salus,"the laurels throughout go to Sanctius and 
Harris(6V".
Attempts at some form of general grammar were evident in 
Europe earlier this century, namely L. Hjelmslev's Principes 
de Grammaire Gendrale, Copenhagen, 1928, and V. Br<j>ndal's 
Les parties du discours, Copenhagen, 1948, in which the 
Aristotelian categories of substance, quantity, quality and
(7)
relation were suggested as a basis of classification
1. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 223.
2. Sahlin, Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 70
3o Universal Grammar 1000-1850, in Parret, 197 6, p.97.
4. Briefly described by R.H. Robins in Short History of 
Linguistics, 2nd. Edn., 1979, pp. 153-155.
5. Sahlin, Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 5.
60 Universal Grammar 1000-1850, in Parret, 1976, p. 100.
7. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 158.
Chapter 3. General Grammar in France.
Although the Port-Royal Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee 
enjoyed considerable prestige in the period following its 
publication, there appears to have been no notable attempt 
to exploit or develop the work during the remainder of the 
seventeenth century. Chevalier attributes this to the 
ambiguity of its dual tendency, logical and pedagogical, and 
to the diffused state of grammar at the time, with the diversity 
of models and aims calling for synthesis. He regards Pere 
Buffier's Grammaire of 1709, some fifty years after the public­
ation of the Port-Royal Grammaire, as the departure point for 
the philosophical grammar of the Encvclopedistes, and as the 
first among efforts to purify the state of g r a m m a r .
The development of general grammar in the eighteenth century
(2 )
is seen by Brunot as falling into three periods.
The effort of the grammarians of the first period was mainly
(3)
aimed at freeing French grammar from subservience to Latin 
The Port-Royal grammar had set the precedent for this, and for 
the mentalist basis which persisted in the thinking of the later
(4)
grammarians . Duclos and Fromant, who added Remarques and 
Supplement respectively to the 1754 and 1769 reprints of -the Port- 
Royal Grammaire Generale, are included among the grammarians of 
this period, as are those who produced treatises on grammar, 
among them Buffier, Restaut ^  , De Waill}^ and Regnier-Desmarais. 
Also included are D 1Olivet and l'abbe Girard whose Synonymes 
frangais (1716), establishing his reputation as grammairien-
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 540-541.
2. Histoire de la Langue Frangaise, Tome VI, La Grammaire 
Philosophique, le XVIIIe siecle, pp. 899-920.
3. Ibid., p. 902.
4. Harnois, Les Theories du Langage en France de 1660 a 1821,p.30.
5. Les Principes gdneraux et raisonne de la grammaire frangaise, 
1730, not very novel according to Chevalier (Histoire de la 
Syntaxe, p. 615) .
6. Principes Generaux et particuliers de la langue frangaise.
philosophe, encouraged expectations that he would advance the
penetration of philosophy into French grammar Although
Chevalier acknowledges his role in establishing clear rules
(2)of grammatical construction , it appears that his major
work, Vrais principes de la langue frangaise (1747), did not
(3)fulfil expectations .
Inclusion of the two main contributors on grammar to the
Encyclopedie, Du Marsais,and Beauzee, his successor, in the
(4)second period of general grammar , is appropriate, not 
least in relation to differences in their conceptual approach 
from that of the earlier period.
Chevalier describes the attempt at a detailed formalisation
of grammar linked to general principles as the work of several
grammarians,writing at a time of intense intellectual activity
around 1750. At the pedagogical level this was evident in
new methods of Latin instruction such as those.of Pluche and
Chompre and by exploitation of the methods of Du Marsais, Fremy
and d'Agarq. At the theoretical level the work consisted in
the efforts centred round the Encyclopedie. Du Marsais appears
to have been at the heart of this thinking "d'essence cartesienne
et leibnizienne, mais qui a pour point de depart la Grammaire
Generate de Port-Royal et les developpements qu'en ont tires
(5)des grammairiens comme Buffier et Restaut." .
Hans Aarsleff claims that there is strong evidence that 
universal grammar as a philosophical and theoretical discipline 
had lapsed during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
gaining fresh importance only after the stimulus from
1. Brunot, Histoire de la Langue Frangaise, Vol. VI, Pt.II, p.902«.
2. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 682.
30 Brunot, Vol. VI, p. 902.
4. Ibid.
5. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 650.
discussion on the origin of language had, thanks to Condillac, 
created renewed interest in linguistic theory. In support 
he refers to the lack of new editions of the Port-Royal 
grammar between 1709 and 1754
Whether there was a fall in interest, or a gestation period,
(2)or whether, as Harnois suggests , the very renown of the Port-
Royal grammar had inhibited the development of. further theories
of general grammar (at least for some 50 years), the
strong emphasis on the conceptual character of general grammar,
very evident in the Port-Royal theory, is again obvious from
the time of the grammar of the Encyclopedie. Harnois* view
of language and thought being examined *selon un parallelisme
(3)constant1 ' , valid for Port-Royal, applies also to the 
Enlightenment, though the nature of the relationship changes.
Indicative of this emphasis on the conception of grammar
as a formulation of underlying thought are- remarks such as
*Avec Du Marsais, la grammaire generale s'enfonce toujours
(4)davantage dans l1abstraction* , and Sahlin*s view (though
coloured by her concentration on grammatical rather than
philosophical aspects) that after Du Marsais, grammaire generale
was to degenerate to the point of being nothing more than
vague speculations on operations of mind with its objective
as the analysis of thought by means of language rather than
(5)as the explanation of the facts of language 7 . . This implies 
a paradox in view of the description of the philosopher 
grammarians in the later period as empiricist.
1. The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of .the Origin of
Language in the 18th Century and the Debate in the Berlin 
Academy before Herder0 In Dell Hymes, Studies in the 
History of Linguistics, p. 115.
2. Les Theories du Langage en France de 1660 a 1821, p. 10.
3. Ibid. , ,p. 7. . « ' ■ ■ • .
4. Brunot, Vol. V, p. 903.
5. Introduction, Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais.
Brunot*s third and last period of general grammar was 
dominated by the theories of Condillac and the Ideologues.
The stimulus given to the question of the origin of language 
by Condillac*s theory is recognised in Aarsleff's comment 
that it is * characteristic that the late eighteenth century 
and early nineteenth understood the terms * universal grammar* 
and *grammaire generale* to include the problem of the origin 
of language in its Condillacian formulation* ^ . The extended 
scope of linguistic enquiry was evident in such works as 
President de Brosses* Traite de la formation mecanique des 
langues et des principes physiques de l'etymologie (1765)
and Court de Gebelin’s Monde primitif analyse et compare
(2) * 
avec le monde moderae (1774-1782) . The discussion on the
(3)origin of language was not confined to France .
Increasingly popular for a while, 'grammaire generale*
became officially instituted in education at the time of the
Revolution, but as an applied discipline it proved unsuccessful,
due, apparently, to excessive zeal in the application of
(4)general rules . There was growing emphasis on philosophy 
and on the teaching of logic at the time, and it was pre­
dominantly with the aim of perfecting the art of reasoning
that Destutt de Tracy and Dieudonne Thiebault, among others,
(5)published their grammars , among the last of the period.
1. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 94.
2. Brunot, Vol. VI, p. 910.
3. Parsons, Historical inquiries into the affinity and origin 
of the European languages, 1767, and Herder, Dissertation 
sur la premiere origine de langues, are instanced in Brunot, 
p. 910. James Burnett (Lord Montboddo) wrote a treatise
'Of the origin and progress of language', 1773-92, referred 
to by R.H. Robins, Short History of Linguistics, p. 158.
4. Brunot, Vol. VI, pp. 912-916. Droz provides details of the
reason for the failure of the subject in the Ecoles
centrales (Introduction to Thiebault's Grammaire Philo- 
sophique, p. 44) .
5. Ibid., p. 913.
Thiebault*s Grammaire Philosophique, ou la metaphysique, la 
logique et la grammaire, reunies en un seul corps de doctrine, 
1802, appears to be representative of the current move towards 
fusion of grammar and logic. D r o z ^  describes it as having 
lost all respect for frontiers. It is interesting to note that 
Thiebault, in his preface to the work quotes the Port-Royal 
Logique, in which Ramus* delineation of the arts is opposed, in 
support of his merging of the three subjects in one doctrine - 
"il n*y a pour toutes les trois, qu*un seul et meme sujet a 
approfondir11.
Condillac*s and de Tracy's theories were still in fashion 
in 1815, but their popularity was subsequently affected by
(2)the philosophical and literary reaction of the Restoration 
Evidence indicates that the specifically French phase of 
general grammar may be regarded as having run its course by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Some features of the late eighteenth century theories,
however, foreshadowed those of nineteenth century linguistics.
(3)Droz refers, in discussing Frangois Thurot, to the duality
of a grammaire generale already looking toward comparative
grammar, being common to almost all the Ideologues. Aarsleff
considers that certain principles about thought and language,
found in Humboldt's work, are similar to Condillac's ideas.
He also sees aspects of Condillac's and de Tracy's theories as
having some affinity with the two closely linked principles
which permeate Humboldt's work, namely, the deep subjectivity
(4)of language, and its strongly social motivation .
1. Introduction to the 1977 reprint, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.
2. Harnois, Les Theories du Langage en France de 1660 a 1821,
p. 62.
3. Introduction to Thiebault's Grammaire Philosophique.
4. Guillaume de Humboldt et La Pensee Linguistique des
Ideologues, in La Grammaire Generale des Modistes aux 
Ideologues, Lille, 1977, pp. 224-233.
'Part: 2.. Section 1.
Port-Royal
Chapter I Introduction
The grammatical theory of the 'Messieurs de Port-Royal'^
attracted no noteworthy interest beyond the eighteenth
century, and, on the whole, any comment in the intervening
period up to recent times has tended to be unfavourable
(2)or unenthusiastic . In contrast, particularly as Chomsky
attributed an initiating role to Port-Roval in a "Cartesian
(3)approach to language" , and even considered the developing
theory of transformational generative grammar to be an
essentially modern and more explicit version of the Port-Royal
(4)theory, their work became the subject of considerable 
discussion following the publication of Cartesian Linguistics 
in 1966.
Current interest in the theories of Port-Roval and other 
philosopher grammarians has moved beyond the context of 
'Cartesian linguistics', but, because so much discussion on 
such theories, and on that of Port-Royal in particular,
1'. A detailed history of the famous Petites Ecoles of Port- 
Royal and of the 'Messieurs' or 'Solitaires', as they are 
variously called, the community's leading educators, is 
to be found in Sainte-Beuve's work, 'Port-Royal', 3 vols., 
Bibl. de la Pleiade, Paris 1953-1955.
2. Dale A. Myers and Larry H. Hillman, in their respective 
dissertations, include summaries of comments by various 
authors in the pre-Chomsky period which illustrate the 
lack of enthusiasm for Port-Royal grammatical theory during 
that time, apart from a small number of exceptions, and 
the surge of interest thereafter. (Dale A. Myers, The 
Port-Royal Grammar, An Edition of the 1753 English Trans­
lation,, University of Florida 19 70; Larry H. Hillman, 
Vaugelas and the Port-Royal Grammar, usage and reason in 
17th century French grammar, Cornell University, 1972) .
3. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 33
4 . Ibid., p. 39
-  -
arose from Chomsky*s work, and since some of the points 
of argument are pertinent to this study, the following 
paragraphs briefly indicate the main issues raised.
Chomsky*s claims of similarity between the theories of 
philosophical grammar and that of transformational grammar 
extended to various authors of the seventeenth and eight­
eenth centuries but were mainly related to the Port-Royal 
Grammaire Gendrale et Raisonnee of Antoine Arnauld 
(1612-1694) and Claude Lancelot (1615 or 1616-1695), and 
La Logique ou l'Art de Penser of Antoine Arnauld and 
Pierre Nicole (1625-1695), the best known works of Port- 
Royal relevant to l a n g u a g e ^ .
Chomsky*s conception of the 'creative aspect of language
(2)use' , man's ability to form stimulus free novel state­
ments, is seen by him to be evident in Descartes' view of
. human language as free of the type of mechanistic stimulus
(3)operative with animals . Descartes' distinction between 
body and mind,which lay behind this view, was also reflected 
in an inner and outer aspect to language, the outer aspect 
appropriate to the sounds of the linguistic sign, the inner
1. Unless otherwise indicated, references to La Logique 
relate to the text of the 5th edition of 1683, published 
by Flammarion, 1970 and in the case of the Grammaire 
Generale, relate to the text of the 1830 edition, pub­
lished by Republications Paulet, 1969.
A full list of editions of the Grammaire Generale and of 
associated works is/included in H. E. Brekle's 1966 
facsimile reprint of the 1676 edition of the work, 
(Friedrich Fromman Verlag, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt). More 
recent comments by Brekle on the editions of the Grammaire 
are included in his article on the Seventeenth Century, 
Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol.13, Mouton 1975, and 
in Historiographia; Linguistica II, 2, 223-231, 1975.
Also of interest is R. Mathieson's Review of publications 
of works by Arnauld (Language 46, 126-130, 1970).
2. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 3.
3. Ibid., pp. 3-13.
one to the way in which it signifies thought. A sentence
may be considered from its 1 surface or its deep structure1,
and these need not be i d e n t i c a l ^ . This latter point,
considers Chomsky, is "brought out with particular clarity
in the Port-Royal Grammar, in which a Cartesian approach to
language is developed, for the first time, with considerable
(2)insight and subtlety ..." . Chomsky also regards the
Port-Royal Grammar as initiating the tradition of philosophical
(3)grammar .
Much.of the discussion and criticism which followed the
publication of Cartesian Linguistics was directed at
contesting the initiating role attributed to Port-Royal both
in philosophical grammar and in applying a form of 'deep
and surface structure' to grammar. Also contested was the
extent of Cartesian influence on Port-Royal and the
representation as Cartesian of features considered to be
either not specific to or not appropriate to Cartesian philo-
(4)sophy . As a result there have been useful contributions 
to knowledge of Port-Royal's antecedents, though to some 
extent, concentration, at least in the early stages of the 
discussion, on questions of historical validity tended to 
overshadow consideration of aspects more specific to Port- 
Royal's theory. The relative lack of discussion on the 
Parallels drawn by Chomsky between Port-Roval theory and 
that of transformational grammar drew from Padlev the comment
1. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
2. Ibid., p. 33 and Language and Mind, p. 16.
3. Language and Mind, p. 16.
4. H. E. Brekle, in his article on the Seventeenth Century
(Current Trends in Linguistics, 13, pp. 335-347) provides 
a resume of the reviews of Chomsky 19 66 and of,the main 
contributions to ongoing discussion of Port-Royal 
linguistics. Jacques Rieux and Bernard E. Rollin also 
provide a resume of the challenges to Chomsky's picture 
of the Port-Royal Grammar in the introduction to their 
English translation of the work (The Port-Roval Grammar 
Janua Linguarum minor 208, Mouton, 1975).
"It is a great pity that the absorbing interest of the 
parallels Chomsky draws ... has been largely obscured by the 
furore aroused by his misreading of linguistic history, and 
by his attribution to Cartesian philosophy of concepts which 
had been common currency among grammarians and logicians 
for centuries1 ^  .
Chomskyfs views on Port-Royal's work and cn.other theories 
of general grammar have apparently been formulated in the 
limited context of comparison with his own theory, and there 
is evidence that, in addition to some historical inaccuracies, 
he has not fully penetrated the details of the former theories. 
But he appears to be the first modern author to have concen­
trated specifically on the Port-Royal theory in its role of 
linking the mental processes with language, a fundamental 
feature of its conceptual basis.
Apart from specific aspects of the theory itself, other 
matters such as its role, and that of its authors, and the 
factors which could be regarded as influencing their thinking, 
have received a fair amount of attention. Such factors will be 
the subject of chapters 2 and 3, the subsequent chapters of 
this section being devoted to features of the theory itself.
Roland Donze's publication on the Port-Royal Grammaire
(2)
Generale . i s  the only modern major work which concentrates 
exclusively on their grammatical theory. It is generally 
acknowledged, and justifiably so, as the most comprehensive
(3)
and impartial work yet published on the Grammaire . The 
only adverse criticism appears to be by Brekle, who comments
1. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 1500-1700, p. 216.
2. La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee de Port-Royal, Berne, 
1967.
3. By, among others, R. A. Hall Jr. Acta Linguistica Hafniensa,
1969, p. 219, Brekle, Current Trends in Linguistics, 13,
pp. 343-344.
that Donze might have paid more attention to recent developments 
in the fields of semiotics and linguistics, in which case he 
might have found it easier to cope with a number of theoretical 
p r o b l e m s T h o u g h  his emphasis is on the grammatical aspects 
of the theory, Donze does to some extent take account of its 
conceptual nature. Other notable sources of pertinent comment 
on the latter aspect are J. C. Chevalier's Histoire de la 
Syntaxe, M. Foucault's Introduction to the Paulet edition of 
the Grammaire, 1969, G. R. Padley's Grammatical Theory in 
Western Europe, 1500-1700 and, more recently, Sylvain Auroux'
La semiotique des encyclopedistes, 1979 and Andre Robinet's 
Le Langage a l'Age Classique, 19 78.
1. Current Trends in Linguistics, 13, p. 344.
Chapter 2. The M.ain Works and their Authors.
However justified challenges to claims of originality 
on their behalf may be, there is general agreement that the 
Port-Royal authors were largely responsible for a trend in 
general grammar ^  , certainly in France, which persisted 
through the eighteenth century. Although the later philosopher 
grammarians who subscribed to the concept of general grammar 
did not necessarily retain the same theoretical basis, or 
provide the same grammatical explanations, the Port-Royal 
authors continued to be generally held in high esteem during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
This continued regard is evident in the number and nature 
of references to them in the works of their successors, and 
in the number of editions of the Grammaire, and to a lesser 
extent of the Logique, which followed the first publication 
of these works.
The extent of their influence does not however go un­
challenged. Daniel Droixhe, for instance, refers to the 
numerous volumes of "Remarques, Observations, Reflexions et 
Doutes", after 1660, testifying to the dominant persistence
of Vaugelas* method, compared with the relatively few
(2)emulations of Port-Royal*s work . Andre Joly, instancing 
Diderot’s description of the Grammaire Generale as an *essai 
superficiel*, refers to their work sometimes being judged
(3)
severely in the second half of the eighteenth century .
1. Robert A. Hall Jr. names the various authors who recognised 
that Port-Royal was a prime source of the Universal Grammar 
movement of the 18th century (Acta Linguistica Hafniensa, 
1969, p. 207). G. Padley (Grammatical Theory in Western 
Europe, 1500-1700, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 222, 223) comments 
that it started a veritable vogue for general grammar.
2. La Linguistique et l'appel de l'histoire, 1600-1800, Geneva, 
1978, p. 15.
3. Introduction to F. Thurot, Tableau des Progres de la Science 
Grammaticale ("Discours Preliminaire a Hermes"), Edns. 
Ducros, 1970,p . 30.
Certainly the various works of general grammar which
succeeded the Port-Roval Grammaire took issue on many points
of detail, apart from differing in certain basic principles.
On the other hand, the work of the Solitaires still appears
to have been regarded as an inspiration a century later.
In the context of education, Condillac was able to refer to
them as being the first to introduce a new approach.
"Messieurs de Port-Royal ont les premiers porte la lumiere
dans les livres elementaires. Cette lumiere, il est vrai,
etait faible encore; mais enfin c'est avec eux que nous avons
commence a voir . . . " ^ .  Guy Harnois refers to a new
conceptual approach with Port-Royal. "Avec la Grammaire
Generale de Port-Royal commence l'etat metaphysique ou
abstrait", the Middle Ages and the Renaissance being ident-
(2)ified with an 'etat theologique ou fictif* . The idea of a
continuing conceptual approach, though an evolving one,-is also
implied by Sylvain Auroux. "La grammaire gendrale n'est pas
au XVIIIe siecle un champ morcele; c'est un champ en travail,
et ce qui travaille en lui c'est encore le projet de Port-
Royal; l'oeuvre de Beauzde est la maturite de ce qu'autrefois
(3)Lancelot avait propose comme theme de reflexion: . ..."
An undisputed reason for the success of the Grammaire 
Generale is the fact that it was virtually the first work of 
its kind, with the exception of that of the Italian, Benedetto 
Buonmattei, to relate to a language other than Latin. Buon- 
mattei's Della Lingua Toscana of 1643 is referred to as the 
earliest application of philosophical grammar to a modern
1. Grammaire, Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac, Vol. I, 
p. 427. ed. Georges Le Roy, Paris, 1947-51.
2. Les Theories du Langage en France de 1660 a 1821, Ch. I, 
Etudes Frangaises, no. 17, Paris, 1929.
3. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, Paris, 1979, p. 213.
spoken language, but the Port-Royal work was generally more 
influential because of the prestige of France in Louis XIV* s 
reign^^. Donze refers to the noveltyof putting a philo­
sophical essay within the reach of the non-Latin reader, a 
fact which must have given the Port-Royal Grammaire consider­
ably more influence than the preceding Latin treatises of
(2 )
Scaliger, Sanctius and Campanella .
That in itself seems unlikely to have been sufficient to
ensure its appeal. The fact that it emanated from the
Solitaires of the Petites Ecoles of Port-Royal, who, apart
from their role as educators, were well known for their
persistent adherance to Jansenism in the face of Jesuit and
official opposition,must also have played a part in its
(3)success .
It was usual in the 17th and 18th centuries for the 
Grammaire and the Logique to be considered together. As
(4)
evidence for this, Donze refers to the comments of 
Frangois Thurot which also testify to the continuing esteem 
in which the works were held.
"Les deux ouvrages de ce genre auxquels il a eu part, 
feront a jamais epoque, l'un dans la philosophie grammaticale, 
et l'autre dans la science du raisonnement. On sent que je 
veux parler de deux livres si connus et si generalement 
estimes ... " ^  .
1. J. R. Howe, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Grammars,
in Dell Hymes, Studies in the History of Linguistics,
pp. 366—367.
2. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p.7.
3. Robinet comments: "Si Port-Royal, sa Grammaire (1660) et 
sa Logique (1662), se composent et s fimposent dans les 
publications de cette decade, la raison en est august- 
inienne (Le Langage a l fAge Classique, p. 9).
4. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 13.
5. Tableau des progres de la science grammaticale, Discours
preliminaire a Hermes, Edns. Ducros, 19 70.
Lancelot1s earlier works,the Nouvelle Methode pour 
apprendre la langue l a t i n e ^  and similar Methodes for Greek, 
Spanish and Italian, do not appear to have been associated 
with the Grammaire and Logique, but they were important 
pedagogically. The Nouvelle Methode latine features in 
modern discussion because, in its 5th edition of 1656, it 
gives prominence to the use of ellipsis in converting figur­
ative phrases to the simple underlying ones, Lancelot openly 
acknowledging a debt to Sanc.tius in this respect. R. Lakoff 
considers that it is in this work rather than in the Grammaire
Generale> which appears to have an explanatory role, that
(2 )
a form of deep and surface structure is described .
Her views on the aims cf the two works are echoed by
Padley who considers it paradoxical, given Port-Royal's
emphasis on the proposition, that the Grammaire contains so
little on syntax, and inclines to the thought that the
"Nouvelle Methode latine is the best illustration of what
is specifically linguistic in Port-Royal theorv, the grammar
(3)being conceived as an accompanying explanatory manual".-
Whereas'-Lakoff-does" hot specifically refer to the Logique,.
and her views therefore do not appear to take into account
the conceptual basis of the grammatical work, Padley
more appropriately adds that if one treats the Nouvelle Methode
latine, the Grammaire and the Logique as one grammatico-
logical work in three volumes, the result is an imposing and
(4)
coherent body of doctrine and practice .
1. Nouvelle Methode pour apprendre facilement et en peu de 
temps la langue latine, 5th ed., Paris, 1656. The first 
two editions of this work, first published in 1644, were 
written before the availability of the Sanctius1 Minerva, 
following which Lancelot extended considerably his treat­
ment of sentence construction. The additions, discussed 
by Lakoff (1969) and referred to by Donze (La Grammaire 
Generale et Raisonnee, p. 3) were first noted by Sahlin. 
(Cesar Chesnau du Marsais et son role dans devolution
de la grammaire generale, 1928, p. 13).
2. Review of Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee. Language 45 (2) , 
343.64 1969) .
3. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 256.
4. Ibid.
Although the three works doubtless reflect the practices 
and the views of the Port-Royal educators as they had evolved, 
there is no indication that it was the express intention of 
the authors to plan the works as a complete body of doctrine, 
though each does complement the other in certain respects.
The well quoted preface to the Grammaire, ostensibly 
written by Lancelot, refers, in modest terms, to ,fce petit 
traite" having been composed from the reflections dictated 
by Arnauld "ci des heures perdues", and arising from discussion 
on the reasons why some things are common to all languages 
and some particular to a f e w ^ .
The immediate circumstances which resulted in the com­
pilation of the Logique appear to have been even more a
(2 )
matter of chance and are described in the Avis to the work 
"La naissance de ce petit ouvrage est due entierement au 
hasard et plutot a une espece de divertissement, q u 1a un 
dessin serieux". Following a chance remark by a nobleman to 
the young Due de Chevreuse that in his youth he had, within 
a fortnight been taught a section of logic, Arnauld, who was 
present, undertook to set down, in four or five days, every­
thing of substance in the subject. The task induced new 
reflections, and these, and subsequent discussions and col­
laboration with various sources resulted, through several 
editions, in a gradually extended work.
Evidence from the publications themselves indicates that 
even if 'the theory'did’no't crystallise for some time, much of 
the thinking which went towards it was already current at the 
school. On the other hand, there are indications that 
Arnauld, the main proponent of the /conceptual basis of.the theory,
1. Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 3.
2. Logique, p. 29.
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either had not taken it to its later stage at the time when 
Lancelot*s earlier linguistic works were published, or had 
not discussed his more advanced thinking with Lancelot. By 
the time the Grammaire and the Logique appeared, although 
neither work in itself can be regarded as providing an account 
of the grammatical theory in its entirety, they complemented 
each other. Although the Logique appeared two years later 
than the Grammaire, there is evidence that they were compiled 
at the same time, if not jointly, at least complementarity^•
While the Nouvelles Methodes are acknowledged to be
essentially the work of Lancelot, the extent of each author*s
contribution to the Grammaire and the Logique seems open to
(2 )some speculation. Donze refers to the rule of anonymity 
at Port-Royal as an obstacle to knowing the details of 
collaboration.
That Arnauld was primarily concerned with the thought behind
language and was chiefly responsible for the Logique is
generally accepted, as indicated by Donze. "Partant, en
philosophe, de 1 *analyse de la pensee, il etait inevitable qu'il
s *interessat, plutot qu*a 1 *etude materielle des formes linguis-
tiques, a celle des concepts et des rapports qu*ils entretiennent
(3)avec les termes qui les expriment .." . Pierre Nicole,who
has received the least publicity of the three, appears to be the 
author of the Avis, the Discours, and most of the additions to 
the Logique. Close collaboration between Arnauld and Nicole was
1. Donz§ (Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 18) refers to a 
letter from Arnauld to Mme. la Marquise de Sable on a 
"discours que nous avons pense de mettre a la tete de nos 
Logiques" (Oeuvres tome I, Lettre XCVI, p. 206) and also - 
comments that even if the sudden decision to write a manual 
of logic was due entirely to chance, the rapid realisation 
of the project shows that Arnauld was not completely 
unprepared.
2. Ibid., p. 13.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
likely on the first three parts, but the fourth part, com­
pletely Cartesian in its inspiration, would be exclusively 
the work of Arnauld. "Quoi qu'il en soft, ce dernier parait 
avoir ete 1 *inspirateur de ce qui fit 1 *originalite de 
1 1ouvrage, 1 1esprit qui le conforma aux idees nouvelles qui 
en imposa la realisation^ ^  .
Donzd and Lakoff urge that Lancelot’s role should not be
(3)
underestimated in the field of language and grammar. Donze 
considers that although Lancelot modestly attributes the 
leading role to Arnauld, in his Preface to the Grammaire, 
the latter was apparently not well versed in grammatical 
tradition and Lancelot’s own contribution, given the content ' 
of the Grammaire, must have been appreciable.
(4)
Brekle refers to 1'Abbe Fromant’s acceptance of Arnauld 
as. the author (supplement to the edition of 1756, p. VII), 
but it is not clear whether this acceptance relies on any­
thing other than Lancelot’s acknowledgement in the Preface. 
Brekle also notes that Fromant proves indirectly that the 
essential definition of the verb, that of affirmation, is 
not Lancelot’s. In the second edition, 1650, of his Nouvelle 
Methode latine, Lancelot follows Scaliger and Sanctius in 
defining the verb as a word which signifies etre, agir or 
partir. The 8th edition of the Methode, 1681, however, 
conforms to the Grammaire in giving the essence of the verb 
as affirmation only.
1 . Ibid., p. 17.
2. Evidence is provided~in the Clair et Girbal Edition of the 
Logique, 1965,p . 365.
3. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 15.
4. Introduction to the 1966 facsimile impression of the 3rd 
edition, 1676 of the Grammaire.
As the role of affirmation attributed to the verb is an
important part of Port-Royal1s conceptual theory, the verb
representing the action of mind in affirming or joining,
this is an indication that the Nouvelle Methode latine had
been compiled without Lancelot being aware of the conceptual
basis of the theory which subsequently became evident from
the Grammaire Generale and the Logique. Since the 5th
edition of the Methode also made no mention of the verb in
its capacity of affirmation^ and it was in this edition
that Lancelot made extensive use of Sanctius1 method of
restoring ; glided elements to reconstruct the full form of
the sentence, it follows also that Lancelot had not at that
time associated this method with the conceptual basis of
the Port-Royal theory. Lancelot himself provides evidence
that the conceptual basis was due to Arnauld:'s.- thinking.
" ... mes questions m§mes onbete cause qu'il (Arnauld) a:fait
diverses reflexions sur les vrais fondements de l'art de
parler, dont m'ayant entretenu dans la conversation, je les
trouvai si solides, que je me fis conscience de les laisser
perdre, n'ayant rien vu dans les anciens Grammairiens, ni dans
les nouveaux, qui fut plus curieux ou plus juste sur cette 
(2)matiere." .
1. The 8th Edition (Paris, 1681) contains, under the heading, 
'De la nature et de la signification des Verbes1, the 
comment "Le raisonnement de ces Auteurs (Scaliger and 
Sanctius) comme nous i'avons fait voir dans la Grammaire 
Gdnerale, ch. 12, n'est venu que de ce qu'ils n'ont pas 
assez compris la nature essentielle du Verbe qui n'est 
pas autre que de marquer 1 1 affirmation." (Ibid. p. 458). 
The corresponding chapter in the 5th Edition has as a 
commencing statement, "Qu'il n'y a que deux sortes de 
Verbes, Actifs et Passifs." (Ibid. p. 499).
2. Preface, Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee.
A view, supported by evidence from the Port-Royal pub­
lications, of progress in three stages towards the Grammaire 
Generale, is provided by Robinet.
Lancelot approached general grammar through seeking a 
new method of language instruction. The first stage was 
exemplified by the first two editions of his Nouvelle 
Methode latine, based on the method of the particularist 
grammarians. The third and subsequent editions, represent­
ing the second stage, were generalist in character through 
adopting the ideas of the earlier generalists, Scaliger, 
Sanctius (especially), and more recently, Scioppius and 
Vossius. Thanks to these authors, his new publication 
expounded grammar "selon les termes exprimes dans leur 
ordre nature!", repondant a des "maximes assurees", a des 
"regies stables", ayant "une entiere certitude", faisant 
preuve "dfordre, de liaison et de rapport, que les pierres 
doivent avoir dans 1 'ensemble de l 1edifice", et-oh le 
principal theme devient celui de la "construction", "simple" 
ou "figuree".^^ Robinet's quotations are illustrative of 
the extent to which Port-Roval theory was indebted to the 
earlier generalist grammarians in matters of syntax'.
The third stage, Arnauld's contribution, acknowledged
(2 )by Lancelot in the Preface to the Grammaire was achieved 
with the inclusion of the true bases of general grammar, 
novel to Lanclot. Port-Royal's grammar was therefore not 
new in the capacity of general grammar but in incorporating
1. Le Langage a l'Age Classique, p. 29.
2 . "... mes questions m§mes ont ete cause qu'il a fait 
diverses reflexions sur les vrais fondements de l'art de 
Parler..." quoted above.
the fundamentals of general grammar, "directement tires 
de 1 *augustinisiredominant^ de la pensee d'Arnauld, tres 
secondairement de son cartesianisme," and in its applicat­
ion to French as much as to Latin. The true bases were
those expounded in the Logique, which brought about a
(2)change in the philosophy of the sign- .
1.„ Le Langage a l'Age Classique, pp. 28-29.
This anticipates the question of Augustinian influence 
on the Port-Roval concept of the sign, dealt with in 
Chapter 7 of this section.
2. Ibid.
Chapter 3. The Formative Influences.
In addition to the acknowledged debt to the more immediate 
influence of Sanctius, Port-Royal grammatical theory, no less 
than any other of that period, owed much to the long heritage 
of Grammar^ and philosophy outlined in Part I of this study. 
The general question of Port-Royal*s antecedents has been 
regarded as a matter of some importance. Donze considered 
that the ’origines doctrinales* of the Grammaire would be of 
the greatest interest, but there were difficulties in under­
taking a study of them at the then current state of research,
( 2 ) 'and his own work examined the theory as a 'systeme clos*
(3)
Jacques Rieux and Bernard E. Rollin commented that a full 
and definitive Study of the historical antecedents and 
influences relevant to the work remained to be done, and, 
until accomplished, it was difficult to assess the originality 
of Arnauld*s and Lancelot*s contribution.
The most recent consideration of Port-Royal*s antecedents
(4)appears to be that provided by Padley , who emphasises that 
their grammatical works are derivative, the sources being 
mediaeval tradition, and the more immediate influences of 
Scaliger, Sanctius, Caramuel and Campanella. However,
1. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 49 0.
2. Foreword, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnde de Port-Royal.
3. The Port-Royal Grammar, translated by Jacques Rieux and
Bernard Rollin, Mouton, Janua Linguarum, 208, 1975, 
Introduction.
4. Padley comments that: "In view of the importance of the
Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee for eighteenth-century 
grammatical theory, it is curious that its historical 
antecedents have never been thoroughly investigated." 
(Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 219) .
the interest does not consist in demonstrating their ante­
cedents, but "in the situating of the Grammaire Generale 
and the Nouvelle Methode latine within a developing tradition 
which includes them". ^  . They used notions which had been 
known to Latin scholars for a long time, namely that "language 
is a rational phenomenon, whose underlying ratio can be
(2 )
stated, and whose causde are amenable to logical analysis" .
Padley consequently has reservations about Chevalier*s
(3)
claims that Port-Royal showed a completely new approach 
in the way it applied logic to grammar, but agrees with him
that, by the late seventeenth century, grammatical theorv
(4) "had reached an impasse . It faced the alternatives of the
inherited mixed formal-semasiological approach, a rigid
formalism of the type suggested by Ramus, or the mentalist
type of approach pursued by Scaliger, Sanctius, Caramuel
(5)and Campanella .
While Chevalier acknowledges that Port-Roval had the 
benefit of several centuries of reflexion on grammar, and 
of progress made in grammatical theory by Ramus, Sanctius 
and their disciples, he also refers to influences on their 
theory which derive from the impact of modern language study
and from progress in philosophical thought, notably the
(6) ~
principles of Descartes' method .
1. Ibid./ p. 257. .
2. Ibid. pp. 258-259.
3. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 490-1, 499.
4. Ibid. pp. 503-505.
5. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 258-9.
6 . Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 490.
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The developments in grammar arising from confrontation .with
modernslanguages, ’.particularly- French, are dealt with at
(1)some length by Chevalier , whose conclusions include the
comment :" ... il est constant que les cadres d 1analyse,
elabores au contact des langues anciennes ne conviennent
(2 )pas aux langues modernes ..." . The structure of modern
languages indicated a need for more general principles than
(3)those prevailing in formal grammar .
The determination of a limited number of principles, in 
the Cartesian sense, was incompatible with a system of 
heavily inventoried formal features such as had developed 
in Latin grammar. Ramus and Sanctius had taken formalism 
to its limits with some positive results, but with rules 
being established at the level of discourse, exceptions 
exceeded principles. Sanctius, through the use of ellipsis, 
made a notable attempt at determining an explanatory code, 
but there was no distinct medium for the code,•ellipsis 
relative to a logical value not being clearly distinguished 
from ellipsis in rhetoric, because the medium applied to
(4)
both was language . Chevalier sees Port-Royal’s version 
of a logical basis to grammar as an attempt to overcome 
such ambiguity, by using logic as the 'technical' language, 
or meta-language. The risk in this method is of an arbitrary 
linguistic analysis, but at least the problem took on a
(5)
modern formulation . The unsatisfactory state of grammar 
had also induced the thinker to look beyond language and 
concentrate on pre-existent m e a n i n g ^  .
1. .Ibid.', Troisieme Partie.
2. Ibid. p. 478.
3. Ibid. p. 502.
4. Ibid., pp. 502-3.
5. Ibid., p, 502. ,
6. Ibid., p. 504.
The Port-Royal authors, more especially Lancelot, the 
specialist in language teaching, were brought into direct 
contact with the kind of problems involved in applying 
grammatical rules to modern languages, through their 
adoption of the new method of teaching languages through 
the mother tongue. Both Chevalier and Michael Foucault 
see the importance of this pedagogic initiative in encour­
aging Port-Roval to concentrate on meaning and to look for 
general principles in language. Before Port-Roval, analysis 
of meaning was inserted into a formal framework; with 
Port-Royal meaning took priority and logical relations 
dominated the form. The preceding 1grammairiens philosophes1 
had laid the basis for such an analysis but "... il fallait
decrire une langue moderne pour en tirer les consequences..
„(D 
• • • •
Foucault sees,as a consequence of the resulting concen­
tration on general principles, a conception of language in 
two stages; the manifest one of sentences, words, and speech, 
and the underlying stage of principles which need to account
for the observable facts. Language was also freed from
questions such as the natural or conventional origin of
words, the values of etymology and the reality of universals.
(2 )The task ahead was to seek the reasons for usage .
The incentive to seek general principles is recognised 
by Lancelot in the preface to the Grammaire where he refers to 
his work with the grammars of different languages leading 
him often to enquire into the reasons why some features are 
either common to all languages cr particular to a few .
1. Ibid. p. 491.
2. Introduction to La'Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, ed. 
Paulet, 1969, pp.vii-ix.
3. Ibid. p. 3.
Of contemporary influences, that of Descartes is the 
one more readily discussed in the context of Port-Royal 
grammatical theory, partly because of Port-Royal's endorse­
ment of some of his theory and partly because of Chomsky's 
references to the Cartesian inspiration behind Port-Royal's 
doctrine.
It has been pointed out by, among others, Donze, Droixhe
and Z i m m e r t h a t  Descartes said little of direct relevance
to language. Apart from the context of Cartesian Linguistics,
(2)modern discussion on his work in a linguistic context 
appears to have concentrated on his views, in the 5th part, 
of his Discours de la Methode, of language, as a tool of 
reason in human beings, distinguishing man from animals.
This view is echoed in the Grammaire Generale.
"II nous reste a examiner ce qu'elle (la parole) a de
spirituel, qui fait l'un des plus grands avantages de l'homme
au-dessus de tous les autres animaux, et qui est une des
plus grandes preuves de la raison: c'est 1 'usage que nous
(3)en faisons pour signifier nos pensees, .
1. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 225.
Zimmer, International Journal of American Linguistics, 
vol. XXXIV, 1968.
Droixhe, "Outre les deux lettres a Mersenne du 20 novembre 
et 18 decembre 1629 et la Cinquieme partie du Discours de 
la methode (1637), ce sont en effet les deux celebres 
lettres au marquis de Newcastle du 23 novembre 1646 et 
a Henry More du 5 fevrier 1649 qui offrent l'essentiel 
de la conception cartesienne du langage". La Linguistique 
et l'appel de 1 'histoire (1600-1800), p. 16.
2. Gunderson, Descartes, La Mettrie, languages and machines,
1964. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 
vbi.-XXXIX, No. 149, 1964, pp. 193-222.
S. K. Land, The Cartesian Language Test and Professor Chomsky, 
Linguistics 122 , 1974 , ’pp.' 11-24 . ' ’ .
3. Grammaire Generale, Pt. II, ch. 1, p. 22.
It is difficult to deny that, even though Descartes
himself had little to say about language, and even though
aspects of his philosophy to which Port-Royal subscribed,
for instance, the doctrine of ideas, the cult of reason and
and the following of a method, were by no means original 
(1 y
to Descartes , the Port-Royal theory was directly 
influenced by Descartes.
It is in the Logique, rather than the Grammaire, that
this influence is evident. Donze refers to the Cartesian
influence deeply penetrating the spirit and form of the 
(2)work . Although Arnauld, probably more influenced by
the philosopher than were his colleagues, was not always
(3)in agreement with him , he praises Descartes' clarity 
of mind and acknowledges him as a source of some of the 
content of the Logique. The material used is essentially 
in Part IV, De la Methode.
Padley considers that, given the importance of mental
operations for Cartesian philosophy, it is no accident that
the publication should be sub-titled 'L'art de penser' , and
describes it as "the manual of Cartesianism, the logic
which Descartes should have written but did not .... the
(4)application of principles contained in the Discours"
• 1. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, *pp76, 96, 239.
2. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 19.
3. P. Nicole is said to have„ been less convinced of the value 
of Cartesianism, and Arnauld's disagreements with Descartes 
have been pointed out. (Padley, p. 10). Ste Beuve noted 
reservations in the application of his philosophy. Far 
from building "toute une philosophie sur un premier fait 
interieur", Arnauld and Nicole were content with simply
an application of his rules. (Port-Royal, LIV, Ch. Ill, 
ed. de la Pleiade, t. II, p. 480, referred to by Donze,
La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 19).
4. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 228.
He also notes that the educational practice of the Petites 
Ecoles de Port-Royal was based on Cartesianism, on pedagogic 
reform and opposition to the Universities/and that the 
application of the philosophy of Descartes in teaching was 
the subject of strong Jesuit opposition^.
The opinion has been fairly frequently put forward that
Cartesianism was accepted at Port-Royal only in so far as
it was compatible with Augustinianism, a doctrine strongly
supported by the Port-Royal Solitaires as fervent Jansenists.
(2)The main source for the argument is Genevieve Rodis-Lewis .
It is also supported by Jan Miel who emphasised the dominant
Augustinian influence in arguing that Port-Royal was more
indebted to Pascal, strong supporter of the Jansenist cause,
(3}
than to Descartes, than is generally recognised' .
Andre Robinet also particularly emphasises the influence
of Augustinianism on Port-Royal linguistic theory, even
going so far as to say that without Augustine Vs De Magistro
and De Doctrina Christiana there would have been no Grammaire,
(4)no Logique and no Petites Ecoles .
Miel*s' claims that Port-Roval was indebted to Pascal in 
linguistics matters are considered by Brekle to be over­
stated but he agrees, however, that Pascal had considerable 
influence on the Logique, except for the linguistic and
semiotic aspects of this work, which rely heavily on the
(5)Augustinian doctrine of signs . The inclusion of- material
from Pascal*s De 1*Esprit §§ometrique is acknowledged in 
/ \
the Logique .
1. Ibid. p. 210.
2. Augustinisme et Cartesianisme a Port-Royal, in Descartes 
et le Cartesianisme Hollandais, 1950. W. & M. Kneale 
also took this view. (The Development of Logic, p. 316) .
3. Pascal, Port-Royal and Cartesian Linguistics, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 30, 1969, pp. 261-271.
4. Le Langage a l*Age Classique, Paris, 1978, p. 9.
5. Current Trends in Linguistics, vol. 13, p. 337.
6. Premier Discours, p. 41.
Cartesianism is also seen as coming together in the work 
of Port-Royal with another main current of thought, namely 
that traceable from the speculative grammar of the Middle 
Ages, through humanist philosophical grammar. Sahlin 
took this view^1^, but Donze, while recognising the combining 
of the two influences in Port-Royal theory, points out that 
she did so through misinterpreting Arnauld's attitude towards 
the two methods, analysis, advocated by Descartes in his 
Recherche de la Verite, appropriate to research, and syn­
thesis, appropriate to demonstration and in sympathy with 
the scholastic deductive method. She erroneously saw the
amalgamation of the two traditions arising from a stand by
(2 )
Arnauld in favour of the scholastic method. .
Donze rightly refers to Arnauld's recognition of the 
two methods as complementary, in the Logique,(Part IV, chs.
II and III),and emphasises that it was not due to any mis­
understanding on Arnauld's part that the scholastic in­
fluence on Port-Royal became combined with that of Cartesian 
philosophy.
He adds that, following the researches*, of Etienne Gilson
on the role of mediaeval thought in the formation of
Descartes' system, the meeting of these two traditions
(3)
should come as no surprise .
While the influences of Augustine, Descartes and Pascal 
may be regarded as fundamental to Port-Royal's theory, the 
more immediate seventeenth century characteristics of reason, 
in its contemporary clothing of 'bon sens', and usage were 
also evident.
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, pp. 14-16.
2. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, pp. 26-27.
3. Ibid.
Reason, though not defined by the authors, is identified 
with 'bon sens' in the Logique. There is nothing more 
estimable in distinguishing truth and falsehood than 'le 
bon sens et la justesse de 1'esprit'. Other qualities of 
the mind have limited uses but the exactitude of reason is 
generally useful in all aspects of l i f e ^ .
Normally associated more with Cartesian rationalism, 
Port-Royal's use of reason has tended to be seen in opposition 
to the principle of usage followed by Vaugelas. Padley, 
for instance, refers to the Grammaire Generale as represent­
ing in part a reaction against the contemporary pre-occupation 
with style and usage, and refers to the Port-Royalist
(2 )polemics with Pere P. Bouhours,a supporter of Vaugelas .
Some authors, on the other hhnd, consider that the Solitaires 
were closer to Vaugelas than has generally been acknowledged.
Larry Hillman sees in the Port-Royal grammar a mixture
of Cartesian rationalism and the more general reason of the
salons which was the basis of classicism, and he provides
evidence to illustrate that "in their brief history of
persecution and dispersion, the Messieurs of Port-Royal were
never able to isolate themselves from the world jof Paris
(3)and honnetes gens, nor did they try ..." . In support of
his claims in respect of the influence of usage on Port-Royal, 
Hillman instances the number of references by the authors 
to Vaugelas, mostly implying acknowledgement of him as an 
authority, and mentions their concession to the role of usage 
in the interests of style, in cases where there are irregular­
ities in grammar and therefore cases of divergence from
(4)rational patterns
1. Logique, Premier Discours, p. 35.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 220.
3. Vaugelas and the Port-Royal Grammar; Usage and Reason
in 17th Century French Grammar. Diss. Cornell University, 
1972, pp. 186-191.
.4. Ibid.
' - R. A. H a l l ^  , in discussing the common ground between 
Port-Royal and Vaugelas, considers the bases on which they 
operated were essentially the same. Their common approach 
to language included formulation in terms of rules rather 
than of descriptive statements; use of ellipsis as a 
grammatical technique; a belief in correctness, to be 
imposed by an authority, and the recognition of usage as 
one of those authorities. Differences sprang mainly from 
their divergent aims.
(2)W. Keith Percival challenges Chomsky's view that the 
new approach of Port-Royal to language was reaction against 
the pure descriptivism which had held sway prior to the 
appearance of the Grammaire. He sees common ground between 
Port-Royal and Vaugelas on the primacy of usage and the 
desirability of providing explanations, and in their 
acceptance that not all features of normal linguistic usage 
can be rationally accounted for, but considers that Port- 
Royal differed from Vaugelas in attempting to explain more 
facts and in the type of explanations. He concludes that 
Port-Royal did not repudiate Vaugelas, they transcended 
him completely, and in this process incorporated many of 
his ideas.
That Port-Royal recognised the importance of usage, though
upholding the primacy o f v rational bases of language, is
supported by references in the.Grammaire. Expressions .
authorised by general and uncontested usage must be accepted
as valid, even when contrary to the rules and the analogy
of language, but they should not be a reason for casting
(3)doubt on the rules' . . .
1. Some recent studies on Port-Royal and Vaugelas, Acta 
Linguistica Hafriiensa, 1969, pp. 207-233.
2. The Notion of usage in Vaugelas and in the Port-Roval 
Grammar (in Parret, 1976, pp. 374-382).
3. Grammaire Generale, Pt. II, ch. X, p. 61.
An important feature which permeates the thinking of 
Arnauld is his strong opposition, specifically directed 
against Ramus, to the delineation of the boundaries of the 
various disciplines. In the Premier Discours of the 
Logique he criticises Ramus and the Ramistes for restricting 
the jurisdiction of each science, commenting that everyone 
has the right to arrange knowledge according to need, and 
that if anything should be of assistance in forming judgment, 
it matters little to which science it belongs.
Vivian S a l m o n ^  refers to the question of delimiting 
rhetoric, grammar and logic as one of the most important 
debates of the 17th century and earlier, in which the Port- 
Royal Logique explicitly, and the Grammaire implicitly, 
play a part.
She sees the three arts of language fused in the Grammaire.
From grammar, Port-Royal took over the traditional description
of sounds, parts of speech and grammatical markings; from
logic, the distinction into two major word groups, those
signifying objects of our thoughts and those signifying
(2)manner of thought , as well as the three operations of mind 
and the reduction of complex sentences to simple subject/ 
predicate propositions; and from rhetoric (Sanctius1 Minerva), 
the concept of the ideal sentence on which various operations 
of ellipsis are performed to produce surface structures.
The way in which Port-Royal authors applied and interpreted 
features from earlier theory will become evident in the 
subsequent chapters.
1. Review of Chomsky, 1966, Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 5, 
1969, p.168.
2. The definitions are based on Aristotelian distinctions, but, 
as will be indicated, the Port-Royal application of the 
distinctions is novel.
Chapter 4 The Conceptual Basis of Port-Royal
Grammatical Theory
Padley justifiably comments that the operations of 
mind and the existence of mental concepts as ideas are 
basic to both the Logique and the Grammaire G e n e r a t e ^ . 
But as the Logique is the dominant inspiration behind 
the mentalist basis of the theory, it is the source of 
most of the material in this chapter, which concerns 
the Port-Royal view of the nature of thought and its 
processes.
The relationship of the Logique . .to . grammatical
theory is not immediately obvious'. Modern discussion of
Port-Royal1s grammatical work has more often concentrated
on the Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee and the Nouvelle
Methode latine, though authors engaged in more extensive
(2 )
appraisal of Port-Royal theory take the Logique into 
account.
The Port-Royal approach to logic, shared by others of
(3Vthe period and subsequently , was to regard it as the
art of managing one'sreason. "La Logique est L'Art de
bien conduire sa raison dans la connaissance des choses,
tant pour s'en.instruire soi-m§me, que pour en instruire
(4)les autres." ■ As well as Arnauld and Nicole, Descartes,
1. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 1500-1700, p. 230.
2. Including Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe; Donze,
. Grammaire Generate; Padley, Grammatical Theory in
Western Europe; and Robinet, Le Langage a l fAge Classique.
3. W & M; Kneale comment that the general conception of 
logic which it expounded was to continue to dominate
the treatment of the subject by most philosophers for the 
next 200 years (The Development of Logic, p. 320, 1962).
4. Logique, p. 59.
Malebranche, Spinoza, Bacon, Locke and Condillac are
included by Emile Charles ^  . among those who understand
logic as the art of directing the operations of the
understanding. Padley refers to Descartes1 Rules for
the Direction of the Mind, which advocated this view of 
(2Vlogic' . Descartes * condemnation of "traditional
Aristotelian logics which presupposed a body of knowledge
(3)rather than being instruments of discovery... " is
echoed in the Logique*s criticism of Aristotle*s cate- 
f 4 Vgories , and Padley refers to the Logique as answering 
Descartes* requirements, as it is a theory of enquiry
(5}
rather than a theory of communication . It has also 
be£n referred to as a supplement to Descartes* M e t h o d e ^ .
So,, the Logique, as the extended title indicates, is 
about thinking. • "La Logique ou l'Art de Penser, contenant, 
outre les regies communes, plusieurs observations nouvelles, 
propres a former le jugement." In discussing the use of 
the title, "L'Art de Penser" rather than "L'Art de Bien 
Raisonner" (which seems more appropriate to the purpose 
of the work) the authors say that the aim of the Logique 
is to give rules for all the actions of the mind, for 
simple ideas, as well as for judgments and reasonings, 
and the word 'pensee* includes them all, " ... car les 
simples idees sont les pensees, et les raisonnements sont 
des pensees." "L'Art de bien Penser"is not necessary
(7)
because 'L'Art' implies 'de bien faire quelque chose'.
1. La Logique, Paris, 1869 edn. p. 37.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 228.
3. Ibid.-
4. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. III.
5. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 229.
6. La Logique, Clair et Girbal edn. pp. 366-367.
7. Logique, Second Discours •, p. 48.
Ostensibly, the work therefore does not relate to 
language, but because language has been introduced for 
communication, through habit, things in the mind become 
associated with the words which represent them. So "il 
est necessaire dans la Logique de considerer les idees 
jointes aux mots, et les mots joints aux idees" It
consequently contains much material which is relevant 
to the way in which thought is presented in language.
This is not given in a comprehensive exposition, from 
the linguistic point of view, but interspersed, according 
to the context relevant to thought,throughout the Logique.
Guidance on the art of thinking comes from reflecting
on the four main operations of mind, conception,
judging, reasoning and arranging (concevoir, juger,
(2 y
raisonner and ordonner) . Although the more emotive 
concepts, e.g. wanting, commanding, are .referred to in 
the Logique and the Grammaire, it is the four main oper­
ations of the mind which provide the framework of the 
Logique. The first two, which play a vital role in the 
Port-Royal view of the proposition and of the functions 
of words, are also particularly basic to the Grammaire.
The Grammaire, in fact, refers to only the first three 
operations ^  .
The first three parts of the Logique correspond to
the customary divisions of treatises on logic, but the
(4) (5)fourth part is an innovation . Clair and Girbal
note that the general plan, resting on the distinction
of the four operations of the mind appeared common about
1660 and had been followed by Ramus and Gassendi.
1. Ibid., Preamble to Pt. I, p. 60.
2. Ibid., p . 59.
3. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, p. 23.
4. W. & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 317.
5. La Logique, 19 65 edri., p. 2.
Similarities between the divisions in the Logique and 
those of Scholastic logicians and Ramus and Bacon are 
however regarded by Padley as purely superficial;
Port-Royal were not in favour of Scholasticism or 
Ramistic logic
The Port-Royal definition of the four operations of 
mind is:-
(2V'Concevoir' : the simple view of things presented to 
our minds, without forming from it any express judgment, 
and the form in which we present these things is called 
idea.
'Juger': the action which, joining various ideas, affirms 
or denies of one that it is the other.
'Raisonner1: the action whereby a judgment is formed of 
several others.
'Ordonner': the arrangement of various ideas, judgments 
and reasonings on the same subject into the most appropr­
iate form for imparting knowledge on the subject, other-
(3)
wise known as method
1. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 228-229. 
The Logique includes some criticisms of these, in 
the Premier and Second Discours.
2. The term 'concevoir1 is usually translated as'to 
perceive* in the context of the Logique but this 
does not adequately convey the author's intention, 
which is the formation of ideas. Padley's 'concept 
formation' (Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 
1500-1700, p. 228) is more appropriate. The term 
'conceive* will be used in this study.
3. Logique, Preamble to Pt. I, p- 59.
oThat the operations are i n n a t e ^  is indicated by
the authors1 comment that they are performed naturally:
nature has provided th&:means to carry them out in
endowing us with reason. The art of logic does not
consist in finding the means to carry out the operations
(2)but to reflect on what nature causes us to do .
The source of the mental operations is the soul,
*ctme*/ the thinking substance. The Cartesian distinction
between soul and body is evident. "Ainsi trouvant en
nous-memes deux idees, celle de la substance qui pense,
et celle de la substance etendue, il arrive souvent que
lorsque nous considerons notre ame qui est la substance
qui pense, nous y melons insensiblement quelque chose de
I 1idee de la substance etendue." The inspiration from
St. Augustine*s thinking about the soul is also acknowledged
(3)in this context , m  discussing the problem of identify­
ing its true nature despite the intrusion of corporeal 
objects.
1. Chomsky*s references to the innate mental organising 
principles of * Cartesian linguistics*, which make 
language learning possible and are the cause of 
language universals (Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 59-73) 
gave rise to some discussion, including David E.
Cooper*s Innateness: Old and New (Philosophical Review,
81 (1972) pp. 465-483) and Chomsky*s reply 
(Philosophical Review, 84: 70-87), H. Bracken*s Innate 
Ideas, Then and Now, Dialogue, vol. 6 , 1967, pp. 334-346.
Rieux and Rollin (Introduction to Port-Royal 
Grammar) refer also to R. Edgley's Innate Ideas on 
Knowledge and Necessity (Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lectures, Vol. 3, 1968-9, 1970, 1-34)*, Sidney Hook^ 
Language and Philosophy 1969, 51-223; Zeno Vendler,
Res Cogitans, 1972.
2. Logique, Preamble to Pt. I, p. 60.
3. Ibid., Pt. II, Ch. VII, pp. 172-173.
The term 'esprit' is also referred to as the thinking 
substance^ and mostly appears to be synonymous with 
'cirne' in this capacity, but is sometimes associated 
specifically with the powers of the intellect, whereas
'Sine1 also experiences emotions and sensations received
(2) (3}
through the body . Whereas 'ame* is immortal ,
'esprit' apparently, in the sense of limited intellect,
is finite ^  .
In general those subscribing to the dualist Cartesian 
conception of body and soul appear to have regarded
'esprit' and 'ame* , the principle of thought, as one
C5V •and the same .
It is implicit that eachoof the mind's operations
depends on the previous one. To judge requires the
conception of more than one idea? to reason requires
two or more judgments, and arrangement into a method
requires the material of the resulting facts and 
(6)reasonings .
The interdependence of the mind's operations is 
referred to in the Grammaire, where it is pointed out 
that knowledge of what occurs in the mind is necessary
1. Ibid., p. 172.
2. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. I, p. 24.
3. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. XII, p. 120,
4. Ibid., Ch. IX, p. 1020
5. In his Notes Directed Against a Certain Programme,
Descartes identifies Human Mind with Rational Soul. 
Haldane and Ross, vol. 1, p. 431. For Geraud de 
Cordemoy, the terms were synonymous. "Qui dit Ame 
ou Esprit (car c'est ici la meme chose ...)"
(Sixieme Discours, quoted by H. E. Brekle in the
1970 publication of the facsimile of the 1677
edition of Discours Physique de la Parole, pp. xx-xxi).
6 . Logique, Preamble to Pt. I, pp. 59-60.
to understand the bases of grammar, on which the diversity 
of the words which form speech depends. As the third 
operation is merely an extension of the>.second, it is 
sufficient in the context of grammar to consider the first 
two, or rather that of the first operation which is 
included in the second, for men rarely speak to simply 
express what they conceive but almost always to express 
the judgments formed from their conceptions^"^.
Donze criticises this interdependence on two counts.
The Port-Royal view of raisonner as an extension of the
second operation, 1juger1, inhibits the theory of
reasoning from leading to consideration of the liaison
of propositions between themselves. Secondly, to say
(2)
that man only speaks to express what he affirms, not 
what he conceives amounts to saying that the concepts 
represented by words only concern the* grammarian in so 
far as they become elements in an utterance. This 
could have undesirable results, but Donze acknowledges
that there is little trace of such consequences in the
, (3) work .
In itself, such criticism appears valid, but it is 
directed at points which are fundamental to the theory 
and which, if altered or eliminated would undermine the 
conceptual basis. For Port-Royal, as will become 
evident, the vital nucleus is the proposition, as a .. 
judgment. The authors, comments Chevalier, are concerned
1. Grammaire Gendrale, Pt. II, Ch. I, p. 23.
2. The actual words of the Grammaire are "... car les
hommes ne parlent guere pour exprimer ce qu'ils
congoivent, mais c'est presque toujours pour 
exprimer les jugements qu'ils font des choses qu'ils 
congoivent.11 (Grammaire, Pt. II, Ch. I, p. 23).
(The underlining is mine).
3. Donze, La Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee, p. 130.
to determine the constituent elements of the judgment/
to provide a solid basis to the third stage of thought,
r e a s o n i n g ^ . "La Grammaire que contient la Logique
est fondee sur la notion de proposition et de groupe-
(2)
ment de propositions ..."
The initiating role of the first action of mind,
'concevoir1, which produces ideas, is acknowledged by 
the comment that as we have no knowledge of that which 
is outside ourselves except through the intervention 
of ideas within, the reflections on the subject of 
ideas form perhaps the most important part of the
(3)
Logique because it is the basis of all the rest .
Although the authors provide no definition of idea,
considering it to be.one of those so clear and distinct
(4)
as to require none , the extensive discussion on various
aspects of the term indicates its importance in the
authors1 thinking, and provides ample evidence of their
conception of its nature. This conception, which is
also evident in the thinking of Augustine and Descartes,
was to have important repercussions on the Port-Royal
(5)view of the word as sign .
In discussing ideas according to their nature, a 
distinction is made between imagination, that is, 
consideration of images which arrive in the brain through 
the senses, and pure intellection, which produces true 
ideas; "Lors done que nous parIons des idees, nous 
n !appelons point de ce nom les images qui sont peintes 
en la fantaisie, mais tout ce qui est dans notre esprit, 
lorsque nous pouvons dire avec verite, que nous concevons
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 518.
2. Ibid., p. 538.
3. Logique, Pt. I, Preamble, p. 63.
4. Ibid., Ch. I, p. 25 and Ch. XIII, p. 125.
5. Discussed in Chapter 7.
une chose, de quelque maniere que nous la concevons
The view that all ideas come through the senses is
refuted. No idea in the mind has its origin through the
senses, except in so far as movements caused in the
brain stimulate the mind to form ideas which would not
otherwise have occurred.. But, almost always, these
ideas contain nothing similar to what occurs in the
senses and the brain, and many ideas which owe absolutely
nothing to any corporeal image can in no way be
(2 )
attributed to the senses .
The common ground with Descartes and Augustine is 
indicated by Arnauld in Objections IV to Descartes1 
Meditations. "... i wholly approve of M. Descartes1 
teaching, relative to the distinction between the 
imagination and thought or intelligence, and of the 
greater certainty attaching to that which we grasp by 
reason than to what is perceived by the senses. For
(3)
long ago, I learned from St. Augustine ... " . This
is also corroborated in Descartes1 definition of idea
in 1Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God and
the Distinction between Soul and Body*. "... nay to
such images I here decidedly refute the title of ideas
in so far as they are pictures in the corporeal
(4)imagination."
Reference has been made to ambiguity and lack of
(5)clarity in Descartes1 various pronouncements on 'idea1 , 
but it is generally accepted that essentially, the 
thinking of Port-Royal and of Descartes on the matter
1. Logique, Pt; II, Ch. I, p. 67.
2. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
30 Descartes' Philosophical Works, Haldane and Ross,
vol. II, p. 86.
4. Ibid., p. 52.
5. Sylvain Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes, 
pp. 25-26 (discussed in Part 2, Section 2 of this 
study), and Chomsky; Cartesian Linguistics, pp.97-98) •
coincides. Padley considers that Port-Royal1s conception
of idea is obviously from that innDescartes' Meditations
III. "Of my thoughts some are, so to speak images of
things, and to these alone is the title 'idea* properly
applied; ... But other thoughts possess other forms as
well. For example in willing, fearing, approving, denying,
though I always perceive something as the subject of
the action of my mind, yet by this action I always add
something else to the idea which I have of the thing; and
of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or
affections, and others judgments."^  Padley describes
this as none other than the 'adaequatio rei et intellectus'
of the Thomists, their view that the mind is by its
(2)nature predisposed to arrive at the truth . Chomsky 
refers to the usage of the term 'idea1, evident in other 
references of Descartes, namely, anything that can be
conceived (not merely imagined), as the one carried over
(3)to the Port-Royal Logique,, ♦ But he is also inclined to 
regard in this sense 'proposition1 as an idea, and this 
goes beyond Port-Royal*s restriction of the term, by 
definition, to the operation of 'concevoir*. Propositions 
introduce the further action of judgment, though, as will 
become evident, there is some justification for Chomsky's 
view since it seems possible to regard certain complex 
ideas as containing an underlying proposition.
The ideas resulting from the first operation of mind
'concevoir1, are considered in relation to their objects,
(4)namely, what is conceived . Everything conceived is
1. Haldane and Ross, vol. I, p. 159.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 226, 240.
3. Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 97-98.
4. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. II, Des Idees Considerees selon 
Leurs Objets.
represented to the mind as s u b s t a n c e ^ , manner of substance,
(2)or as modified substance.
Substance is conceived as existing on its own and as
the subject of everything conceived in it, manner, or mode,
or attribute or quality is that which, being conceived
in the substance and not able to exist apart from it,
determines it to be of a certain kind and to be named
accordingly. Modified substance occurs when the idea of
the manner or mode, e.g. rondeur, is joined to the substance, 
_ (3)e.g. corps rond .
To judge is to affirm that a substance which we conceive
is or is not so, as when, having conceived 'la terre' and
(4)'rondeur' , it is affirmed of 'la terre' that it is
'ronde'. In the expression, 'terre' and 'ronde' belong to
the first operation of mind, 'concevoir' because they form
the object of thought. The liaison 'est' belongs to the
second, 'juger', the action of the mind, the manner in which
(5)we think . Chevalier refers to 'terre' and 'ronde' as
the elements of judgment, with the verb as the means of
(6 )establishing the judgment
1. The Aristotelian categories of substance and form persist.
(Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 244) .
2. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 73.
3. Ibid.
4. This contrasts with the earlier reference in the Logique, 
p. 59. "Lorsqu'ayant 1'idee de la terre et l'idee de 
rond, j'affirme que ... " The replacement of 'rond' by 
'rondeur' allows for the separate perception of the 
quality of roundness, which, when joined to the substance, 
modifies it and becomes the attribute 'rond'.
5. Grammaire, Pt. II, Ch. I, pp. 23-24.
6. Histoire.de la Syntaxe, p. 504.
There is an apparent anomaly here in that, whereas 
modified substance, 1 corps rond* is an object of per­
ception, 'le corps est rond' would be a judgment. It is 
moreover acknowledged, in considering complex terms 
which in this case would be 'corps rond', that they may 
equally be expressed by using the relative pronoun and 
incidental proposition without changing the meaning, and 
that, moreover, the relative is always in some way under­
stood, even if not expressed. 'Un corps rond' would 
thus be 'un corps qui est rond*. Furthermore, the 
description of a modified substance includes a reference 
to ' j o i n i n g * t h e  mode with the substance; the’joining1 
could, it seems, therefore be taken as affirmation.
Given the importance which the Port-Royal authors
(3)
attach to the judgment and their distinction between 
the mental operations which produce 'un corps rond' and 
'la terre est ronde', they obviously intend, however, to 
discriminate between the two forms of expression.
The specific role attributed to the judgment by Port- 
Royal, and its distinction from conception has been the 
subject of some comment. Louis Marin mentions that the
1. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. VIII.
20 ibid., Ch. II, p. 73.
3. The assertive nature of the judgment in Port-Royal 
theory appears to be not without precedent. W. & M. 
Kneale comment that the^word 'iudicium' was not commonly 
used in the Middle Ages for the mental counterpart 
of assertion, but the phrase, 'actus indicativus' had 
been used by Ockham in this sense, and the word 
judgment may perhaps have seemed less strange in a 
seventeenth century book on logic than idea"(The 
Development of Logic, p. 317).
Port-Royal Logique places the centre of gravity in the 
judgment, and not in reasoning, as in former logic. The 
judgment is the nucleus, the act of speech and of thought, 
by which man not only conceives things, but judges and 
affirms them. The judgment does not occur until the 
1liaison-action1, the verb, introduces the verbal distinc­
tion between judging and conceiving. This leads to a 
certain ambiguity in that if it is not possible to judge 
without first conceiving, one can question whether it 
is possible to conceive something without the objects of 
conception, and their terms, already having a propensity 
for judgment. "... le sens est-il dans le terme ou dans 
la relation." Marin regards this as the fundamental 
problem of the Logique. In analysing the judgment " ..en 
decomposant cet acte de pensee et de parole que Pascal 
pose au contraire comme indivisible, ..0" Port-Royal 
necessarily gave priority in order, to the terms of conc­
eption, while at the same time affirming that the meaning 
viewed as true or false could only rest in the relation­
ship, i.e. the judgment
That the Port-Royal authors regarded the judgment as 
distinct from compound terms is endorsed by Arthur C. 
Danto, who refers to a compound idea being merely a con­
junction of its component conceptual parts, themselves 
ultimately uncompounded, while a judgment has to be more 
than conjoined concepts, as a sentence is more than a 
conjunction of terms. This he considers is brought out 
by Port-Royal's insistence in the Grammaire G^ndrale on 
the difference between nouns and verbs and by the 
authors1 explicit apology in the final avertissement for
their neglect of compound terms, which they regard as
(2 )more appropriate to analytical lexicography
lo Introduction to the Logique, pp. 9-11.
2. Preface to the Port-Royal Grammar, Jacques Rieux and
Bernard E. Rollin, edn. 1975.
Chevalier emphasises the novelty of the Port-Royal
conception of the judgment. It results in language
being not merely a process of association, but an org­
anisation and a creation, with the verb and conjunctions 
as the operators which enable the formation of a commun­
icable thought, in contrast to the other elements which 
are pure facts. Moreover, the division of the judgment 
into two, subject and attribute, with on the one hand 
the object of thought, which in grammar is the subject,
and on the other the form and manner of thought, the
verbal grouping, cuts across the traditional Aristotelian 
view of the parts of speech, which identified subject 
and verb as the main elements, others being a n c i l l a r y .
The distinction between object of thought and form
or manner of thought is described in the Grammaire Generate
as the major one in relation to the mind's operations,
and, of the form or manner of thought, the main one is
judgment, others being "conjonctions, disjonctions, et
autres semblables operations de notre esprit, et tous l&s
autres mouvements de notre ame, comme les desirs, le
(2)
commandement, 1 'interrogation, etc." .
This division is carried into the word classes by 
regarding nouns (substantive and adjective), articles, 
pronouns, participles, prepositions and adverbs as those 
relating to the objects of thought, and verbs, conjunct­
ions and interjections as those expressing the form or
(3)manner of thought .
1. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 504-5. 
Chevalier considers that this division which appears 
fundamental has not been sufficiently appreciated and 
instances comment by l'abbe Fromant as an example of 
inadequate comprehension (Histoire de la Syntaxe,
p. 505).
2. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. I, p. 24.
3. Ibid.
While the simple qualitative form *la terre est rondef, 
which is limited to terms relating to the main actions of 
mind, conception and judgment, is easily reconcilable with 
the two Port-Royal criteria of operations of mind, and 
object and form of thought, more complex expressions con­
taining other word classes do not conform so readily to 
this formulation.
That Port-Royal*s differentiation between substance 
and form of thought does not rest too easily with 
grammatical considerations is illustrated by Donze in 
his criticism of their formula.
He considers it feasible to classify nouns, substantive 
and adjectival, pronoun and participle as objects of 
thought since they express in differing degrees autonomous 
concepts, forming in themselves the terms of a proposition, 
but it is stretching the category too far to apply it to 
the article, the preposition and the adverb. These three 
parts of speech would not apply to objects perceived 
independently by the mind nor be able to form in themselves 
the subject or attribute of a proposition. They could be 
associated with subject or attribute in the capacity of 
determination, (article), a relational particle (preposition) 
or a modifier (adverb), which is apparently the reason for 
including them in the first category of words, but this 
would be more on grammatical than logical grounds since it 
would depend on whether they were part of the material 
terms of a j u d g m e n t ^ .
Donze also criticises the inclusion under form of thought 
of mental operations as diverse as the main one of affirm­
ation and those of wanting, ordering, interrogation. It 
is true that they have in common with affirmation a negative 
property, that of not expressing an object perceived
1. Donze, La Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee de Port-Royal, 
p. 63.
independently, but their association in the same category 
is questionable^^. By including them under the descript­
ion 'form of thought' the authors have moreover given this 
term a scope it cannot have in relation to the theory of
the logical proposition, since judging is only one of three
(2)forms of thought
To Donze, it seems that the ambiguity of the classi­
fication rests on a faulty basis, in that the two criteria 
are drawn from two points of view which are logically 
complementary, for the decomposition of the judgment into 
terms and liaison implies the assimilation of the terms 
to objects of thought and that of liaison to manner of 
thought. While the first distinction, between terms and 
liaison, absorbs the second, between object and form of 
thought, in so far as logical concepts are concerned,, the 
Port-Royal analysis of the judgment implies that it also does 
so in the case of parts of speech, and this does not 
necessarily follow.
For certain types of words such as noun and substantive
(Uf-C)
verb/, the criteria are reconcilable, but with other kinds 
the assimilation is inconceivable. Even if it is conceded 
that the adverb and negative particle express respectively 
the object of thought and the view of mind, the first 
could not alone constitute the subject or attribute and the 
second the liaison. It is therefore by virtue of the 
second criterion that word classes are distinguished, but 
this does not lead the authors to dissociate the two 
aspects of the principle on which they base the division 
of parts of speech(3).
1. Ibid., p. 65.
2. Ibid., p. 64.
3. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
In his criticism, Donze appears to be assuming that 
individual parts of speech should each be separately 
reconcilable with the specific terms of the judgment, but 
this does not appear to be the intention of the authors, 
at least in so far as the terms are considered logically. 
Within the Port-Royal definitions it seems that?adverb,
for instance, would be classed as^maniere de chose, and
tk-'Z-
would not exist on its own, but accompany/chose, both
&
together, depending on the context, forming^object of 
thought^. Similarly, the negative particle would not, 
as form of thought, exist on its own.
Nevertheless, Port-Royal's dual formula, which appears 
to be aimed at representing the mental functions directly 
in the expression, could benefit from amplification and 
clarification. The ambiguity appears to be due in some 
measure to the difficulties in successfully identifying 
mental operations with terms other than noun and verb and to 
the failure to make a distinction between logical and 
grammatical levels.
The lack of a clear distinction on these aspects makes 
it difficult to segregate discussion on the mental operations 
from their expression, but the emphasis in the following 
chapter will move to the latter.
The operations of conception and judgment are the only 
mental processes linked directly to the structure of the 
proposition, but certain other processes, which relate 
more to semantic aspects of language and which could, it 
seems, precede theoperation of judgment, since they confcern 
the formation of ideas, are discussed in the first part of 
the Logique, containing reflections on ideas.
1. A thought need not necessarily be a single idea 
(Logique, p. 48).
Of these, abstraction^1  ^ (abstraction de l'esprit) is
discussed in considering ideas according to their compos-
(2)ition or simplicity . Because the mind's capacity is 
limited, it can only understand complex items properly 
by separate consideration of their parts, generally called 
!to know by abstraction*. A distinction is made between 
firstly knowledge of parts which are truly distinct, such 
as parts of the body, which do not really involve abstrac­
tion? secondly, consideration of a mode or manner separately 
from the substance, while continuing to associate the two? 
and thirdly, the application of an attribute which is con­
tained in a substance to other substances to which it is 
common, without relating the attribute to the substance 
from which it is abstracted. As ..examples -for the second, 
the authors give the length and breadth of an object, and 
for the third, the derivation of the.idea 1 all persons who 
think* from the reflection that *1 think1, of'all triangles' 
from an equilateral triangle, (three sided figure) and of 
'rectilinear figures'from a triangle (straight lined 
figure) . In these examples the progress is from the 
inferior degree represented by 'I who think *, and the 
'equilateral triangle-', to the superior, which, being less 
determined than the inferior, can represent more things, 
namely 'all persons who think', 'all triangles' , ' all
rectilinear figures'. The inferior includes the superior
(3)with some particular determination .
Through abstraction, ideas can be considered according 
to their generality, particularity and singularity.
Although all things which exist are singular, through 
abstraction several kinds of ideas are possible; some; 
singular ideas, representing individuals, are marked by
1. The abstraction of universals from real properties of
particulars was a feature of Thomist philosophy. See
Pt. I, Ch. 2, p. 10.
2. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. V.
3. -Ibid. .
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proper nounsj some representing several, namely universal 
or general ideas, are marked by common nouns, e.g.
'homme, ville, cheval'. Both the universal ideas and the 
common nouns which represent them can be called general 
terms ^  .
Words are general in two ways . . They are 'univoque' if the 
same word applies to several objects, with the same sound 
representing the same idea, as with 'homme'. They are 
Equivoque1, when the same ideas expressed by the same 
sound have no connection with each other, as 'canon* which 
represents both a weapon and a Decree in Council, and in 
cases where there is some resemblance, as of cause, effect, ‘ 
or sign, e.g. 'sain' refers to air, animal or food. By 
general words, the authors mean the unequivocal ones 
joined to universal and general ideas and it is these 
which are the subject of their further consideration of 
universal ideas, which the authors classify into five
(2)
kinds, 'genres, especes, differences, propres, accidents'
The authors distinguish in universal ideas 'comprehension' 
and 'etendue*. The comprehension of an idea is defined 
as the attributes it contains and which cannot be removed 
without destroying the idea, as the comprehension of the 
idea of triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, 
and the equality of three interior angles to two right 
angles. The extension of an idea is defined as the subjects 
to whom the idea applies, also called inferiors of a 
general term which is superior in relation to the subjects.
The idea of triangle, for instance, applies to all the 
different species of triangles. Whereas any one of the 
attributes contained in a general idea, i.e. its comprehension, 
cannot be removed without destroying it, its extension 
can be restricted by only applying it to some of
1. Ibid. , Ch. VI, p. 86‘.
2. Ibid;, Ch. VII. ' -
the subjects/without thereby destroying the idea. This 
restriction can be effected in two ways. The first is 
by joining to it another distinct and determined idea, 
as when to the general idea is added that of a right 
angle, thus restricting the idea to one species of triangle. 
The other is by joining to it some indistinct and undeter­
mined idea signifying a part, as 'quelque triangle* ^ .
W. and M. Kneale point to some lack of clarity in the 
concepts. By referring to the inferiors of a general term 
it is not clear whether the inferiors are supposed to be 
species or individuals. If, as the Logique says, the 
extension of a term, unlike thscomprehension, might be cut 
down without the destruction of the idea, this is not 
true of the set of species falling under a genus. Triangle 
must include the possibility of a right angled triangle, 
though the absence of an individual triangle would not 
invalidate the term. . Almost certainly, Port-Royal, if 
pressed on this point, would have said that by 'extension* 
they meant the set of individuals to which a general term 
applies .f^ V.
Although the two terms, comprehension and etendue are 
distinct, in Port-Royal*s definition, there appears to be 
risk of confusing them due to the lack of precision in 
regard to the nature of the general term and the attributes 
it contains vis-a-vis the less general terms.
When related to their preceding account of abstraction, 
the definitions are more intelligible. The comprehension 
of the idea of triangle consists of the attributes it 
contains, which are attributes abstracted from, say, the 
equilateral triangle, these attributes being three lines,
1. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
2. The Development of Logic, p. 317 et seq.
three angles, and three angles equal to two right angles 
etc. . One assumes that by "etc" the authors imply 
only general qualities for, through abstraction, they 
would exclude the property of equilateral. But though 
the general idea extends to all the subjects to which it 
applies, this is indistinctly. The application or 
extension can be made specific, that is, restricted, by 
the addition of another idea, distinct and determined, 
such as that of a right angle^).This, in effect, would 
restore to the particular idea e.g. the inferior, the right 
angled triangle, the general attributes which were extracted 
from it,- and the terms extension and comprehension appear 
consistent with Port-Royal1s explanation of abstraction.
The notion of universality and particularity is also 
linked to that of extension in the rules for syllogisms.
The attribute of an affirmative proposition, not having
(3 )
more extension than the subject,is always taken particularly # 
Kneale ^  V refer to this as translating into their own 
terminology what mediaeval logicians said of 1 termini non 
completi distributi".
There have been various references to earlier, though not
(5) ' 1
necessarily similar notions of- this kind. . Salmon 
refers to the notion of extension and restriction going 
back to the Middle Ages and possibly earlier, and discusses 
various instances of restrictive relative clauses in
(6)
works of Port-Royal"s immediate predecessors. Peter Salus 
notes that Petrus Hispanus, later Pope John XXI, was
1. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. VI, p. 87.
2. Ibid. , p. 88. . .
3. Ibid., Pt. Ill, Ch. Ill, p. 239.'
4. The Development of Logic, p. 319. •
5. Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 5,1969, pp. 180-181*
6. Pre-pre Cartesian Linguistics, Papers from 5th Regional
Meeting, Chicago Linguistics Society, pp. 429-434.
primarily concerned with the difference between significatio,
the meaning of a word, and suppositio, the acceptance of
a term as denoting something. P i n b o r g ^  relates
significatio and suppositio to approximately sense and
reference and describes it as one of the two most important
mediaeval distinctions. He adds that this distinction was
developed within logic and formed the core of what was
known as the logica moderna. W. and M. Kneale consider
the Port-Royal notions as possibly intended to replace
significatio and suppositio but the correspondence is not
exact, since the comprehension and the extension of a term
are not properties of it, but rather sets of entities to
(2)which it is related in certain ways '. This may be true 
of extension, but is doubtful in relation to comprehension 
which contains the attributes of the objects to which it 
relates.
Pursuing their notions of comprehension and. extension, 
the Port-Royal authors regard the addition of a term in 
the case of ftermes complexes1 as being of two kinds, 
'explication1, and 'determination'.
Explication merely develops that which is included in
the comprehension of the idea of the first term, or that
which is appropriate to it as one of its accidents,
providing this applies generally and to all of its extension.-
As examples, the. authors quote '1'homme qui est un animal
doue de raison1, '1 'homme qui desire naturellement d'etre
heureux', and 'l'homme qui est mortel', which do not change
(3)the idea of man or restrict it to one part of man . All
1. Some Problems of Semantic Representations in Mediaeval 
Logic, in History of Linguistic Thought, ed. Parret, 
1976.
2. The Development of Logic, p. 317.
3. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. VIII.
additions made to nouns which distinctly mark an individual 
are explicative, because, always taken in their full 
extension, they are already determined as far as they can 
b e (1).
Determination occurs when the addition to a word
restricts its meaning and results in it no longer being
taken in its full extension, only part of it, as in 'les
homines savants', 'un animal raisonnable'. Such additions
can sometimes make a general word individual, as 'le
Pape qui est aujourd'hui' determines the general word
(2 )
'Pape' to be the individual Alexandre VII . .
Complex terms are distinguished according to whether 
they are complex in expression, or only in the meaning, 
when the addition is understood.
1. Ibid., p. 97.
2. Ibid., p. 96.
Chapter 5. The Proposition.
The Port-Royal definition of a proposition is related 
to the simple form of the judgment, described by 
Chevalier as rlc a n o n i q u e e . g .  "La terre est ronde,
Dieu est juste, Dieu n ’est pas injuste11.
1 Having perceived things through our ideas, the ideas 
are compared, and finding that some are appropriate to 
each other, and others not, we join or separate them, 
otherwise known as affirming or denying one or the other, 
in general judging. This judgment is also called pro­
position, which has two terms, the one of which one 
affirms or denies, the subject, and the one which affirms
or denies, the attribute or predicate. There is also
(2 )
the liaison between the two terms, festfr .
The authors do not make it clear how they view the 
operation of comparison. It is not mentioned separately 
as an operation of mind, so is presumably regarded either 
as a subsidiary one, not directly reflected in language, 
or as part of the process of judgment. Neither do they 
pursue,in relation to the process of forming a judgment, 
the problem of how one knows which ideas to compare. In 
this connection, their discussion in the Logique on ideas 
considered according to their composition or simplicity, 
where things become known through the process of abstraction, 
appears relevant, but there is no mention of direct 
involvement of this process with the judgment.
The specific importance to Port-Royal of this form of 
the proposition, both as a nucleus from which thought 
can proceed to its further operations of reasoning and 
ordering, and as the basic structure in language, to which 
all linguistic expressions can be reduced, is particularly
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 518.
2. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. Ill, p. 156, & Grammaire, Pt. II, 
Ch.I, p, 24.
emphasised by C h e v a l i e r ^ . With Port-Royal, the propos­
ition appears as the module of analysis, and, at the 
same time, as the first element in forming the synthesis. 
‘Richer ‘ than the Method of Ramus, that of Arnauld
and his colleagues had benefited from contact with
Descartes and the sciences,in learning how to develop
(2 )the double movement of analysis and synthesis . A t
the basis of all grammatical construction is the grouping
of subject and predicate which forms the proposition, which,
from the time of Port-Royal, was to be the core of syntax.
The point of departure was no longer the formal grouping
of subject and verb, of which variations, substitutions
etc. were studied, but the relationship between subject
and predicate. Behind all the Port-Royal initiatives was
the reasoning that the art of thinking is at the centre
(3)of all the sciences .
It is this view of the Port-Royal definition of the 
proposition ("definition inconnue dans la grammaire jusqu*
(4)
alors ...") as a formative element which leads Chevalier 
to regard the authors as having founded an autonomous
(5)
syntax . Contributing to the devolution* brought about 
by Port-Royal was their formulation of a hypothesis which 
would account for the fundamental criteria of formal 
grammar, and the basing of this hypothesis on thought.
"C'est la determination des formes du contenu qui est le 
premier devoir du grammairien" .
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 510-511.
2. The method is defined in the Logique, Pt. IV, Ch. II and 
HI.
3. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 500.
4. Ibid., p. 490.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 499-500.
Padley, less convinced about the novelty of Port- 
Royal *s approach, considers that Chevalier was led to 
regard Port-Royal as the founders of modern syntax by the 
emphasis which the authors put on the sentence as the 
grammatical unit; on its coincidence with the logical 
proposition containing subject, affirmation, and attribute. 
To speak, as does Chevalier, of the "revolution of Port- 
Royal insights concerning underlying logical structure is 
to treat them as original when they form part of a develop­
ing tradition, and also to ignore the semasiological trend 
of Humanist grammar which readily regarded formally 
divergent structures as semantically identical"^^ .
To some extent, the differing appraisals of Port-Royal 
syntax appear to be due to difference in emphasis, arising 
from the differing contexts in which the respective authors 
consider the question. There is no doubt, however, that 
the simple form of the judgment , or proposition was dominated 
by Port-Royal's emphasis on the thought content, and that 
it provided the nuclear syntactic element. The Grammaire 
can be regarded in some measure as an explanation of the 
various applications of this element and of deviations 
from its ideal form. In this they had the benefit of 
Lancelot's Nouvelle Methode latine, with its numerous 
examples of 'construction figuree* reconciled with 'const­
ruction simple'.
A key feature in the Port-Royal proposition is their 
distinctive interpretation of the role of the verb 'est', 
and for this reason, the verb is considered in this chapter. 
The definition of the verb is given in the first instance 
as "un mot dont le princip.O/l usage est de signifier 
1 'affirmation", that is, to indicate not only that the 
speaker simply perceives things, but judges and affirms
1. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 1500-1700, p. 258.
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them^^o The authors distinguish affirmation in this
sense from the meaning it has with certain words,
indicating the perception of an affirmation, e.g.,
(2 )affirmans, affirmatio .
The only verb which has this main signification is' the 
verb 'etre' and then only in the third person present, 
and in certain cases. Because of man’s natural inclination 
to curtail speech, affirmation is almost always combined 
with other meanings in the same word. Hence, ' Pierre vit' 
is equivalent to *Pierre est vivant', the attribute, 
'vivant', being included in one word with the verb ’est’, a 
fact which, consider the authors, accounts for the great 
diversity of verbs in each language. Other variations on 
the basic form of the verb are illustrated by 'sum homo, 
je suis homme, and vivo, sedeo, je suis vivant, je suis 
assis', forms which result in different marking for person 
in verbs. The aspect of time can also be combined with 
affirmation, e.g. 'coenasti' signifies that 'I affirm the
(3)
act of dining in relation to the past' .
The inclusion of various meanings in the one. word is,
say the authors, the reason why various persons, Aristotle,
Buxtorf, Scaliger, have not appreciated the essential
(4)
nature of the verb .
10 Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. XIII, p. 66. Virtually
the same content of Ch. Ill of the Grammaire is 
included in the Logique, Pt. II, Ch. II.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 67-69.
4. Ibid. Lancelot himself followed.the definitions of 
Scaliger and Sanctius on the verb, prior to the 
publication of the Grammaire (see p. 34 of this study).
- / b -
The inclusion under 'manner of thought1 of all other
'mouvements de notre ame ^  comme les desirs, le commande-
ment, 1 1 interrogation, etc.', affects the interpretation
of the role of the different modes of the verb, which are
regarded as expressing these emotive operations. The
conditional or subjunctive are described as expressing
more distinctly what is experienced in the mind; 'aimat,
aimerait', for instance, therefore represent modified
affirmations. The action of the will is represented through
(2)the optative, the subjunctive and the imperative
The various explanations aimed at reconciling the 
different forms of the verb with its principal role of 
affirmation in the judgment tend to cause a certain amount 
of confusion, and are not always clearly stated.
Donze comments that in the case of propositions using 
moods of the verb which express desire, command, etc., 
the 'mouvements de notre ame', the authors do not say 
whether these include the same constituent elements as 
those in which affirmation is expressed. They may have 
thought about it, but, in the absence of an explanation the
'theory of modes' remains disjointed from that of the
. (3)expression
1. Donze mentions that the operations of 'juger' and the 
other 'mouvements de notre ame' recall the classical 
logical distinctions between l'oratio enunciativa, 
the operation joining or separating the subject and 
attribute to achieve a judgment which is true or false; 
and oratio ordinativa, expressing what is to be done. 
(La Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee, p. 13.).
2. Ibid., pp. 78-79.
3. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
-  / /  -
There is also lack of clarity in that the authors tend
not to mark the transition between regarding the expression
in terms of a judgment, and the application to it of
their theory on the verb. "La theorie du verbe interfere
en effet, sur ce point, avec celles des termes du jugement,
et ces Messieurs passent constamment de l'un a l'autre
point de vue sans pour autant marquer nettement les
transitions"^. Thus, when the verb adjectival is regarded
as adding an attribute to the fundamental signification
of affirmation, this can be understood as a separate notion,
e.g. of action, passion, or quality, or as containing the 
(2 )predicate .
Donze's comments perhaps illustrate the risk of confusion 
which can arise through attempting to provide an explanatory 
theory for grammar at the same time as expounding grammatical 
principles. Such confusion might be mitigated by a 
distinction between the proposition considered logically 
and the proposition considered grammatically, but it seems 
possible that, since the authors envisaged a direct represent­
ation of the logical operations by grammatical categories, 
they would see no call for such a distinction.
On the same topic, Donze considers that Port-Royal1s 
division of the proposition into subject, copula and 
attribute is appropriate to the form now called attributive, 
(la terre est ronde) and more in conformity with the
1. Ibid., pp. 134-135.
2. Ibid.
verbal structure than the version comprising two terms, 
specified by Du Marsais. He concedes that this kind of 
analysis was perhaps necessary at the time, because no 
other way had led to a more or less organic conception of 
the proposition. Bub deduction of the basic form of 
'Petrus est affirmans' from the surface structure 'Petrus 
affirmat', not simply to isolate the sign of affirmation 
but to indicate a fundamental structure of language to 
which all other forms of expression can be reduced, is to 
stray dangerously from the facts. The same criticism 
applies to impersonal propositions. " ... cette confusion 
est dans Port-Royal, et tout entiere dans 1'extravagante 
theorie de propositions impersonnelles auxquelles la 
Grammaire, toujours soucieuse de retrouver dans l'enonciat- 
ion des trois termes constitutifs du jugement, attribue, 
contre toute vraisemblance, un sujet r e e l . " ^
Given the fundamental role of affirmation which the 
verb has,in generating the structure of the proposition, 
it cannot really be considered in isolation from it, and 
Donze appears therefore to be criticising the entire 
explanatory concept, at least, in its application to 
grammar.
The Logique contains essentially the same content in
respect of the essential features of the verb as does the
Grammaire but the further chapters in the Grammaire, which
consider the additional forms of verbs,are not included
in the Logique. Robinet attributes this omission from the
Logique, notably in respect of the various modes of the
verb,to an intention to rejinforce the theory of the main
(2 )rol’e of affirmation . The reason could however be simply 
contextual. The detailed exposition of the Grammaire could
1. Ibid., p. 135.
2. Le Langage a l'Age Classique, p. 39.
be inappropriate to the more strategic thinking in the 
Logique, which does, in fact, refer to the different 
moods of the verb, without expanding on them.
Explanations of other verb forms are:-
Participles: These are true nouns (adjectival). In
the example, 1Pierre est vivant1, ’vivant1 is the a t t r i b u t e ^ .
The essential reason for this definition is that they do not
(2)signify affirmation and cannot therefore form a proposition
without the addition of a verb, i.e. by replacing what has
(3)been removed in changing the verb into a participle .
Infinitive: This is referred to as a substantive noun, 
as used in 'le boire1, 'le manger1, but it is conceded 
that it can also be used in the role of affirmation, e.g.
'Scio malum esse fugiendum, je sais qu'il faut fwir.e le 
mal*. Its function in comparison with other modes of the 
verb is likened to that of the relative among pronouns, in 
that in addition to its affirmatory role,it can join the 
proposition in which it features to another, 'scio' in the 
above example being one proposition, 'malum est fugiendum1 
another. By using 'esse' instead of 'est', the second 
proposition is only part of the first, as happens with the 
relative pronouns ^ .
Adjectival verbs (verbes adjectifs) are those which have
an attribute joined to the general signification of the
affirmation. As a verb can, according to man's wishes, have
any attribute added, it is a mistake to believe that all
verbs signify either action or passion. Such verbs are those
which signify an action to which the passive is opposed,
(5)e.g. 'battre' is opposed by 'etre battu*
1. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. XIII, p. 69.
2. Ibid., p. 70.
3. Ibid. pp. 89-90 are also relevant.
4. Ibid., pp. 80-81
5. Ibid., pp. 83-86.
Impersonal verbs: The infinitive is most properly the 
impersonal since it marks affirmation without number or 
person. But grammarians tend to call certain defective 
verbs impersonal, which are usually found in the third 
person only. Since certain parts of the construction are 
omitted but understood (reference is made to the Methode 
Latine, Remarques sur les verbes, ch.V), they are not 
true impersonals. In illustration, 'pudet me', is extended 
to 'pudet tenet*, or 'est tenens me'; 'libet mihi' to 
'libido est mihi*. It is noted that 'est' in such cases 
signifies also e x i s t e n c e ^ .
The Port-Royal authors also relate complex propositions 
to the basic form’ of'the proposition-as a judgment.
The terms joined in a proposition may be simple, as in
'Dieu est bon', or complex, e.g. 'un habile magistrat est
(2)
un homme utile a la republique* . Whether the proposition 
containing complex terms is itself complex, depends on 
whether it contains more than one judgment, i.e. affirm­
ation, including any which may be present in the mind, but 
unexpressed. 'La valeur d'Achille a ete cause de la prise 
de Troie' is regarded as containing only one judgment, 
but from 'Dieu invisible a cree le monde visible', the 
three judgments, 'Dieu est invisible, il a cree le monde', 
and 'le monde est visible' are deduced, the first and third 
being merely incidental propositions to the main one, of
(3)
which the first is the subject and the third the attribute
If the complexity of a proposition is.;regarded as
dependent on what is present in the mind, it might be argued
(4)that 1la valeur d'Achille a ete cause de la prise de Troie*
1. Ibid., p. 86.
2 . Ibid., Ch. IX, p. 49.
3. Ibid;, p. 50.
ft
4. Robins comments' that it is hard to follow the authors*
reasoning, as, in modern transformational terms, this
proposition would be treated very similarly to the other
(Short History of Linguistics, p. 125). The point is also
noted by Kretzmann (Transformationalism and the Port-Royal 
Grammar,in the Rieux and Rollin edn. of the Grammar).
also contains the proposition 'Achille est valeureux1.
This example is admittedly different in construction and 
in the type of content, from that of 'Dieu invisible' etc., 
but it does raise the question of how one distinguishes 
from the various possibilities which may be regarded as 
in the mind, prior to the actual expression, the form 
which lends credence to the postulated generic structure.
The authors choice is of course subjective, influenced 
by their a priori view of the nature of thought.
In the examples quoted, the authors are concerned in
demonstrating the role of the relative pronoun. If the
three judgments are expressed, the relative pronoun is
used; 'Dieu, qui est invisible, a cree le monde, qui
est visible'. From this it is deduced that the relative
pronoun, in addition to having in common with other
pronouns the property of being a substitute for a noun,
has its own characteristic of always referring.to an
antecedent, expressed or understood, and is part of an
incidental proposition, which in turn forms part of the
subject or attribute of the principal proposition. The
relative is also implied when two nouns are in apposition,
e.g. 'Urbs Roma', or when one is an adjective, e.g. 'Deus
sanctus'. Syntactic rules for forming the full construction,
using the relative pronoun, are given which Chomsky
regards as equivalent to modern transformational rules
(2 )
for converting deep to surface structure .
The different grammatical roles attributed to the
relative pronoun (as pronoun it can take the place of a noun,
(3)but it can also act as a conjunction ,) transcend the
division of parts of speech into objects and manner of
thought, for pronouns fall in the first category and con-
(4)junctions the second '. The authors do not comment on 
this point.
1. Grammaire Generale, Pt. II, Ch. IX, pp. 51-52.
2. Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 34-35.
3. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. IX, p. 52.
4. Ibid., Ch. I, p. 24.
An inconsistency is also apparent between the Grammaire
and the Logique in that whereas in the example * Je suppose
que vous serez sageff the Grammaire regards 'que' as
denoting liaison, having lost its role of pronoun ^ ,
the Logique maintains its role of relative pronoun by
providing an extended form, ' Je fais une supposition qui
(2)est que vous etes sage1 . This chapter was added in the
1683 edition, so it appears that the authors had second
thoughts on this particular example. On the other hand,
a proposition of similar overt structure is considered
differently. In 1je soutiens que la terre est ronde1,
included in the Logique under propositions which are
complex according to affirmation or negation, ' je soutiens'•
is described as an incidental proposition.which should form
part of either subject or attribute in the principal
proposition. It does not because it changes nothing; it
simply results in affirmation being expressed in two ways,
one normally, with the verb festf; the other more expressly,
(3)by fje soutiens* . Obviously the separate treatment of
(4)similar structures depends on semantic considerations;
Propositions are considered further in the Logique 
according to their content and the property of being true 
or false. They are first classified.into four categories, 
universal affirmative, universal negative, particular 
affirmative or particular negative, depending on whether 
they affirm or deny something of a subject which is universal
(5)
or particular' . In so far as the criterion of true or
1. Ibid., Ch. IX, p. 54.
2. Logique, Pt. II,.-Ch, I,, p. 147.
3. Ibid., Ch. VIII, p. 174.
4. Chomsky relates the earlier version included in the 
Grammaire to the modern terminology that each term 
generated by the underlying base (phrase structure) 
does not necessarily underly a possible kernel structure 
(Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 39 and 99). He might have 
found the example 'je soutiens‘que' more appropriate to 
this comparison.
5. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. Ill, pp. 156-159.
false is concerned, the authors, significantly, say that 
there can be no propositions which are neither true nor 
false, since every proposition marks the judgment we make 
about things. The proposition is true when this judgment 
conforms to the truth, false when it does n o t ^ .
The form of complex propositions, considered in the
Grammaire Generale in the context of relative pronouns, is
defined in the Logique. A distinction is made between simple
propositions, those having only one subject or attribute,
'composees1, those having more than one subject or attribute,
and 'complexes1, those containing more than one proposition,
i.e. judgment, whether expressed or understood. The additional
proposition in complex forms r-cai relate either to the subject 
(2)
or attribute
Chevalier summarises the various types of logical proposition 
formulated by Port-Royal, the first being fundamental to the 
remainder:
(3)simple: la terre est ronde .
apparently compound (composee), in effect complex:
Celui qui fait le volonte de mon Pere qui est
(4)dans le ciel, entrera dans le royaume des cieux .
implicitly complex: Dieu invisible a cree le monde 
visible and
(5)Brutus a tue le tyran .
compound: Alexandre a ete le plus genereux de tous les
(6 Vrois, et le vainqueur de Darius .
simple, apparently complex: II y a des craintes qui sont 
raisonnables ^ .
/o\
C'est une folie que de s'arreter a des flatteurs
1. Ibid., p. 159. 5. Ibid., pp. 164-165.
2. Ibid., Ch. V. . 6. Ibid., p. 164.
3. Grammaire, Pt. II, Ch. I, p. 23. 7. Ibid., Ch. XIII, p. 201
4. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. V, p. 162. 8 . Ibid., Ch. XI, p. 192.
With these different forms, comments Chevalier, the 
importance of knowing whether the proposition is simple, 
complex or compound is to ascertain whether affirmation 
or denial is to be applied to all or part of it. Port- 
Royal is not seeking to demonstrate the functioning of 
language but to determine the constituent elements of 
the judgment and so provide a firm base for reasoning^^.
Of interest is the illustration that all propositions
composed of active verbs and their regime can be called
(2)
complex . 'Brutus a tue un tyran' being equivalent to 
'Brutus a tud quelqu'un* and 'celui qu'il a tue etoit tyran'.
Thus the proposition could be contradicted either 
by saying that Brutus had not killed anyone or that the 
one he killed was not a tyrant. (One could also add the 
one he killed was not the one regarded as a tyrant).
The validity of the conclusion deduced from-the 
analysis of 'Brutus a tue un tyran* is questioned by 
Chevalier. The analysis is of importance at the level 
of logical argument since it permits the separate con­
sideration of the facts, but to apply the conclusion that 
all propositions consisting of active verbs and their 
regime can be called complex is to generalise a particular 
case to others which are dissimilar. For instance, there 
would be no need to imply a proposition such as 'Quelqu'un 
est Cesar', from an analysis of 'Brutus a tue Cesar*.
This would be on a par with the mediaeval propositions of 
identity. The flaw in the reasoning is due to the fact 
that the notion of regime of the active verb is not clearly 
explained, and it is not clear what relation is involved.
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 517-518.
2. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. V, p. 165.
Port-Royal mention sometimes regime of object, sometimes 
of subject, indiscriminately^^.
This example again raises the question as to what 
structure, if any, is regarded as underlying the expression, 
and whether this can be deduced according to syntactic 
principles only, or whether semantic aspects need to be 
taken into account. The Grammaire appears to concentrate 
on cases which are amenable to purely syntactic analysis.
The contexts in which the Logique considers propositions 
go beyond syntactic issues.
Chomsky includes examples from the Logique, such as
(2)
the above quoted one,as illustrations of 'deep structure' 
but> while obviously aware of the specific context in 
which they are used in the Logique, does not appear to 
deduce any fundamental distinction between cases requiring 
knowledge of semantic content or context and those where 
the underlying structure can be deduced according to 
syntactic criteria.
The need to take into account the semantic content
of the proposition in order to define its nature is also
evident in considering the distinction between incidental
propositions which are explicative, which refer to the
term in all its extension, without changing it, and those
(3)which determine it or restrict its application . The 
definitions originate from the Port-Royal concept of 
comprehension and extension and have already been ex­
plained ^  .
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 517.
2. Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 34-35.
3. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. VI.
4. See Ch. 4 .
In the case of explicatives, the subject of the 
total proposition can be substituted for the relative 
pronoun referring to it without invalidating the sense. 
Thus *les hommes qui ont ete crees pour corinoitre et 
pour aimer Dieu* can be replaced by 'Les hommes ont 
ete crees pour connoltre et pour aimer Dieu1. But with 
determinatives this would make the proposition false.
'Les hommes qui sont pieux sont charitables' presented 
as 'les hommes sont pieux' forms an 'idee totale* which 
wrongly implies that 'pieux' is compatible with (all) 
men. The authors acknowledge the need to have more regard 
to the meaning and intention of the speaker than to the 
expression itself in order to judge the nature of these 
propositions, and to determine whether they are 'explic- 
atif' or 'determinatif*^ .
The Logique instances complex propositions which are 
ambiguous in that they can be taken according to the 
sense in which the speaker intends them. In the example 
'Tous les Philosophes nous assurent que les choses 
pesantes tombent d'elles-memes en bas', the first pro­
position is incidental if the intention is to show that 
heavy things fall etc. But if the intention is merely 
to relate the opinion of the philosophers without necess­
arily approving of it, the first proposition is the
principal one. The context usually indicates in what
(2)
sense such propositions are intended .
Compound propositions are classified into those which 
are overtly compound, the copulatives, disjonctives, 
causales, conditionnelles, relatives and discretives and 
those where the composition is covert, the exponibles, 
which comprise the 'exclusives, exceptives, comparatives,
Logique, Pt. II, Ch. VI, pp. 167-168.
2- Ibid., Ch. VIII, pp. 174-5.
inceptives or desitives1^ ^ . All these imply something 
in addition to that expressed by the proposition. Ex­
clusives, for instance, by noting that an attribute is
appropriate to a single subject, imply that it is in-
(2 )
appropriate to others . Although the unexpressed 
element in the covert forms instanced by Port-Royal may 
be regarded as a form of deep structure, to do so would 
seem to include other thoughts ..or sentences which may 
not be parts of the same structure, and may not even 
express what is 'in the mind1. In other words, where
(3)o
does one structure end, andanother begin .
The reliance on content for discerning the structure 
of a sentence is also indicated by the authors1 view that 
the only true rule for discerning which is the subject 
and which is the attribute in irregularly expressed pro­
positions is to observe by the meaning that which is
(4)
affirmed and that which is affirmed of it (the attribute) 
Sometimes to indicate the true subject the active of the 
verb needs to be changed into the passive. The same 
attention to meaning and change of mood is required to 
identify incidental and principal propositions, where the 
order is irregular. In the example 'Dieu commande d 'honorer 
les Rois; Louis XIV est Roi.' from which 'Done Dieu 
commande d'honorer Louis XIV* is deduced. The main intention 
here is to affirm something of Kings, from which one can 
conclude that Louis XIV is to be honoured. The phrase
10 Ibid., Chs. IX and X.
2. Ibid., Ch. X.
3. This would appear to present difficulties in attempting 
to relate exponibles to transformational rules, a 
possibility mentioned by Kretzmann (Pt. I, Ch. 2, p. 10).
4. Ibid., Ch. XI, pj. 191.
regarding 1Dieu1 is an incidental proposition which
confirms the affirmation 'les Rois doivent etre honores1a
Rois is the subject of the principal proposition, Louis
XIV that of the conclusion^. Chomsky comments on the
fact that this analysis is thus used to develop, in
effect, a partial theory of relations, since from it, the
(2 )
final conclusion can be thus reduced from the argument 
'Re^inforced' may be a more appropriate description than 
'reduced*, particularly as the analysis is dependent on 
the person's understanding of the meaning of the argument, 
not on independent syntactic standards.
Constructions in French such as 'C'est de la grele 
qui tombe' can also be reduced to their natural arrange­
ment by placing the subject before the attribute, fCe qui 
tombe est de la grele.1 Various similar examples are
provided by the authors "pour faire voir qu'on en doit
(2)
juger par le sens, et non par l'ordre des mots". .
1. Ibid., p. 192.
2. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 44.
3. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. XI, p. 193.
Chapter 6. Syntax, and the Word Classes.
The surprisingly limited attention given to syntax in 
the Grammaire Generate, given the importance of the pro­
position, has already been noted in referring to Padley's 
comment on the more extensive treatment of this subject in
the Nouvelle Methode latine^.Padley also refers to
(2)Chevalier's association of this limited treatment with
the authors' failure to exploit the analysis of the pro-
(3)position at the linguistic level 7 .
Apart from matters which may be regarded as relevant 
to syntax, namely the various constructions of the pro­
position, and case relations, which are dealt with elsewhere 
in the Grammaire, the short chapter devoted to it (which 
is also the last one in the work) is limited to the notions 
of 'convenance' and 'regime'; to the five maxims referred 
to as generally applicable in all languages, and to figures 
of construction which entail deviations from the natural 
order.
Syntax is described as the construction of words togethero 
Construction is generally subject to 'convenance', or agree­
ment between words, and 'regime', whereby a variation is 
caused by one term on another. Convenance is mostly the 
same in all languages as it is a natural consequence of the 
practice of making the expression more distinct. It governs 
the agreement of substantive and adjective, and of verbs 
with nouns and pronouns. Regime is almost entirely arbitr­
ary, and therefore differs from one language to another,
some relying on case (e.g. Latin), others on prepositions,
(4)as in French, Spanish and Italian
1. See Ch. 2 p. 31.
2. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 501.
3. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, p. 256.
4. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. XXIV.
Chevalier points to the influence of Latin on this 
conception of syntax, an influence also indicated by the 
analysis of the genitive, which conforms to that in the 
Nouvelle Methode latine ^  .
Of the five general maxims, the first three are obviously 
in conformity with the Port-Royal view of the elements of
the proposition, though they appear to have ante-dated
(2)this . A nominative is always related to a verb, either 
expressed or understood, and the converse, a verb is always 
accompanied by a nominative, expressed or understood; and 
there can be no adjective without a substantive. The fourth, 
that the genitive must be governed by a noun because this 
case marks the possessor, is described as difficult to apply 
to the vulgar languages because of the use of the particle 
de. According to the fifth, the regime of verbs is de­
pendent on the various kinds of relations implicit in the 
cases; the case relations are constant but the usage 
differs ^  .
The foregoing (i.e., the remarks on syntax of 1conven­
ance * and ’regime1 and the five maxims) comment the authors, 
is sufficient to understand natural order, whereby all the 
parts of speech are simply expressed, with no superfluous 
or e.lided words, and conform: to the natural expression’ 
of thought. But when, due to men following more often the 
meaning of their thoughts, than the words they use to 
express them, or with the aim of shortening speech, they 
omit some words, or in the interest of style include super­
fluous ones, natural order is reversed.
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 519-520.
2. Sahlin comments that these maxims are not the result 
of personal observations but an extract "fr6m • 
twelve maxims from Scioppius1 Syntaxe (Cesar Chesnau 
Du Mafsais, p. 34).
30 Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. XXIV, pp.-105-106* and 
Nouvelle Methode latine, Book VII, Ch. i.
'Syllepse1 or Conception1, in conformity with thought
rather than with the words of the expression, is illustrated
by 1il est six heures1, instead of 1ils sont six heures*
which would be grammatically c o r r e c t ^ . 1 Ellipse1 or
*defaut* is the figure which mostly appears in Port-Royal1s
reconstruction of the natural forms of expression. *Pleon-
asme*is the inclusion of unnecessary words, and *hyperbate*
the reversal of the natural order of speech. The reader
is referred to the Nouvelles Methodes for Greek and Latin
(2)for fuller illustration of all the figures of speech .
French is referred to as the language which uses figur­
ative expressions particularly sparingly, aiming at clarity
and the closest possible adherence to natural order while
(3)at the same time maintaining style '.
Ricken comments that the views in the Grammaire Generate
on *ordre naturel* had earlier been evident in.Lancelot*s
claims of a natural order of construction in French. In
the Nouvelle Methode latine of 1650 Lancelot had spoken
of the obscurity of Latin due to abandonment of natural
order while in French this order, which should be common
to all languages, could be observed. This latter reference
was not repeated in the Grammaire Generate, but since the
Grammaire aimed to find in language the universal laws of
thought and thus use reason as a principle for explaining
an apparently inexplicable usage, this lent force to an
explanation of natural order based on Cartesian rationalism.
Subsequently, other authors were to provide a more studied
(4)rationalist basis for natural order
1. Ibid., p. 107.
2. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
3. Ibid., p. 108.
4. Ulrich Ricken, Grammaire et Philosophie au Siecle Des 
Lumieres, PUL 1978, pp. 16-18. The question assumed 
greater importance with Du Marsais, Beauzee and Condillac, 
and is discussed further in the sections dealing with 
their theories in this study.
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It is noteworthy that in dealing with case relations, the 
Grammaire refers to the relationship as being between words.
In spite of the importance attached by Port-Royal to mental 
operations, there is no reference to relations between ideas, 
as was the case with certain later theories.
According to the Grammaire, if things were always considered 
separately, only the two modifications of nouns, namely 
number and gender, would be necessary, but because nouns are 
often considered according to the different relations between 
them, additional markings are needed. One of the inventions 
used in some languages for this purpose consists of case endings. 
Without cases, the ’liaison du discours', called construction, 
would not be understood^^.
Case endings, or the use of prepositions to serve the same
purpose, are explained, in terms of the kind of relationship
which they express. Nominative is not really a case, but the
base from which case endings are formed by the different
modifications to this first ending. Its first use is to be
placed before all the verbs, as subject of the proposition.
Vocative marks the person to whom one speaks; genitive the
relation of a thing to another in whatever manner this may be;
dative the relation of advantage or disadvantage. Accusative
indicates the object of verbs signifying action. It is
recognised in French by the natural order, which places it after
the verb. Ablative, the sixth case in Latin,has not been
invented for any one particular relation, but to be joined to
prepositions which mark relations for which the other cases do
not suffice. The authors provide illustrations mainly in Latin
and there is some discussion on the different means in each
(2 )language of expressing the same relation .
1. Grammaire generate, Ch. VI, p. 33.
2. Ibid., Ch. VI.
The possibility of ambiguity, which requires know­
ledge of the context to resolve, is discussed in relation 
to the various specific cases falling under the general 
purpose of the genitive case. In ’vulnus Achillis1, the 
genitive Achillis can signify either relation of the 
subject and be taken in the passive sense for the wound 
received by Achilles, or the relation of cause, the wound 
Achilles has caused ^  .
Consistent with the emphasis in the Logique on the main
operations of mind, which are reflected in the proposition
as a judgment, consideration of word classes in this work
is limited to nouns, pronouns (described as words which
take the place of nouns), and verbs. These are referred
to as the main parts of the proposition and the three kinds
(2)of words mainly invented for the four operations of mind .
Consideration of other aspects affecting nouns, and of 
other word classes, falls to the Grammaire. Although all 
words are regarded in this work as signifying either 
object or manner of thought, apart from the main classes, 
noun and verb, little or no substantiation is given for 
this classification, the reasons for the words and of 
grammatical features being given in terms such as the 
purpose for which they were invented, their manner of sig­
nifying, their usage.
Thus, for instance, the sub-division of substantive
nouns into proper and general is explained by their repres-
(3)entation of particular and general ideas respectively'
(4)
Singular and plural markings are manners of signifying
1. Ibid., p. 35.
2. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. I.
3. Grammaire Generale, Pt. II, Ch. III.
4. Ibid., Ch. IV.
Gender was introduced with adjectives to make the expression
clearer through distinguishing between male and female,
and its use was generally extended, sometimes being applied
with a particular reason, sometimes by c h a n c e ^ .  Articles
are particles invented to determine the vague signification
(2 )of common nouns in a way additional to that of numberv .
Adverbs are explained by man's inclination to shorten speech.
Most adverbs express in one word what would be signified by
(3)a preposition and a noun .
Of particular interest are the further criteria applied 
to nouns, which appear to be aimed at reconciling conceptual, 
semantic and syntactic aspects.
In addition to the first distinction between nouns, of 
substantives, signifying substances, and adjectives, which 
signify their accidents, corresponding respectively to 
the subject and attribute of the proposition, the further 
notion of manner of signifying is introduced. Because sub­
stance exists by itself, substantives exist by themselves 
in the expression, without the need of another noun, even 
if they signify accidents. Adjectives, on the other hand,
are those which by their manner of signifying need to be
(4 v
joined to other nouns .
Padley comments that this Aristotelian-based distinction,
and the philosophical terms of the signification of substance
and accident/followed mediaeval and much Humanist practice.
The syntactic criterion appeared with Linacre and Colet; the
combined philosophical and syntactic definition with Campanella
and Vossius, the latter specifically referring to Aristotle
(5)as an authority .
1. Ibid., Ch. V.
2. Ibid., Ch. VII.
3. Ibid., Ch. XII, p. 65.
4. Ibid., p. 25.
5. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 244-245.
But Port-Royal experienced the same difficulties in 
application as did the Modistae in that lexical signifi­
cation did not necessarily agree with the syntactic 
distinctions^. Such cases are reconciled by Port-Royal
through use of the mediaeval distinction between denotation
(2)
and connotation .
(3)The reason given for a noun not being able to exist 
on its own is that in addition to its Signification dist- 
incte1 it has a 1 signification confuse *. 'Rougeur' is 
the 'signification distincte V°r precise denotation of 
1 rouge1 but it connotes imprecisely ('signification confuse1) 
what it is that is red. Hence rouge cannot exist on its 
own in the expression; it must have a noun expressed or 
understood, which it connotes. When the connotation is 
removed from words signifying accidents they become sub­
stantives , as'rouge'becomes 'rougeur!. Conversely, when 
added to words signifying substances they become adjectives, 
as from'homme'one derives'humain' . When such adjectives
lose: their connotation, they in turn form new substantives,
(4)
e.g. 'humanite 'from'humain'’ .
1. Ibid., pp. 245-246.
2. Padley gives Port-Royal's most immediate grammatical 
source of their doctrine of connotation as Scaliger, 
though it had long been a theme of logic and is found 
in Ockham's Quodlibeta (Grammatical Theory in Western 
Europe, p. 247).
3. Donze traces the development of the theory of the noun 
in the texts of the Logique and the Grammaire. The 
first edition of the Logique, 1662, appears to represent
an earlier stage in Arnauld's thinking, which distinguishes 
substance from adjective according to the nature of the 
operation by which the mind grasps the object or mode 
(Donze La Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee, p. 69). The 
later edition of 1683 includes an additional chapter 
'Des Mots Par Rapport aux Propositions' (Logique, Pt. II, 
Ch. II), in which the theory appears to be presented in 
a way which reconciles the logical interpretation with 
the final version which appears in the Grammaire.
4. Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. II, p. 26.
The signification of the accident is indirect, though 
distinct, whereas that of the subject is direct, though 
indistinct^^.
Words such as'roi, philosophe, soldat1,though taken 
for substantives, are really adjectives since they signify 
accidental forms and mark a subject to which this form 
applies. They are regarded as substantives because they 
normally only relate to man and the substantive to which
(2)
they are joined can be omitted without risk of confusion
The syntactic "manner of signifying" applied by Port- .
Royal, together with their use of connotation, fall into
place with the viewof subject and attribute as objects of
thought, appropriate to the operation of mind conception,
the joining of the two forming the proposition.. In, for
example, 'la terre est ronde", the mind can perceive 'la
(3)terre1 and'rondeur'separately . 'Rondeur1thus lacks 
connotation, but when the quality of'rondeur' is affirmed 
of "la terre", it connotes 'la terre'and becomes the adjec­
tive 'ronde *.
Words, in addition to nouns and verbs, which the Port^ 
Royal, authors relate directly to the :mental operations/ are 
conjunctions., .signs';of interrogation and interjections.
Conjunctions are described as the second kind of word 
signifying form of thought (the first being the verb), 
and they comprise ’et", "non", "ou", 1 si' , and 'done'.
They come within this category because they signify the 
very operation of mind which joins or separates things, 
which denies them, considers them absolutely or conditionally.
1. Ibid., p. 27.
2. Ibid., p. 26.
3. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 73, Grammaire, Pt. II, Ch. I, 
p. 23.
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In illustration, the authors point out that there is nothing 
outside the mind which corresponds to the particle ' n o n ' . 
By inference, all the kinds of words included under 'object 
of thought1 should have a counterpart outside the mind, 
but this point is not pursued by the authors in relation to 
such words, apart from nouns and adjectives.
The interrogative, marked in Latin with 'ne', similarly
had no equivalent outside the mind, since it simply marks
the 'mouvement de notre ame' by which we wish to know
something. Various means are used to mark this 'mouvement':
voice inflexion, interrogation marks in writing, reversal
of the order of pronoun and verb. The Latin interrogatives
quis, quae, quid are pronouns to which the signification
(2)
of 'ne' is joined. . As with the relative pronoun, the 
authors allow these to belong both to 'objects of thought' 
in their capacity of taking the place of a noun, and to 
'manner of thought', in their added capacity of- interrogation.
Interjections similarly signify nothing outside ourselves. 
They are expressions which are more natural than artificial, 
marking the 'mouvements de notre ame': 'ah, heu, helas', 
etc.(3).
Words and word classes are considered further in the 
following chapter in relation to their role as signs.
1. Grammaire Generale, Pt. II, Ch. XXIII.
2. Ibid., Ch. XXIII, p. 102.
3. Ibid., p. 103.
Chapter 7. The Theory of the Sign.
The role of words as signs of thought is important in 
Port-Royal theory, but it is made quite clear in the 
Logique that thought itself has no need of language, for 
the authors state that if our reflections on thought merely 
concerned ourselves, there would have been no need for words. 
But, once having had to clothe thoughts with external signs 
to communicate them to others, the habit of using words 
results in their appearing in the mind with the thoughts 
they represent. So, it is necessary to consider, in the 
Logique, "les idees jointes aux mots, et les mots joints 
aux i d § e s " ^  .
It is the concept of 'idea1 which dominates the Port-
Royal view of the way in which words express thought. The
idea must already exist in the mind for the word or words
(2 )tp.be understood . The point is emphasised in Arnauld's
criticism, of Hobbes' reference to the possibility of
reasoning being nothing more than the linking together of
nouns by the word 'est*. The veiy allocation of signs
depends on the pre-existence of ideas which the signs are
to represent. If reasoning depended on words, the diverse
languages of the world would produce different reasonings
(3)
on the same truths
The view that thought requires no need of language,
which is only necessary for communicating with others, was
a dominant feature of St. Augustine!s thinking on language.
The Logique introduces frequent references to Augustine,
and the extent to which the Port-Royal philosophy of the
sign, both in inspiration and detail, was indebted to his
(4)influence, is particularly emphasised by Robinet .
1. Logique, Preamble to Pt. I, p. 60.
2. Ibid., Ch. I, p. 67.
3. Ibid., pp. 68-9.
4. Le Langage a l'Age Classique, Paris, 1978, Livre I.
In tracing Augustine's reflections on the sign, Robinet
instances points of similarity between these and the theories
of the classical e r a ^  . Most of these find an echo in
Port-Royal's thinking on this subject. Thought has its
source in communion with the 'Verbe', (the Word, which was
in the beginning ..). Through this, perfect knowledge'is
possible without the need for images or signs. The Word,
which is above all language, takes on signs merely to
become intelligible to others. Speech, necessarily purely
conventional, is a lengthening and slowing down of thought.
Language is analytical. Words are not the idea, merely
the sign of the idea. Language is the most important of
the signs because it is a monitor of truth: memory, in
re-calling words, brings to mind the things of which the
(2)words are signs- .
The common ground between the Cartesian concept of
thought and the idea and that of Augustine has .already
(3)been noted above . Robinet comments that the level of 
thought 'which only concerns ourselves' is what Descartes, 
Malebranche and Augustine call 'reflection', not a function, 
but an essence, which produces the 'idea* of Descartes and 
Arnauld, in its strict sense, equivalent to Augustine's 
knowledge of the thing itself. The representation of the 
object by the sign is a resemblance which is less that of
(4)
the original purity of thought or idea . "Representer 
est second: penser c'est presenter dans la participation
1. It seems that Augustine also made certain intuitive
observations about language, not directly dependent on his
theological convictions about the purity of thought in its
relationship with the 'Verbe' though in sympathy with them. 
Robinet refers to his frequent remarks to the effect that 
what he says no longer corresponds with what he knows
and that what he has just learned disappears as soon as 
he wants to communicate it (Ibid., p. 25).
2. Ibid., pp. 13-19.
3. Ch. 4, p. 57.
4. Le Langage 5 l'Age Classique, p. 21.
( 1V
intuitive" . This is a vital distinction affecting
Port-Royal? what one calls 'penser1 is not the same at all
as what is called 1parler1. "La pensee donne la replique
exacte et muette de la vision du savoir dans la participation
sans ecart au Verbe. La communication n'est pas partici-
(2 )
pation: elle manifeste l'exclusion" .
The theological convictions of Port-Royal, continues 
Robinet, evident in the texts of the Logique and the Grammaire, 
incline the Solitaires to the intuitive and authentic 
nature of thought, deriving eventually from the Deity.
But this purity of thought is compromised by the need to 
communicate and to usie signs. Through the habitual use of 
signs with ideas, thifiking is no longer in its isolated pure 
state of meditation, but is identified with logic, and it 
is this which makes it necessary to consider ideas joined
(3)
to words and words joined to ideas . The four main 
operations of the mind, concevoir, juger, raisonner and 
ordonner, on this interpretation, are related to thought 
in alliance with language, in less than its pure state.
Robinet refers to the objective of these operations being 
to depart as little as possible from the purity of an idea 
"qui donne la Lumiere dans 1*intuition instantanee et sans 
lieu"(4).
Consistent with their view of the idea, Port-Royal
emphasise that, although the joining of a certain idea to
a certain sound is arbitrary, ideas are not, and they do
not depend on our imagination, at least those which are
(5)clear and distinct .
1. Ibid., p. 22.
2. Ibid., p. 19.
3. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
4. Ibid., p. 25.
5. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. I, p. 69.
Chapter IV of the Logique, Des Idees des Choses et Des 
Idees Des Signes,. contains the essence of the Port-Royal 
theory of the sign. A distinction is made between con­
sidering an object in itself, apart from what it can re­
present, as one has an idea of the earth, or the sun, and 
merely regarding an object as representing another, as 
one would consider a picture or a map. So that with the 
sign there are two ideas, that of the thing which represents, 
the other of the thing represented,and the nature of the 
sign consists in arousing the second by the first
Robinet refers to the word Exciter* as being intended
in the sense of Occasion*. That the signs are invented
by men is the indication of their contingency. It allows
the linearity of the expression and the simultaneity of
(2)thought to happen at the same time but independently .
The Logique anticipates criticism of associating spiritual 
thought with corporeal sound by emphasising that the two 
are distinct. "Car cette image du son de pensee que nous 
nous imaginons, n'est point I 1image de la pensee meme, mais 
seulement d*un son, et elle ne peut servir a nous la faire 
concevoir qu'en tant que l'ame s'etant accoutumee quand 
elle congoit ce son, de concevoir aussi la pensee, se 
forme en meme temps une idee toute spirituelle de la pensee, 
qui n* a aucun rapport avec celle du son, mais qui y est
(3)
seulement liee par 1*accoutumance." . The formula thus
avoids compromising the spiritual nature of thought.
1. Ibid., Pt. I, Ch. IV, p. 80. Robinet comments that
Augustine*s De Doctrina said as much. In fact the main
lines of Chapter IV are expounded in his work (Le 
Langage a l*Age Classique, p. 42).
2. Le Langage a l'Age Classique, pp. 32-33.
3. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. I, p. 72.
Port-Royal thinking on the subject is not restricted 
to signs in language: these are introduced into the context 
as one of various variables of signs. The Logique con­
tinues by referring to various divisions of signs, of which
three are described, "qui sont de plus grande utilite".
These are between *signes certains', such as breathing is 
a sign of life in animals, and 'signes probables', for
example , pallor in a pregnant woman: signs joined to things,
as symptoms accompany illness, and signs separated from 
things, as sacrifices of the ancient law are separated 
from what they represent: and the third division is between 
natural signs which do not depend on man's fantasy 
and those of institution and establishment, whether they 
have some connection with the 'chose figuree', .or whether 
they have none at all. "Ainsi les mots sont signes 
d'institution des pensees, et les caracteres des mots .
Thus, words are artificial signs of thoughts and written 
symbols are artificial signs of the words.
The Port-Royal approach to the sign is seen by Foucault 
to have important consequences for subsequent philosophical 
and linguistic theories, essentially because it invested 
the sign with a representational nature and therefore that 
which it represented was brought within the scope of man's 
thought. The Renaissance theory, in contrast, which 
postulated that which is signified, 'the sign', and re­
semblance, allowed for the postulation in the sign itself,
(2)of what it signified .
1. Ibid., pp. 80-82.
2. Les Mots et Les Choses, pp. 77-79.
He points out that, in contrast to the preceding
sixteenth century conception which linked the sign closely
with the object signified, whether by resemblance,
affinity, or divine origin, none of the three variables
described by Port-Royal necessarily implies similarity with
the thing signified, not even natural signs, foy though
spontaneous, the latter are not a n a l o g o u s ^ . Because,
according to the first variable, the sign is certain or
probable, it is located in consciousness; there is nothing
unknown about it. For the sixteenth century, it was the
language of the things themselves which were regarded as
giving signs their signifying function, and a certain
(2)
secrecy and divine origin were ascribed to them
The Port-Royal distinction between signs inherent in 
things and those separated from things allowed, in contrast 
to the sixteenth century dependence of the sign on what 
it signifies, for separate consideration and arrangement 
of knowledge ^  .
The third variable, allowing for conventional signs,
presented the possibility of choosing them for their
simplicity and practicability, in contrast to the rigid
view of signs as natural and therefore beyond the scope
(4)
of direction .
This opening up of the sign through its representational
nature- to man's own powers, favourable to analysis and
conducive to ideas of artificial and universal languages,
is seen by Foucault as : contributing to the thinking of
(5)
Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, and Condillac
1. Ibid., p. 72.
2 o Ibid,, pp0 72-73.
3. Ibid., p. 75.
4. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
5. Ibid., pp. 75-77.
It is noteworthy that the idea of the sign is contained 
in the part of the Logique which deals with the first 
operation, of mind, ’concevoir1, and that all references 
in the specific chapter devoted to it, ’Des Idees des 
Choses et Des Idees des Signes’, Ch. IV, place it in the 
context of ’idea’ and ’object*, or’chose *. Any examples 
used to illustrate the authors’ points are nouns. However, 
the subsequent chapters, including Chapter V, ’ideas 
according to their composition or simplicity’, where the 
abstraction of parts or qualities is discussed, and 
Chapter VIII, dealing with complex terms, indicate the 
intention to include under ’idee’, modified nouns, and 
modes as expressed by adjectives.
There is no attempt in either the Logique or the 
Grammaire to provide a comprehensive account of how the 
authors* concept of the sign is followed through in 
associating the operations of mind and theksubstance and
i
form of thought with the various word classes, so that 
one is left to draw inferences from the evidence available.
In so far as the sign is linked with the substantive 
noun, the position might be presented as follows:
Through the use of a sign for an object, the idea of 
the sign, as representative of the object, becomes identi­
fied with the idea of the object itself, and the mind 
associates the sign with the specific object, thus giving 
the word meaning', which, in Port-Royal terms, would be 
the representation of the object. As definition, one 
might say that the meaning of a sign is the idea of the 
object which it arouses in the mind, through its role as
representative of the object conceived. One might give a 
shorter definition, e.g. the meaning of the sign is the 
representation of the object conceived, but this would not 
take account of the fact that it is only endowed with 
this meaning because it arouses in the mind, the idea of 
the object it represents.
It would thus appear thatthe word ’soleil' would arouse 
simultaneously in the mind the idea of the sun,or,in other words, 
having become accustomed to associating words with ideas, man,, 
on perceiving the sun would have the idea of the sun and, 
associated with it, the idea of the word which represents 
it. In terms of conception, it seems that the only 
additional operations involved throughs the use of the 
sign are the idea of the sign, and its association with 
the idea of the object conceived.
In the case of the second operation of mind, juger, or 
affirmation, the action represented by the verb ’est*, the 
position is less clear. Whereas, without language, the 
idea of an object is produced by the action of mind in 
’concevoir1, the action of ’juger* is purely an internal 
mental operation, not in itself producing an idea. For 
it to be expressed by an external sign, or word, the word 
would either have to be joined directly to the action, with an 
association which would presumably go against the Port-Royal 
principle of keeping corporeal sound distinct fran the 
purity of thought, or, alternatively, in order to conform 
to the idea of the sign occasioning in the mind the idea 
of the object, the mind would need to observe its own 
action. In this case the idea of ’est* would occasion in 
the mind the idea of affirmation. The ’idea of affirmation* 
as against the direct action of the mind in affirming, is 
therefore an additional menial operation brought about by
the use of language. This interpretation appears to be 
supported by Port-Royal’s reference to the fact that the 
expression of a proposition requires two ideas, one for 
the subject, the other for the attribute, and another 
word to mark the union which our mind observes.
’II est certain que nous ne saurions exprimer une 
proposition aux autres, que nous ne nous servions de deux 
idees: l ’une pour le sujet, et l ’autre pour l ’attribut, 
et d ’un autre mot qui marque 1 *union que notre esprit y
• 4.» (1)congoit’ .
Although adjectives are regarded as words expressing
objects of thought, i.e. subject to the operation of
mind ’concevoir’, their role in relation to the theory of
the sign does not appear to be completely clear. Since
they are described as nouns signifying things as modified,
marking directly the thing though confusedly and indirectly
the mode though more distinctly, and since a mode or
(2)attribute does not exist without a subject , it would 
seem that for the idea of an attribute, say red, to be 
related to the idea of its sign, the idea would be conceived 
as ’having the property of connoting redness’.
For the functioning of the sign to apply in the same 
way to other parts of speech, it seems that the mind would 
also need to regard the mental concepts which the sign 
represents as objects, and, as with the verb ’est’-, the 
implication is that to do so the mind observes its own 
operations. On this basis, the functioning of a sign is 
a principle which operates jn the same way, irrespective of 
which type of word is involved.
On the other hand, Foucault’s interpretation, described 
below, appears to merge the functioning of the sign with 
the question of what the sign represents in terms of 
grammatical categories.
1. Logique, Pt. II, Ch. XVII, -p. 219.
2. Ibid., Ch. II, p. 73.
Foucault considers the inclusion of the theory of the
sign, not in the Grammaire Generate, but in the Logique
*au coeurrde la reflexion sur l'idee1^ ,  to be entirely
appropriate since the analysis of signs forms part of the
analysis of the relations of the idea with its object.
To give a sign to an idea is to give oneself an idea
whose object represents the object of the first idea. He
sees the relation of the idea to its sign as opening up
the relationship of the original idea to its object. It
is in so far as representation is always representation
of something that it can accommodate a sign. 1 Le langage
ou plutot le mot-signe se loge dans l'espace ouvert par
(2)l'idde qui represente son objet*
This interpretation, which places the idea of the sign 
between the idea and its object^appears to be inconsistent 
with Port-Royal's intentions in that it compromises their 
aim. to segregate the spirituality of thought from the 
physical sign (see p. 100 above), and, by attributing to 
the idea of the object a representational value similar to 
that of the sign, devalues the nature of the 'idea1. It 
is true that the Logique, in referring to the idea of an 
object says that it is "tie form in which we represent to
(3)
ourselves the idea" , but it is doubtful whether Port- 
Royal would regard 'idea* as having the same representational
nature as the sign, namely the lower value of a map or
' . . (4)picture .
1. Introduction to the Grammaire Generate, pp. XVI-XIX.
2. Ibid., p. XVIII.
3. Logique, p. 59.
4. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. IV, p. 80.
Marin, well aware of the problems involved in the 
Port-Royal distinction between thought and language, 
distinguishes between representation in the idea of the 
object and in the sign by describing the idea of the 
object as a presence, the form of presentation of it to
the mind, that of the sigmas a repetition of the pres-
(1) ence .
Pursuing his interpretation of the Port-Royal theory, 
Foucault envisages two general principles at two separate 
levels, with the sign in its capacity as object, as the 
point of departure. These principles govern the specifi­
cation of the different categories of words.
The two principles are contained in the following 
formula, which again, does not seem to respect the Port- 
Royal distinction between the idea of the sign and the 
idea of the object.
> (objet=idee —  > ) objet
A2 Bl B2
The word (A2) is the object which functions like the 
idea (Bl) of the object (B2) and which has the idea (Al) 
as its representative formin the mind. The first level 
is that of the idea, (Bl) , represented by the sign,(A2> 
the second that of the object, (B2) represented by the 
idea (Al) but through the intermediary of the sign. Ideas 
(Bl) can be of conceptions or affirmations and words 
representing affirmations are verbs. At the second level, 
(B2), objects can be substances, designated by substantives, 
or accidents, designated by adjectives. Variations occur
idee
Al
1. La critique du discours, Paris 1975, p. 60.
between levels one and two, according to .the number and 
extent of the ideas, reflected in manners of signifying. 
Beyond level 2, prepositions are manners of signifying 
relations between o b j e c t s .
It is noticeable that Foucault relates ideas to 
'affirmation1 as well as 'conception*, but it is not clear 
whether, in so doing, he is regarding the mind as observing 
its own action.
Foucault's table demonstrating the position of the 
different categories of words in relation to the two levels 
is reproduced below.
Niveau Differentiation par Categories grammat*
icales
Logique 
Idee (a)
Objet- 
signe(a) 0
1/2
le nombre de signes 
l'etendue du signe
sing, plur
art. def. - indef,
Idee (b) 1 la nature de 1'idee
1 1/2 1 'extension de l'idee noms propres-
communs
Objet (b) 2 la nature de l'objet substantifs-
adjectifs
2 1/2 les rapports entre prepositions
objets
I' introduction to the Grammaire Generale, XIX-XXII.
Though recognising that this table does not cover the 
whole field of grammar, Foucault considers the other facts of 
grammar to be . mainly modifications using this first 
analysis as a starting point. He classifies the modifica­
tions under the headings of those which are analogous, 
those made for reasons of clarity, those made in the 
interests of brevity, and changes in word order, and 
draws attention to the fact that these four procedures are 
similar to the four figures of construction described at 
the end of the Grammaire, 'syllepse, pleonasme, ellipse 
and hyperbate'^ .
Foucault therefore concludes that there is no hetero­
geneity in the Port-Royal analysis and classification of 
words. Three strata constitute the entire edifice of 
grammar. The first, that of the proposition with its 
main elements, verb, substantive and adjective, at which 
level logic and grammar are in unison; the second includes 
marking for .number, the articles, the distinction between 
proper and common nouns, and prepositions. Taken to this 
stage the structure of language is adequate for expression: 
correlation between grammar and logic are maintained but 
do not correspond exactly. The categories of generality, 
singularity, particularity, complexity and simplicity 
are both included in the Logique and the Grammaire, but 
in different forms. The first two levels form 'la couche 
deductible et absolument indispensable de la grammaire'.
The third stratum includes genders, personal and relative 
pronouns, adverbs and verbs other than the verb 1etre'.
It is the 'figurative' stage which manifests the fulfil­
ment of particular languages, in reality formed from the
(2)
basic elements transformed . Apart from its apparent in­
consistency with the Port-Royal conception of the sign/ mentioned 
above, Foucault's interpretation is supported with evidence from
1. Ibid., p. xxiii.
2. Ibid., pp. xiii-xxv.
the. Grammaire and the Logique, though neither work 
provides an explicit formulation of such a plan*
Donze provides a useful synthesis of all the material
in the! Grammaire Generate and the Logique, which is
associated with s i g n s ^ . In so doing, he stresses the
importance of the theory of the linguistic sign in the
Grammaire as well as the Logique, a fact which, he remarks,
historians, considering the two works have overlooked. He
also sees the theory as one of the aspects by which one
can best judge the extent of collaboration between Arnauld
and Lancelot. The doctrine conceived in the Logique
was applied by Lancelot in the Grammaire, but only Arnauld
would have had a comprehensive view of the theory and
his thinking would have had considerably greater impact
(2 )
had it been presented in coherent form
Among the points summarised by Donze which have not 
already been referred to in this study, at least, in the 
context of the sign, are the role of the written sign 
and the! various references to the reasons for which words 
have been invented.
In general, discussion of the sign in the Logique does 
not distinguish between the written and the spoken sign, 
but it can be; assumed that unless there is any indication 
to the contrary the doctrine appropriate to the spoken 
sign applies. The physical aspect of the sign, namely 
the sounds which compose it and the written characters
1. ; Donze, La Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee, Pt. II, Ch. I.
2. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
which are their equivalent are described in the first 
part of the Grammaire, the Spiritual1 aspect, the use 
made of them to signify thoughts, forming the subject of 
the second, and major part of the work.
As noted by Donze, the sound represents the thought 
directly, writing being only a reproduction of the sound, 
which alone has the truly signifying function. But in 
usage this character of the sound is sometimes overlooked, 
and the written word is regarded as a direct sign of the 
object of thought . Written language thus achieves a certain 
degree of autonomy relative to the sounds it is intended 
to denote. In certain cases it has an advantage, for in 
'champs1 and 'chants' one sign applies to both in the 
spoken language, whereas two distinct signs are provided 
in the written language. It therefore supplements the 
sound and, adopting the symbolic function in the same way 
as does the sound, comes directly into contact.with the 
thing s i g n i f i e d ^ .
In bringing together the numerous references which occur 
in the Grammaire to inventions of words, Donze, though 
criticising recourse to the theme as inept, mentions that 
one should not be taken in by the apparent naiveness of 
it; it is highly unlikely that the authors had in mind some 
precise historic event. Words were invented by men: 1)some­
times to satisfy the expression of thought: prepositions
(2)
and cases to express the relations between things: ;
(2)
modes, to express distinctly what is in the mind .
2) Sometimes the reason givei is ease of communication: 
pronouns, to avoid r e p e t i t i o n ^ ; adverbs, to shorten speech
1. Ibid., p. 58.
2. Grammaire Generate, Ch. VI.
3. Ibid., Ch. XVI.
4. Ibid., Ch. VIII.
by saying in one word what would need a preposition and a
noun ^  . 3) Sometimes for clarity and grammatical distinction
of the expression: gender to make the expression less confused;
rules of agreement. 4) Lastly, for reasons of good taste:
the pronoun of the first person, to avoid the bad taste of
(2)naming oneself ; the genders to embellish the expression
(3)
by the variety of endings .
Donze also refers to the following considerations discussed 
in the Logique on the nature of the sign.
Arnauld* s recognition of ambiguity ..in the arbitrary nature 
of the sign leads him to discuss the possibilities of confusion 
deriving from this, confusion which is not present in the
(4)
ideas to which the words are attached , for although words 
are arbitrary, thoughts are not. Confusion only arises if 
the arbitrary character of the words is associated with the 
thought.
(5)
The theory of definitions leads Arnauld to give some
definitions relating to the nature of the link between the idea
of the sound and the idea of the thing. The definition of
the word 'proprement dit* is that by which, without any
consideration of usage, a certain idea is attached to a certain 
(6)word . But the authors also allow for the definition of the
(7)
word according to what it signifies in usage . The first
corresponds to the original arbitrary institution of the sign;
the second reflects the constraint by convention on the
(8)
individual needing to communicate .
8 . Donze, La Grammaire 
Generale et Raisonnee, 
pp. 53-54.
1. Ibid., Ch. XII.
2. Ch. VIII.
3. Ibid., p. 50.
4. Logique, Pt. I, Ch. I, p. 69.
5. Ibid., Pt. I, Ch. XII-XIV.
6. Ibid., Ch. XII, p. 120.
7. Ibid., Ch. XIV.
Also influencing the use of words are the 1idees access-
oires1^ .  These comprise firstly, those expressing, together
with the 1 chose*, the opinion, passion or emotion of the
speaker and can include mere gestures or voice tonal
changes, hnd secondly , those which the mind draws from
the circumstances of speech to add, to those precisely
signified by the words, a more general idea. The demonst-
(2)
rative pronouns are used in this sense .
A final topic of interest consists in the.comparisons 
of the Port-Royal concept of the sign with the theories,of 
the Modistae.
While Chevalier • sees the Port-Royal theory as
(3)drawing to some extent on that of the Modistae , Padley
(4)
concentrates on the differences between the two systems .
The greater propensity for analysis in the Modistae 
system is illustrated in the following short summary based 
on Siger de Courtrai's system.
Things (res) have properties (modi essendi), which the 
mind apprehends by the active modes of understanding 
(modi intelligendi activi), to which there correspond 
the passive modes of understanding (modi intelligendi 
passivi), the qualities of things as apprehended by 
the mind. The mind confers on vocal noises, active 
modes of signification (modi significandi activi), by 
which they become words (dictiones) and parts of speech 
(partes orationis), and signify the qualities of 
things, these being represented by the passive modes 
of signification (modi significandi passivi). The
1. Logique, Pt. I, Chs. XIV and XV.
2. Donze, La Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee, pp. 5 3-54.
3. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 49 6-497.
4. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 241-24 4.
parts of speech (partes orationes) also have 
modes of signifying, divided into essential and 
accidental. They have the capability of co- 
signifying, i.e. of signifying syntactically 
and to do so acquire the modus consignificandi, 
the syntactic mode of signifying^^.
Major differences between the above and the Port-Royal
concept are the allowance in the Modistae system for the
separate existence of reality, and the distinction between
the meaning of a word and its grammatical function, a
(2 )distinction favourably regarded by Donze . Padley, in
addition, refers to the specific recognition of vox, the
formal component of the word, and of the mind's action in
(3)grasping the reality.in the system of the Modistae .
lo The description of Siger's system is given by R. H. 
Robins in his Ancient and.Mediaeval Grammatical Theory 
in Europe, London, 1951, p. 820 Siger also has a Modi 
Signandi between the Modi Intelligendi and the Modi 
Significandi. The voces are words (dictiones) by 
virtue of the Modi Signandi and the parts of speech 
signifying the qualities of things by virtue of the 
Modi Significandi. Robins comments that Siger's account 
anticipates de Saussure's theory of the word as a sign 
uniting a concept and an acoustic image; (Ibid.).
2. Donze, La Grammaire Generate, p. 48.
3. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, pp. 241-244.
Chapter 8. Summary.
Port-Royal grammatical theory tends to suffer by com­
parison with what has been claimed for it rather than with 
the authors1 own stated aims, which appear to be relatively 
modest. Although the three main works, the Grammaire Generate, 
the Logique and the Nouvelle Methode latine, between them con­
tain obvious elements which contribute to a comprehensive 
theory of language based on an a priori conception of thought, 
the authors do not claim this for their work.
The emphasis of the Grammaire Generate is, as Donze points 
out, simply on consideration of what is common to all languages. 
The eventuality of common principles was only exceptionally 
envisaged and materialised in the five maxims said to be 
widely used in all l a n g u a g e s ^ . The Grammaire, in effect, 
went further than its ostensible aims in that the association 
of mental operations with grammatical features, in sympathy 
with ideas considered in the Logique, provided a universal 
mental basis for such principles, but there was no declared 
intention in either work to construct a theory of language.
That their work has sometimes been judged in relation to 
more sophisticated standards is largely due to the consequences 
of Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics, and doubtless the reper­
cussions from this publication stimulated the exceptional 
interest in Port-Royal*s antecedents.
As the question of antecedents is not a basic issue of this 
study, the various comparisons with earlier theories have been 
noted but the validity of the inferences which may be drawn 
from them has not been pursued. The large number of references 
to similar aspects in earlier theories certainly indicate the 
extent to which Port-Royal drew, intentionally or not, on 
the tremendous heritage of thinking about language, grammar 
and philosophy which was available to them. As far as philo­
sophy is concerned, the point is particularly brought home
1. La Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee de Port-Royal, pp. 35-36.
by Clair and Girbal's comment that the notes to their own 
edition of the Logique read like a history of the philosophy 
of the Western w o r l d ^ .  Among others, Lakoff, Padley and 
Salmon have amply illustrated the Port-Royal debt to previous 
grammarians.
Compiling their works at the time they did, the Port-Royal 
authors would have found it difficult to ignore the long 
heritage to which they, and others of the period were heirs, 
and to avoid being influenced in some way by the powerful 
philosophical and theological thinking of the time.
That Port-Royal theory may appear as a hybrid complex of 
inherited elements need not in itself detract from its value. 
That such elements were welded together into a body of doctrine 
which had some cohesion and which bore the authors1 own stamp 
is in itself an achievement. In effect it appears as a 
synthesis of numerous features inherited and contemp­
orary, and as such may have eased the way for those who 
followed.
The potential components for a theory of language, which 
can be identified from the Port-Royal publications, may be 
described as:
A belief in the universality of thought which is reflected 
in common features of language.
An a priori conception of the nature of thought.
A formula for translating thought into language. This 
consists of the equation of the logical operations with parts 
of speech, and their direct presentation in the proposition.
The reduction of figurative expressions to the form of 
proposition which presents the logical operations.
The theory of the sign, governing the representation of 
ideas by words.
The concept of natural order.
1. Clair & Girbal, Ed. critique of 1683 ed. of La Logique, p. 3.
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These components do not appear to be novel in themselves 
but the Port-Royal authors1 application of them results not 
simply in an expression of thought in the proposition, but in 
a means of explaining how thought is translated into language.
It seems that in this, too, they may not have been innovators,
but they certainly provided an example of a psychological
., (1) theory .
While Padley's description of the three Port-Royal publi­
cations as an "imposing and coherent body of doctrine and
(2)
practice" appears to be largely justified, the term
'coherent* is not entirely appropriate if one expects the
consistency and exhaustiveness of a fully developed theory.
Although a certain amount of co-ordination is evident, there
are instances of lack of clarity in definitions and of inadequacy
in explanations. Illustrative of these are the reflections in
the Logique on the nature of thought, and the signifying role
(3)of language, which are open to interpretation . The
criteria of object and manner of thought are insufficiently
(4)convincing in their application to word categories . The 
distinction between the mental operations of conception and 
judgment appears to be inadequately explained in relation to 
complex terms ^ .
That the Port-Royal authors' thinking did not mature into 
a more fully developed and consistent theory appears to be 
due partly to the fact that the theory oscillates between the 
influence of Lancelot, who concentrated on grammar, and that 
of Arnauld, whose pre-occupation was with thought, and whose
1. Karl Zimmer comments that Sanctius may also have had a 
psychological theory but has the impression that the Port- 
Royal theory is more insightful than that of Sanctius, and 
can be legitimately claimed to represent a new development. 
(Review of Cartesian Linguistics. International Journal
of American Linguistics, Vol. XXXIV, 1968, p. 291.
2. Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, P. 25 6.
3. Chapter 7 „of this section.
4. Chapter 4 of this section.
5. Ibid.
deliberations were much influenced by his theological con­
victions as well as by features of contemporary philosophy.
Such oscillations are noted by comments such as Chevalier's 
that "Les Auteurs ne voient pas comment exploiter sur le 
plan linguistique cette analyse de la proposition. L'attelage 
d'Arnauld et de Lancelot est tiraille entre les soucis d*un 
logicien qui recherche un art de penser et les alarmes d fun 
pedagogue tres scrupuleusement attache a son ouvrage ...1 ^  .
This comment perhaps does not do justice to Lancelot, for
the reconciliation of the broader strategy of Arnauld's thinking
with the more precise facts of grammar appears to present
some difficulties. In contrast with the uncomplicated approach
indicated in the Nouvelle Methode latine, where, in relating
'syntaxe figuree* to 1syntaxe reguliere1, the latter is termed
(2 )
simply 'celle qui suit l fordre naturel. 1 , the discussions
in the Logique on thought in its relationship with language 
disregard boundaries and can hardly be described as conclusive.
A suitable appraisal by Louis Marin brings out the fact that 
in its tensions between the nature of thought and that of 
language, it is as if "tout le probleme de la Logique de Port- 
Royal etait de reflechir, sans la maitriser, la difference
(3)
du langage dans la pensee."
Whereas the Logique alludes to the limitations of language 
in truly conveying thought, the Grammaire aims nevertheless 
to incorporate the structure of thought into grammar. In the 
Grammaire there is no obvious confusion on the nature of thought 
since its structure is identified with the logical operations.
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 501.
2. Nouvelle Methode latine, 8th edn., p. 355. Lancelot no
doubt accepted the association of 1syntaxe simple1 with 
the logical operations, at least at the stage of the 8th
edition, when Arnauld and Nicole appear to have been
associated with the work, and the affirmative role of
the verb was acknowledged. But the context of the Nouvelle 
Methode latine is primarily linguistic and it lacks explicit 
references to an underlying logical structure.
3. La critique du discours, p. 43.
However, discussion in the Logique points to the complexities 
surrounding the authors* views on the nature of thought in 
its relationship with language. As the relationship is much 
affected by the belief in the spirituality of thought, such 
discussion also has strong religious associations. The 
identification of the logical operations with the structure 
of language may appear to transcend the complexities implied 
by such discussion, but even the relationship of these oper­
ations with language appears to be open to interpretation^^•
(2 )If, as Robinet implies , the logical operations are a
consequence of the use of language, even though they depart
as little as possible from "la purete d*une idee qui donne
(3)la Lumiere dans 1*intuition instantanee et sans lieu ..." ,
the relationship with language to thought is not with thought 
in its original nature, but with a form of thought which falls 
short of this. In this case, one might question the:f.need for 
a formula of the sign which detaches the material expression 
from a form of thought which is already associated with 
language and is less than perfect. This is perhaps an illust­
ration of the difficulty in reconciling Port-Royal*s tenuous 
conception of the nature of thought with the material facts 
of language.
1. . The complexities are discussed at some length by Louis
Marin in his *La critique du discours*. The following 
extracts from this work give some indication of their nature.
. "Peut-etre est-ce le statut propre du langage dans la 
Logique qui provoquera le d&placement du discours logique 
lui-meme vers 1 *analyse ethnico-psychologique ou theologico- 
spirituelle? ... (p. 42).
. "Du meme coup, la logique est simultanement un discours 
. et un discours sur le discours; elle est indissolublement
philosophie reflexive et metalangage et c*est la son
ambigu’ite..." (ibid., p. 49).
2. Chapter 7, p. 100 above.
. 3. Le Langage a l*Age Classique, p. 25.
Although Chomsky*s comparison of the Port-Royal theory
with transformational grammar partly survives, in that the
mental operations themselves provide a framework for syntactic
structure and a means of generating novel utterances, the
mental basis envisaged by Port-Royal is obviously different
from the 'biological* innateness visualised by C h omsky^.
Port-Royal*s syntactic framework cannot moreover be regarded
as autonomous since they make it clear that they rely on
semantic and contextual evidence to ascertain the nature of
(2)
some syntactic forms . Semantic primacy is also indicated 
by their theory of the functioning of the sign and by the 
sequence of the logical operations, which imply that the first 
consideration is the formation of an idea. A noun materialises 
because an object has been conceived, which, for the purpose 
of communication, is arbitrarily provided with a sign. It 
may be argued that the syntactic structure is automatic, since 
the grammatical class is an inevitable consequence of the 
mental operation, but it appears that understanding .precedes 
syntax, since it does not depend on a sign.
Although other similarities between Port-Royal theory and
(3)
modern theory have been noted , in general it has no obvious
features of current relevance. Its importance appears to 
rest mainly in the stimulus it provided for later philosopher
1. "The "innateness hypothesis", then, can be formulated as 
follows: Linguistic theory, the theory of UG, construed 
in the manner just outlined, is an innate property of
the human mind. In principle, we should be able to account 
for it in terms of human biology." (Chomsky, Reflections 
on Language, p. 34).
2. Chapter 5 contains illustrations of this. The point was 
also made by George Lakoff. "The theories of Sanctius and 
the Port-Royal grammarians differ from the theory of trans­
formational grammar in a crucial way. They do not acknow­
ledge the existence of a syntactic deep structure in Chomsky*s 
sense but assume throughout that syntax is based on meaning 
and thought." (In Parret, Discussing Language, 1974, p. 173).
3. Brekle compares the Port-Royal application of the scholastic 
notion of substance and accident to grammatical criteria 
with the immediate constituents of modern theory, and 
relates the Port-Royal term 'signification distincte' to 
lexical meaning and 'signification confuse1 with grammatical 
meaning. (Die Bedeutung der Grammaire Generale et Raisonnde 
fur die heutige Sprachwissenschaft, in Indogermanische 
Forschungen, Vol. 72, 1967).
grammarians, through its example of a grammatical theory based 
on an explicit relationship of language and t hought^, and 
through discussion in the Logique on matters which were to 
be taken up in later theories, such as the role of abstraction, 
the notions of comprehension and extension, the effect of 
1idees accessoires1, and views on the shortcomings of language.
1. This point is noted by Foucault. "Pourtant l'oeuvre de 
Lancelot et d'Arnauld marque une transformation dans le 
savoir grammatical. Elle a constitue pour l1analyse du 
langage un nouvel espace epistemologique, un nouveau mode 
d 1apparition des objets grammaticaux, un nouveau statut 
pour leur analyse, une nouvelle fagon de former les concepts. 
... tout un reseau de relations a ete installe qui allaient 
permettre l 1apparition ulterieure des concepts, des 
descriptions, des explications qui caracterisent la grammaire 
generale du XVIIe et du XVIIIe siecles...". (Introduction 
to the Grammaire Generale, Paulet edn., p. xxvi.).
Part 2. Section 2C
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Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais 1676-1756.
Chapter I Introduction
Du Marsais, contributor of numerous articles on grammar to 
the Encyclopedie, in addition to his own publications in this 
field, appears as a major figure in the history of Grammaire 
generale, due to the contemporary importance and quality
of his work, to which
(1) ■ 
testifies . He also appears to have been particularly
representative of a period when grammatical theory was moving
away from the residual influence of Cartesian rationalism,
increasingly subject to the growing pressures of more recent
philosophy and of the Enlightenment.
(2)
Gunvor Sahlin regards him as the most eminent of the
(3)  
grammairierrphilosophes of the 18th century , except perhaps
for Beauzee. However, she does not consider Du Marsais1
grammatical theories to be original in themselves, but very
often remarkable only in the manner in which he could develop
or apply those of his predecessors, to whom he was closely
(4)
connected . She sees him as very dependent on Port-Royal
(5)in his grammatical theories but recognises that, despite
similarity of method in general, and in opinion on certain 
particular points, there was considerable difference between 
them, French grammar having in the intervening period been 
subject to the influence of Leibniz and Locke
1. Oeuvres de Du Marsais, Paris 1797, vol. I, hereafter
referred to as Oeuvres, with v o b  and page no.
2. Cesar Chesnau du Marsais, Paris, PUF, 1928, p. 3.
3. Sahlin provides quotations from ; 'Alembert and other
contemporaries which indicate the high esteem in which 
Du Marsais was heldo
4. Ibid., Introduction, XVI.
5. Ibid., p. IX.
6. Ibid., p. 17.
Brekle mentions that Du Marsais was able to profit from
the ideas on education of Comenius, and more especially
from both the philosophical and pedagogical work of L o c k e .
(2 )Du Marsais himself refers to Comenius' work , and, more 
positively, acknowledges Locke"s Traite de 1'Education as 
an authority for commencing tuition by routine, before 
rules ^  .
Though most of Du Marsais1 work concerned grammatical 
theory, with pedagogical aims even more pronounced than with 
other grammairien-philosophes, his writings also embraced
(4)
religion and philosophy. Among such works are his Analyse 
de la Religion Chretienne and his Logique, which includes 
material directly relevant to his theories on grammar and 
language.
(5)In his Analyse de la Religion Chretienne , he was 
very critical of orthodox Christianity, and a certain amount 
of discussion has centred on whether he was an atheist.
Werner Krauss was led to consider evidence, mainly from Du 
Marsais' contemporaries, for the question, 'Du Marsais, etait-
f c\
il janseniste ou athee?' . Krauss concludes that there is 
no doubt that the philosophies regarded him as one of the 
initiated.
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, Oeuvres Choisies, Stuttgart- 
Bad Cannstatt, 1971, p. xiii. Also noted earlier by 
Sahlin (Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 70).
2. Oeuvres, vol. I, p. 3.
3. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
4. The foreword to Oeuvres de Du Marsais, 1797, refers to 
his works being scattered, some no longer available, 
even in public libraries, others unknown.
5. Oeuvres, Vol. VII.
6. L'Enigme de Du Marsais, Revue d'Histoire litteraire de 
la France, 1962, pp. 514-522.
Whereas Krauss does not see any pronounced emphasis by 
Du Marsais on his philosophical leanings, Frangoise Soublin 
stresses the opposition- in his thinking to Cartesianisn/1^. *
She traces in Du Marsais* works statements in support of 
her interpretation that his pursuance of the same themes, 
albeit in different contexts, in turn philosophical, political, .. 
pedagogical and scientific, influenced by his broad conception 
of the nature of man, formed, as it were, a single project.
She considers that repercussions on his grammatical theory 
from this approach have not been reflected in Sahlinfs 
publication or in any of the recent commentaries on aspects 
of his w o r k ^ .
Soublin's description of Du Marsais' project as 'resolu-
(3)
ment athee' may appear justified by his sharp criticism 
of the Christian religion, and his emphasis on the well-being 
of the human race being related to life on earth ("c'est 
pour la nature, c'est pour la terre, c'est pour lui-meme 
que l'homme est fait,: c'est ici-bas qu'il doit chercher sa
(4)
felicite" . But his attacks on orthodox religion appear 
to be distinct from his belief in God.
"... regardons la religion chretienne du meme oeil que 
nous regardons tant d'autres importunes ... Les idees plus 
epurees doivent nous faire trouver une douceur extreme a 
rendre a Dieu le culte le plus digne de lui et le plus digne 
de nous."
1. Rationalisme et grammaire chez Du Marsais, in History of 
Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, ed.
Parret, Mouton 1976, pp. 383-409.
2. Soublin's article aims to reply to points made by Chomsky 
(Cartesian Linguistics, ppt47-5l, 1966) , Aarsleff (The 
History of linguistics and Professor Chomsky, p. 575, 1970) 
and Julia Kristeva (Du sujet en Linguistique), 1971, in 
the. context of transformational generative grammar and 
rationalism in general grammar.
31 Ibid., p. 384.
4. from Prejuges, OC, VI, p. 239, quoted by Soublin, ibid.
5. Analyse de la Religion Chretienne, Oeuvres, vol. VII, p. 56.
This implied belief in God is, on the contrary, put in
doubt by his article ’De la Raison* ^ , in which he puts
forward the principle of only accepting as valid, those
ideas which are verifiable through the senses and subsequent
reasoning. "D'ou l*on voit que ce principe nous jette dans
(2)le scepticisme et meme dans l*atheisme absolu."
The apparent ambivalence may be due partly to a tendency 
to consider all aspects of a matter, a feature noted by 
D*Alembert in his Eloge, which is also indicative of Du 
Marsais* moderate and dispassionate approach.
11 . . qualites dominantes de son esprit etoient la nettete 
et la justesse ... Son caractere etoit doux et tranquille; 
et son ame toujours egale, paroissoit peu agitee paries 
differens evenements de la vie ...
... esprit plus sage que brillant ... 1 'habitude qu'il 
avoit prise d ’envisager chaque idee par toutes les faces ... 
lui avait fait contracter dans la conversation une diffusion
(3)
qui passait quelquefois dans ses ecrits.
Of modern discussion on Du Marsais, Sahlin*s work, which 
concentrates on the grammatical aspects of his theory, 
remains the only major study. Appreciative acknowledgements 
of her work in recent publications, e.g. those of R. Donze,
J.-C. Chevalier, R. A. Hall Jr., though not uncritical,, are 
indicative of its relevance to issues more recently discussed, 
in spite of the fact that it was written prior to major 
developments in linguistics. However, more recent works, 
such as those of Sylvain Auroux, J.-C. Chevalier, Daniel 
Droixhe, Ulrich Ricken, Andre Robinet, as well as those to 
which reference has already been made, are more attuned to 
those aspects of Du Marsais* theory which are of current 
interest to the study of general grammar and to linguistic theory
1. Oeuvres, Vol. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 20.
3. Eloge de Du Marsais, Oeuvres vol. I.
Chapter 2. The Main Aims and Principles of Pu Marsais'
Theory
S a h l i n ^  refers to Du Marsais as the first in France
after the. Port-RoyaL authors to treat general grammar otherwise
than as an accessory to French grammar, though in the
intervening period, several French grammars appeared in
which the authors, under the influence of Port-Royal and the
prevailing philosophy, often treated their subject as if
(2)they had called their works Grammaires generales .
(3)Du Marsais, contrary to Port-Royal, provided a definition^ 
but this definition, which relates to the proposed content 
of a grammar which he did not complete, does not appear.to 
be particularly informative or meaningful in itself since 
it is limited to what he regards as the broadly common 
features of language. He considered that a grammaire generale 
should comprise observations on articulated sounds, on 
letters as signs of the sounds, and on the nature of words 
and the different ways in which they must be arranged or
(4)
modified to form a meaningful whole
While recognising that particular grammars are affected
by different usages and idioms, in practice, he does not
distinguish between the content of grammaire generale and
grammaire particuliere, and intended dealing with consider-
(5)ations relating to both under the same headings . The
general principles of grammar can be learned in any language- 
providing it is already known through usage, and the 
particular observations appropriate to any one language 
assume knowledge of the general principles .
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 3.
2. She includes among these the works of Regnier Desmarais, 
Pere Claude Buffier (L.) , Abbe de Dangeau, P. Restaut,'
P> d 1Olivet, G. Girard.
3• Ibid., p. 29.
4. Les veritables principes de la Grammaire, Oeuvres, vol. I, 
p. 274.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 219.
In addition to the common facility for language evident 
in the general features referred to above, certain other 
basic premises usual to those subscribing to a form of 
universal grammar are obvious with Du Marsais.
Although expression in language is subject to variety, 
the essential features of thought which are at the basis of 
expression are universally the s a m e ^ .
There is a close connection between language and thought. 
With Du Marsais, an important feature of this close relation­
ship is the order of thought. Language is but the expression 
of thought, and there is in expression the same order of 
thought as that existing in themind of the speaker, an order 
to which the expression can always be reduced, whatever 
its composition^ .
It would appear from the following headings, which he 
proposed for his unfinished grammar, that the work was 
intended to deal with purely grammatical considerations 
rather than formulate a comprehensive theory of language 
which would also explicitly account for the relationship 
between language and thought.
I. La connaissance de la proposition et de la periode, 
en tant qu'elles ont rapport a la grammaire, ... II. L'ortho- 
graphe. III. La prosodie. IV. L 1etymologie. V. Les 
preliminalres de la syntaxe. VI. La syntaxe. VII. Les 
tropes ^  .
The prime aim of most of his completed work is acknowledged
(4)to have been didactic 9- and it is mainly in his works 
of this nature, together with his Logique and the various
1. Methode Raisonnee pour Apprendre la Langue Latine, Oeuvres, 
vol. I, p. 23.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Les Veritables Principes de la Grammaire, Ibid., p. 2 75; 
and Avertissement to Des Tropes ou Des Differens Sens
dans lesquels on peut prendre un meme mot dans une meme 
langue, Oeuvres, vol. III.
4. Sahlin, Chevalier, Krauss.
articles he contributed to the Encyclopedie that his views 
on the relationship between thought and language can be 
found.
K r a u s s ^  comments. "Or, ce n'est pas la theorie de la 
langue qui forme le noyau des etudes de Du Marsais. En 
choisissant 1 *etude de la grammaire, il suivait son inclin­
ation pedagogique., Le centre des preoccupations de Du 
Marsais c fest 1 1 application de la grammaire a 1 *enseignement 
juvenile.11.
Chevalier, in discussing Du Marsais* educational method,
(2 )refers to his leading role in the reform of Latin teaching .
Novel in France, though it followed Locke*s recommended 
procedure, was his use cf interlineary translation, which he 
systematised.
Instead of teaching immediately by rules, he proposed
that instruction should begin by a routine in keeping with
the pupil1s own usage of his maternal language and which
would rely on the natural instinct for learning languages
in this way. Juxtaposed with the text of the mother tongue,:
the literal translation, in natural order, i.e. "selon la
construction simple et sans aucune inversion", and with
glided words inserted, would gradually accustom the pupil
to the different means used by the language being learned,to
express the same content as that of the equivalent in the
(3)mother tongue .
He also attached great importance to learning the meaning
of individual words, and becoming acquainted with the ideas
they represent, starting with objects perceived through the
senses. In emphasising the education of children in ideas
(i.e. knowledge), he refers to the previous works in this vein
(4)by P. Pomey and Comenius .
1. . Enigme de Du Marsais, p. 520.
2. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 616.
3. Methode Raisonnee, Oeuvres, Vol. I, pp. 12 and 25.
4. Ibido, p. 3.
In.his, explanation of his system of 'routine1, important 
apsects of Du Marsais1 grammatical theories become evident.
The natural order of language, reflecting the order in which 
one arranges one's thoughts, and to which the French language 
corresponds closely, is the one to which pupils, through 
usage, are naturally accustomed. To align Latin with this 
natural order, Du Marsais resorts to 'inversion' and 
'ellipsis'. His strong emphasis on 'usage' is apparent in 
the first part of his 'Methode Raisonnee'. The second part,
'De la Grammaire raisonnee', follows up instruction through 
routine by teaching the pupils the principles of 'grammaire 
raisonnee', giving the reasons for the various parts of 
speech, such as their function, and the relations between 
them ^  .
Chevalier sees the originality of Du Marsais' method in
a union of the two basic principles which had so long
(2 )been opposed in grammar . The amalgamation of- the two
(3)
principles in Du Marsais' theory was recognised by D'Alembert
1. Ibid., p. 27.
2. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 617.
3. "La Mdthode de M. Du Marsais a deux parties, 1'usage et
la raison" (Eloge de Du Marsais, Oeuvres, vol. I, p. xxiii).
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Chapter 3. The Thought Processes.
As, for Du Marsais, language is the expression of thought, 
it is appropriate to look first at his 'Logique ou Reflexions 
sur les principales operations de 1 1 esprit1^ . Though 
Sahlin describes this as having very little value and "en
(2)somme ... sensiblement inferieur a la Logique de Port-Royal"
it gives a useful insight into Du Marsais' views about the
nature of mind and its processes, providing evidence both of
his adherence to the Cartesian dualist conception of body
and mind, and of the influence of Locke, in his explanation
of the derivation of all ideas through the senses. It also
gives some indication of Du Marsais' acknowledgement of
the pervasive influence of the nature of man, the point
(3)brought out by Soublin .
»
Sahlin notes that although Du Marsais does not define
logic, his conception of it is visibly that of Arnauld, for
whom it is a normative science which establishes not facts
but rules for thought, a conception common to all grammairien-
(4)philosophes
Maintaining the dualism of body and mind, Du Marsais refers
to the two substances created by God, spiritual and corporal,
and defines the spiritual substance as that which has the
property of thinking, perceiving, willing, reasoning and
(5)experiencing sensations .
Apart from the Creator, only two kinds of spiritual sub­
stances are identified, the angel and the human soul or mind. 
His text indicates a reluctance, cynicism, even, about 
accepting the dictates of religious faith where these are not 
supported by experience or reason.
1. Oeuvres, Vol. V, pp. 303-386.
2. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. x.
3. See p.125 above.
4. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 19. The persistence of this 
approach to logic is referred to in Section I, Ch. 4, above.
5. Logique, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 303.
"A l'egard des anges, nous n'en savons que ce que la foi 
nous enseigne. Comme les anges sont des substances spirituelles, 
ils ne peuvent point affecter nos sens, et par consequent ils 
sont au-dessus de nos lumieres naturelles; et c'est un axiome 
regu de tous les savans, qu'a l'egard des anges, la foi nous 
en apprend fort peu de choses, 1 'imagination beaucoup, et la 
raison rien...11^
However, he accepts that the union of the different sub-
(2 )
stances of body and mind are the secret of the Creator .
In his subsequent discussion on the properties of the mind, 
an empirical tendency is evident,that is, empirical in so far 
as subjective observation appeared to be acceptable at that 
time. He asserts that the mind and its properties can only be 
known through the internal sensation we have of them. But, 
consistent with his view of the mind as a spiritual substance, 
the faculty of sensation is possessed by the mind only, the
(3)
body is incapable of sensation .
He contests the conclusion of the Cartesians that animals
are 'simples automates', for he considers that the situation
(4)
with regard to animals is known only by God .
Two types of sensation are distinguished, immediate, from 
the external impressions of objects on the senses, and mediate, 
the mind's reflection on the impression received through the 
senses. The mind can only feel, whether immediatelv or mediately,
(5)
according to the laws of union established by the Creator .
His description of the way in which the sense impressions
are conveyed to the brain recalls a similar description in
(6)Geraud de Cordemoy's Discours Physique de la Parole , which
(7)in turn used aspects of Descartes' physiological theory
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 307.
3. Ibid., p. 308 4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 309-310.
6. Facsimile edition of the 1677 edition, 1970, Stuttgart-Bad
Canstatt.
7. Ricken, Grammaire et Philosophie au siecle des Lumieres, 
p. 42.
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All sensations are made effective through the nerves, 
whose external extremities receive impressions of objects.
Their internal extremities communicate the impressions to 
the brain, to which all the nerves lead, notably to that part 
of the brain called the 'corps calleux, que l'on regarde comme 
le siege de l'ame'. The impressions received by the senses and 
carried by the nerves to the brain, to form the 'impression 
immediate', leave traces in the brain, which can be revived 
'par le cours des esprits animaux ou du sang', thus recalling 
the first impression and providing memory. Reflection on the 
first impression gives the 'mediate' idea. Imagination is the. 
recall of images seen previously. Operations possible as a
result of the impressions received are:
i. the joining together of certain ideas, e.g. the idea of a 
mountain and the idea of gold, enables us to imagine a mountain 
of gold.
ii. Ideas can be formed by enhancement, e.g. the idea of a 
giant from that of a man.
iii. Similarly, by diminution, the idea of a dwarf results from
the idea of a man.
iv. abstraction/ the most remarkable of mediate means of forming 
ideas. Having acquired an infinite number of particular ideas 
through the sense impressions of objects, it is possible to 
think separately, by abstraction, of certain impressions, 
without relating them to any particular object. Such are the 
ideas of number, length and width ^ .
Du Marsais emphasises the dependence of all these ways of 
thinking, by using memory, imagination, amplification, 
diminution or abstraction, on prior immediate impressions.
The will is also a property of mind, as is man's inclination
(2 )towards what is suitable for his well-being .
He identifies similar operations of mind to those of the
(3)Port-Royal authors as being of particular importance , but
1. Logique, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 312.
2. Ibid., p. 313.
3. Ibid., p. 314.
specifically allows for the influence of the imagination. 'Idea' 
replaces Port-Royal's 'concevoir' but implies the same view of 
the mind conceiving an object, without applying judgment.
"Idee, est done le nom que je donne aux affections de I'ame qui 
congoit, ou qui se represente un objet, sans en porter aucun 
jugement" ^  .
The operations are:
L'idee, qui comprend aussi 1 1 imagination
Le jugement
Le raisonnement
(2)La methode
The importance of abstraction in Du Marsais' theories, both
(3)
in the formation of general ideas and as a condition of
(4)judgment/is referred to by Soublin . Du Marsais sees abstr­
action as the point of reunion whereby the mind perceives the 
affinity between certain objects. Abstract ideas acquired 
through usage become ideas of reference against which we can 
judge whether an object has such and such a property. This 
depends on whether the object causes a similar impression to 
that caused by other objects, the ideas of which persist in the 
mind. Each kind of impression is allocated to the class to which 
it seems to belong, or if it is unique, a new or separate class
is formed. All common nouns are thus formed through the process
(5)of abstraction .
This account of the use of abstraction in the formation of.
a system of general ideas appears to owe much to Locke's similar
(6 )explanation . It is interesting to note that the same basic 
process is effected in the judgment; in both cases, as a result 
of abstraction, two ideas are compared, and the mind judges 
whether one has or has not affinity, or identity with the other.
1. Ibid., p. 316.
2. Ibid.
3. Port-Royal explained the term in relation to the formation of 
general ideas but did not apply it to the judgment (See 
Section I, Ch. 5, p.72).
4. Parret, 1976, pp. 390-391.
5. Des Tropes, Oeuvres, Vol. Ill, p. 247.
6. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Ch. III.
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As the formation of judgments requires ideas, so reasoning 
requires judgments. Reasoning consists of deducing, inferring, 
or compounding a judgment from others already known. The notion 
of identity is also carried into Du Marsais1 interpretation of 
reasoning in that he adds that it consists of demonstrating 
the identity of the judgment in question with some previous 
judgment^ . Again, this process appears to have a parallel 
with that involved in the formation of general ideas and with 
the function of judgment, in that two or more concepts are 
abstracted, and compared.
Thus judgment and the operations of mind which lead to it,
together with reasoning, dependent on it, are not possible :
without ideas, and Du Marsais makes it clear that, for him,
(2)there are no innate ideas , only a disposition to receive
certain ideas. In describing the distinction between types of
ideas, he refers to the main division between 'idees adventices',
those perceived directly from objects and 'idees factices1,
those resulting from amplification, diminution and abstraction,
(3)processes applied to the 'idees adventices' .
Soublin quotes from various works of Du Marsais in support
of her description of him as "inlassable adversaire de. l 'inneisme"
and notes that with him, and this is the key factor in his
pedagogical aims, "l'homme ne se sert pas spontanement de sa
raison, l'homme ne nait pas philosophe. La verite n'est pas
innee, force nous est de l'acquerir; mais en meme temps, l'homme
(4)est ne pour la verite, il a pouvoir et destin a l'acquerir" .
1. Logique, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 323.
2. "L'experience, c'est a dire, les impressions exterieures que 
nous recevons des objets par l'usage de la vie, et les 
reflexions que nous faisons ensuite sur ces impressions, sont 
les deux seules causes de nos idees; tout autre opinion n'est 
qu'un roman ..." (Logique, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 321).
3. Ibid., p. 321.
4. Parret, 1976,p . 388.
Though ideas are not innate, the faculties which make 
possible their materialisation in the mind are, and Du 
Marsais makes it clear that he does not regard the thoughts 
thus produced as being dependent on language. Man was able 
to think, sense, imagine, conceive and judge without words, 
and, without the need to communicate thoughts to others, 
they would have remained in their simultaneous and un­
divided s t a t e ^ , a hypothesis, comments Andre R o b i n e t ^ , 
which Beauzee would have found untenable.
In contrast to the importance accorded to reason in 
the theories of his rationalist predecessors, with Du 
Marsais it appears neither as a feature to be emphasised 
nor as a pervasive principle. He criticises the lack of 
clear definition of the word; it should not be confused, 
with the soul, in its abstract sense, but relates to the 
soul in a certain manner, when modified or operating, i.e. 
reasoning ^  .
Reason is not the order or relation found naturally 
between things. It consists of the thoughts and ideas 
formed by the soul through the use of all the faculties, 
also taking into account the relations of things to man's 
needs and welfare. "Le bon usage de toutes ces facultes
(4)
est ce que nous appelons le bon sens ou la raison."
He distinguishes between the mental operations which
(5)
are obvious perceptions, the axioms, or principles 
readily evident to the mind, which call for no reasoning,
1. Article Construction, Oeuvres, VolQ V, p Q 5.
2. Le Langage a l'Age Classique, p. 630
3. De la Raison, Oeuvres, Vol. VI, pp. 2-3.
4. Ibido
50 . Examples quoted are "le tout est plus grand que sa partie, 
. . o  le neant ne peut avoir aucunes proprietes (Ibido, p. 5).
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and in relation to which the soul remains in a passive state, 
and those which require the introduction and consideration 
of other ideas, which involves the process of reasoning^.
He thus identifies reason with the faculty of reasoning.
"... la raison peut se definir une faculte de notre ame
par laquelle nous decouvrons la certitude des choses
obscures ou douteuses, en les comparant avec des choses
(2 )
qui nous sont evidemment connues.
Reasoning can only be based on experience, the evidence 
from the senses, or that of our own understanding in its
(3) •
consideration of such evidence .
It is interesting to note that Du Marsais1 account of 
reasoning implies that even though the original formation 
of certain well known axioms may require the processes of 
judging and reasoning, the acceptance of them.does not.
It may be that such an implication can be justified 
within Du Marsais1 theory by the fact that the process of 
abstraction has already been effected in the first pronounce­
ment of the axiom, but clarification seems desirable. One 
might assume that having postulated the need for certain 
mental operations to produce a specific statement, similar 
processes would be used in understanding it. But his reference 
to consciousness Of knowledge, of judgment and reflection among 
readily evident principles^ implies that he regards 
consciousness as understanding.
For Du Marsais, the way in which the faculties operate 
is unknown, but he bases his description of thought as 
simultaneous, prior to expression in language, on intuitive 
observation, particularly verifiable from the experiences
(5)
of the first years of childhood, when language was lacking
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
4# De La Raison, Oeuvre, Vol. VI, p. 5.
5. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 4.
Such a conception of simultaneous thought had been evident 
earlier, for instance in Bernard Lamy*s Rhetorique and with 
Le Labourer, both referred to by Ricken ^  .
Though Du Marsais considers thought to be undivided in 
the pre-linguistic stage, it appears that the content of 
the judgment is nevertheless distinguishable at this point/ 
for it requires two ideas, that of the object of which one 
judges something and that of what is judged of the object.
Du Marsais describes ^judgment* as an abstract term for the 
operation of the mind by which we think that an object is, 
or is not, of such a m a n n e r ^ . .
There is also in the judgment an operation of mind 
whereby the object and that which is judged of it, is regarded 
as forming a whole. "Nous unissons, pour ainsi dire, l*un 
avec 1 1 autre." ^
Sahlin sees in this view of the proposition as a whole,
a replacement of Port-Royal*s conception of judgment, which
was dominated by the ancient logic of subsumption "Celle
qui fait entrer le sujet dans 1 *extension de l*attribut",
(4)by Leibniz* logic of identity . According to this, every
true proposition is identical either when the subject and
attribute are logically equivalent and can be substituted
(5)
for each other, or by reason of an axiom such as A is A
But although thought in the pre-linguistic stage comprises 
two ideas, it is not until it comes to be expressed in lang­
uage that this content is divided and the ideas considered 
successively in a second operation of mind. "Cette division 
de la pensee est une seconde operation de 1 'esprit qui se
1. Grammaire et Philosophie au Siecle des Lumieres, pp. 62,69.
2. Logique, Oeuvres, vol. V, p. 316.
3. Ibid., p. 317.
4. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 66f- Source - Leibniz* Discours de metaphysique 
ed. Gerhardt, IV, p. 433. “
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fait relativement a 1 1 elocution." ^
*
It is not clear from this whether, prior to the second 
operation relating to speech, the entire thought is still 
considered as one, or whether the subject and attribute are 
already distinct. The latter appears to be the case.
"L'objet dont on juge s'appelle le sujet du jugement; et 
quand le jugement est exprime par les mots, l1assemblage 
de tous ces mots, qui fait 1 *expression du jugement est 
appele proposition."^
There is nevertheless the idea that it is the need to
communicate thought to others that forces us to observe in
(3)it a subject, attribute, adjective etc. The subject
and attribute already exist in the judgment in the mind of 
the speaker, at least in composite form, but are not 
specifically recognised as such until they need to be 
expressed.
Du Marsais indicates that the second operation is a 
division into parts (the nature of which is unspecified) 
beyond the total subject and attribute, and these parts 
correspond to the words, of which’ they are the original 
counterparts. ' Thought is analysed, as if by instinct, 
into parts, and these are then grouped according to the 
order of their relations, and given signs, i.e. words, 
which are at the same time the instrument and the sign
(4)
of analysis of thought.'
1. Fragment sur les causes de la Parole, Oeuvres, Vol. Ill, 
p. 380.
2. Logique, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 327.
3. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 6 .
Chapter 4. The Proposition.
Du Marsais divides the proposition into the two 
essential parts, the subject, the word which marks the person 
or thing of which one judges or which one regards as having 
such and such a quality or modification, and the attribute, 
containing the words which mark what is judged of the 
subject or what one regards as the manner of the sibject.
The attribute contains the verb ^  .
In his Logique, the verb ’est* is described as expressly
marking the action of the mind which joins an attribute
(2)
to its subject , thus implying a similar point of view
(3)
to that of Port-Royal . But he does not limit the verb 
to this role. It is the essential part of the attribute, 
not a simple liaison or copule ... it is the sign of the 
real or imagined existence of the subject 7 of the pro­
position, to which this existence and the remainder of the
(5)attribute is linked • His general definition of the verb, 
"un mot qui marque I 1action de l 1esprit qui adapte ou 
applique un qualificatif a un sujet, de quelque maniere 
que cette application se fasse." allows for the effect 
of all moods, not only the indicative, to which it.was 
restricted by Port-Royal*s conception of affirmation.
1. Ibid., Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 44.'
2. Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 317.
3. See Part 2, Section 1 , Chapter 5.
4. Robinet sees in Du Marsais* view of the verb a similarity 
with the doctrine of consignification of Scotus, Boethius 
and Aristotle, for whom the basis of the verb and subject 
rests in the enunciation of the existence of the subject. 
(Le Langage a l*Age Classique, p. 66).
5. Oeuvres, Vol. Ill, p. 331.
6. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 49.
The judgment, expressed in language, inevitably takes 
the form of the proposition, but not all the propositions 
are judgments. This is evident in Du Marsais1 definition 
of the proposition as a collection of words which,by means 
of the different relations between them/express a judgment, 
or some particular consideration of the mind in regarding 
an object as s u c h ^  .
The effect of this definition is to exclude from 1 judg­
ments1 enunciations using moods of verbs other than the 
indicative. Although enunciations of command, condition, 
wish, or dependence, e.g. soyez sage, si vous etiez sage, 
afin que vous soyez sage, Pierre etre sage, express the 
action of mind which adapts a perception or qualification 
to an object, the sign of the action is, as Auroux notes,
in a form which does not involve a decision which affirms
(2)or denies the position relative to the object . It is 
this, comments Auroux, which leads Du Marsais to admit that 
all moads of verbs other than indicatives correspond not 
to judgments but to enunciations, hence the distinction 
between "proposition directe enoncee par le mode indicatif" 
and "proposition oblique ou simple, enonciation exprimee 
par quelqu'un des autres modes du verbe." However, he 
includes both types of proposition in the same syntactic 
propositional structure, and the distinction between the 
two forms of proposition can only depend therefore on their 
relationship to external reality. Du Marsais1 definition
assumes that this relationship depends on an act of the
(3)mind . The consequences of this in relation to Beauzge's 
opposing definition, discussed by Auroux, are considered 
in Part 2, Section 3, Ch. 5. of this study.
1. Ibid., Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 41.
2. Auroux, La semiotique.des encyclopedistes, p. 92.
3. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
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While criticising Du Marsais* retention of the relation­
ship between proposition and judgment, Sahlin sees con­
siderable progress in his definition over that of Port-Royal, 
and over his own earlier definition in his Methode 
Raisonnee, in that not only unity of meaning but grammatical 
unity is achieved through the construction of words together 
His * assemblage de mots* was however opposed by Beauzee,
who quoted ,moriemur* as an example of a proposition being
(2)composed of one word only . As no difference „ is implied 
in the syntax of the two distinct types of proposition, 
it seems doubtful whether Du Marsais had in mind grammatical 
considerations in this aspect of his definition. Rather 
it appears as his acknowledgement of the expression of 
the will, the emotions and imagination in language. He was 
the only grammairien-philosophe to make this distinction.
Du Marsais distinguishes between the proposition viewed 
grammatically, when only the reciprocal relations between 
words are concerned, and logically, when only the total 
meaning resulting from the group of words is considered.
The grammatical proposition relates to speech, the logical 
form to the understanding, which is only concerned with the 
different parts, or the different points of view of the mind. 
One part is considered as subject, the other as attribute, 
or as cause and effect, without regard to the words which 
express them(3).
He appears to regard the proposition in an abstract 
sense in distinguishing it from the enunciation, or utterance, 
thus indicating that both in its grammatical and logical
form, it is viewed theoretically, "La proposition a deux
' (4)parties essentielles... II en est de meme de 1 * enonciation.1
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 107.
2. Grammaire Generale, Livre III, Ch. I.
3. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 57.
4. Ibid., p. 44.
Du Marsais* definition of four kinds of subjects appears 
to conform to his view of the logical proposition. Simple 
consists of one idea; multiple, 'la foi, l'esperance et la 
charite', of several? complexe 'Alexandre, fils de Philippe', 
allows for the subject and its complement, and the fourth 
consists of several words forming a total meaning equivalent 
to a noun, 'differer de profiter de 1 'o c c a s i o n ' ^ .
It was the differentiation between the logical and 
grammatical proposition, which led Du Marsais to introduce the 
notions of identity and determination as relations appropriate 
to the proposition considered logically, which would neverthe­
less be reconcilable . with the traditional grammatical features 
of agreement and rection (concordance and regime).
Chevalier's commentary on Du Marsais' thieory, in its 
application to syntax, points to the difficulty in reconciling 
with a logical analysis, the formal distinctions of concordance, 
which relates to the agreement-of accidents of gender, sas.e, 
number and person, and regime, which governs the case used.
He demonstrates this through the example quoted by Du ;Marsais,’ 
"Celui qui me suit ne marche point dans les tenebres". Whereas 
a grammatical analysis would distinguish a nominative, 'celui'; 
an attribute, 'ne marche point dans les tenebres'? and an 
incidental proposition, *qui me suit', the logical analysis 
merely segregates the logical subject, 'celui qui me suit' 
and the logical attribute, 'ne marche point dans les 
tenebres', and in this case the formal distinctions of 
concordance and regime would be irrelevant. Nor would Du 
Marsais' standards for complement be appropriate to an analysis 
by function (i.e. grammatical) since, as well as relative 
determinative propositions, "complement" would embrace
(2)adjectives and objects of active verbs, used in this capacity
1. Ibid.
2. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 693-4.
The relations of identity and determination and their 
grammatical counterparts of concordance and regime fall 
appropriately within Du Marsais' conception of syntax but 
in view of their basis in the logical proposition, discussion 
on them is included in this chapter.
Du Marsais describes identity and determination as the
two relations between words governing their construction
(i.e. arrangement) ^ . It is clear that the relations
relate to the meaning of the ideas represented by the words,
for he deduces them from the fact that the use of words in
the expression consists of two points only, to announce an
idea, e.g. 'lumiere', and to make known the relation that
an idea has with another. This is done by signs established
in each language, to extend, or to restrict the ideas, or
(2)to apply them in a particular way .
From this it appears possible to identify a subject as 
being something, and at the sarretime, to determine it by 
restricting it to a certain kind. Du Marsais, in factsays 
that the relation of identity does not exclude that of 
determination. In the example 'l'homme savant', or 1le 
savant homme*, 'savant* determines 'homme', but there is 
also a relation of identity between 'homme' and 'savant* 
for the two words relate to the same individual and could 
be expressed by one w o r d ^ .
On the other hand the relation of determination is
often found apart from that of identity. In the example
'Diane etait soeur d 'Apollon', 'Diane' and 'soeur' have a
relation of identity but that between 'soeur' and 'Apollon'
7 4)
is one of determination only
1. . Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, pp.’ 63-64.
2. Ibid., p. 66.
3. Article Concordance, Oeuvres, Vol. IV, p. 324.
4. Ibid.
The relation of identity is the basis for agreement 
between the substantive and adjective. Because the 
adjective announces what the subjective is said to be, 
the adjective is the subject analysed, so that it should 
not be differently marked from the substantive^1? .
Since Du Marsais includes the verb in the attribute, it 
is not surprising that the same relation of identity 
applies between the verb and the subject of the proposition.
"... parce que le verbe enonce que 1 *esprit considere
le sujet comme etant, ayant, ou faisant quelque chose.
Ainsi le verbe doit indiquer le meme nombre et la meme
(2)personne que le sujet indique, .
The relation of determination applies when a word in 
itself only forms part of the analysis of a particular 
meaning, the remainder, or determining word or words being 
necessary to complete the meaning ^  . Chevalier notes ^  
that it was this definition which was to justify the term 
Complement1, and which provided Thurot with grounds for 
regarding Du Marsais as author of the notion.
Du Marsais regards the relation of determination as the
basis of regime. In the example ’Dieu a cree le monde',
’le monde’ ’determine ce que je dis que Dieu a cree* and
the formal relation of regime exists between cree and le
(5)
monde . Nouns, verbs and prepositions are the only
(6)parts of speech requiring determination .
1. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 64.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
4. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 695.
5. Oeuvres, Vol. I, pp. 203 and 2 63.
6. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 68.
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The concepts of identity and determination were open
to confusion, in themselves and in their relation to the
grammatical distinctions of concordance and regime, though
Beauzee's subsequent treatment of then/1  ^ led to some
clarification. They were to be abandoned subsequently
though at the time providing the means of retaining the
traditional syntactic framework within a changing philo-
(2 )sophical perspective' ' .
Explicative and determinative propositions fall within
the concept of determination. The terms are those of
(3)Port-Royal, though Sahlin notes that it was Bu Marsais 
who specifically introduced them into French grammar, though 
still, as with Arnauld, in a purely logical sense, explic­
ative, leaving the word to which it refers in its original
(4)value, whereas determinative restricted its meaning .
Du Marsais also retains the Port-Royal distinction between
(5)the proposition principale and the proposition incidente , 
and similarly recognises the possibility of ellipsis in 
the incidental proposition, by noting that it is explicit 
when the subject and attribute are expressed, implicit, 
imperfect and elliptic when subject and verb are not 
expressed ^  .
1. See Part 2, Section 3, Chapter 6.
2. Chevalier, Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 698.
3. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 132.
4. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, pp. 52-3.
5. Ibid., p. 54. As with Port-Royal, the incidental was
introduced only by the relative proposition, not a 
subordinate proposition, but Sahlin comments that it was 
the introduction into grammar of the notion of principle 
proposition which led to that of the subordinate pro­
position, a term noted in Condillac's Grammaire (Cesar 
Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 132).
6. Ibid., p. 55.
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Chapter 5. Syntax
Although Du Marsais, obviously, from his 'Tropes1, gave 
considerable thought to the meaning of separate words, 
and acknowledges, as above, their role in analysing thought, 
it is through his emphasis on the relations between words 
contributing to the external expression of the total thought, 
that his grammatical theory shows a major development, with 
notable repercussions on syntax.
In itself, the meaning of words is insufficient for the 
comprehension of a sentence; one must also know the sign 
of each different relation between the words, for it is 
only through these that the words make sense ^  .
Neither can the total meaning resulting from the collection
and construction of words be understood until the whole
(2)
proposition has been uttered .
Syntax, defined as the part of grammar which provides
(3)knowledge of signs established in a language to stimulate
(4)a meaning in the mind , assumes a particular importance 
within this conception of relations. So do the relations of 
identity and determination, which are the two principles 
from which all the rules of *syntaxe necessaire' are 
derived ^  .
1. Inversion, Oeuvres, Vol. Ill, p. 344.
2. Ibid., p. 354.
3. 'Signs' in this case appears to mean signs of the relation 
between words.
4. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 2.
5. Les Veritables Principes de Grammaire, Oeuvres, Vol. I, 
p. 204.
Whereas Du Marsais in this respect may be said to have 
introduced a new emphasis in the development of syntax, as 
with other aspects of his theory, there were precedents; 
the way towards it was encouraged by earlier developments.
Reference has already been made to Chevalier1s view of 
the role of Port-Royal in the development of syntax He
also acknowledges that they paved the way for the segregation 
of syntax from construction but pays tribute to Pere Buffier's 
more direct contribution in advancing syntax from being 
simply an account of features of association towards a science 
allowing for progress from elementary to much more complex, 
structures ^  .
Daniel Droixhe also acknowledges the importance of 
Buffier's emphasis on relations between words ,
"Quand il (i.e. Buffier) regrette, a propos des diverses
"parties de la grammaire", "qu'on ne fait point assez sentir
leur rapport mutuel, leur arrangement, leur dependance",
n'est-ce pas exactement 1 1 oeuvre de Du Marsais, premier grand
jalon du courant que nous nommerons "immanentiste", qu'il
(3)
appelle?" ' .
Auroux, while recognising that Port-Royal's definition 
of syntax, "la construction des mots ensemble" was entirely 
concerned with the operation of joining words to each 
other, points out that they gave, however, no emphasis to 
this operation and no definition of the different types of 
concatenation. The focal point of the Grammaire generate 
was the explanation of word classes starting from the basis 
of their way of designating, with the functional categories,
1. . See Part 2, Section 1, Chapter 5.
2. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 614.
3. La Linguistique et l'appel del'histoire 1600-1800, p. 232.
e.g. regime, being given little attention. V7ith Du Marsais 
and his successors the basic factor did not consist of-word 
categories but was the total expression of a thought
Du Marsais illustrates his distinction between syntax 
and construction by examples from Cicero to demonstrate 
that although the construction, or arrangement of words 
varies, the syntax, the relations between words, remains 
the same.
"Je crois qu'on ne doit pas confondre construction avec 
syntaxe. Construction ne presente que I 1idee de combinaison 
et d*arrangement. Ciceron a dit, selon trois combinaisons 
differentes,
accepi litteras tuas, tuas accepi litteras, litteras 
accepi tuas.
II y a la trois constructions differentes, puisqu'il y a
trois differens arrangemens de mots: cependant il n'y a
qu'une syntaxe; car dans chacune de ces trois constructions,
il y a les memes signes des rapports que les mots ont entre
eux: ... Ainsi, chacun de ces trois arrangemens excite
(2)
dans 1 * esprit le meme sens ...1
He distinguishes two kinds of syntax, 'syntaxe simple
(3)
et necessaire1, and 1syntaxe figuree et elegante’ .
Syntaxe simple occurs when, following the original order 
of thought, words are arranged according to the successive 
relations between them, that is, according to the different
1. The later Encyclopedie articles of Grammaire and Syntaxe 
(E.R.M.B.) followed Du Marsais1 conception of syntax.
The definition given, "concours de mots reunis pour former 
une pensee", which was said to be identical with that 
of Du Marsais1 definition. La semiotique des Encyclo- 
pedistes, p. 162.
2. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 2.
3. Lancelot, in the Nouvelle Methode latine, distinguished
similarly between syntaxe simple ou reguliere and Syntaxe 
figuree ou irreguliere. (8th edition, p. 355) . Syntaxe
simple also followed the natural order of thought,but
there was not, as there was with Du Marsais, the emphasis 
on the total meaning of the phrase, conforming to the 
liaison between ideas.
modifications they produce on each other in following the 
liaison between ideas, the order in which the mind conceives 
ideas. 1Syntaxe figuree et elegante1, the kind commonly 
used in Latin, is the order caused by the passions and 
internal*mouvements1, whereby objects or their attributes 
are presented to the imagination. This kind of syntax is 
subject to inversions and ellipsis
It is important to note that as 1syntaxe simple et 
necessaire' follows the natural order of thought, the 
words which represent the ideas have the same modifying 
effect on each other as the ideas conceived in the mind.
It seems reasonable to deduce from this that providing 
the words are arranged according to the order of thought/ 
the arrangement itself will, by placing the words which 
modify each other in suitable positions, provide the 
necessary effect of the liaison of ideas, without the 
need for additional signs to mark such liaison.
In spite of having distinguished syntaxe from construct-
(2 )
ion, Du Marsais also implies that 'construction simple* 
is synonymous with 'syntaxe simple', which, of course, is 
the case if the arrangement of words, or construction, 
provides at the same time the order of ideas and the 
relations between them.
Although 'syntaxe figuree et elegante' deviates from 
'syntaxe simple' through inversions and ellipsis, it 
remains subject to the essential rules of 'syntaxe simple'.
Any expression can therefore be reduced to this form by 
supplying the Glided items and placing its constituent 
parts in natural order. It is this procedure which Du
(3)Marsais uses in his interlineary method of teaching Latin
1. Les Veritables Principes De La Grammaire, Oeuvres, Vol. I, 
p. 197.
2. Ibid., p. 198.
3. Ibid.
It is the basic principle of syntax in every language 
that words, whether expressed or glided are always formed 
according to the sign of the relation which exists between 
them in the same proposition. Words must always be put 
with their co-relatives and those which are understood 
must be expressed for the intended meaning of the author 
to be understood ^ .
The concept of natural order implicit in 1syntaxe simple*
had a long history prior to Du Marsais. It was a feature
(2)
of the Port-Royal theory but did not with Port-Royal 
assume the importance or the role which Du Marsais gave to it.
Its earlier history has been referred to by several 
authors. Chevalier describes it as one of the focal points 
of reflection by grammarians from the time of the 17th 
century. Precedents were invoked to justify its importance.
"Du Marsais inscrira Donat et Servius et Cornutus, et 
aussi Priscian et ce Joannis susenbrotus Ravenspurgi, lequel 
publiait a Bale une Grammatica artis Institutio en 1529; tous 
ont eu recours a la magique formule, Ordo est. Beauzee
(3)
sera plus explicite encore a l 1article Inversion" .
Auroux refers to discussion on a suitable definition of
natural order. Neither the problems nor the solutions
proposed in the 18th century were original, the question
having already been debated by Quintilian, Servius, Priscian
and Isidore de Seville. Denys d 1Halicarnasse (1st century
BC) had concluded that there were no natural rules for the
arrangement of words, a conclusion subsequently echoed by
(4)
the sous-precepteur of Louis XVI, l'abbe de Radonvilliers
1. Fragment sur les causes de la parole, Oeuvres, Vol. Ill/ 
p. 400.
20 See Part 2, Section 1, Chapter 6.
3. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 556.
4. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 192.
The whole question of natural order is dealt with 
specifically and comprehensively by Ulrich R i c k e n ^ .  From 
its earlier postulation and rejection by Denys d fHalicarnasse 
to its identification by theiModistae with the order con­
forming to logical relations, it became from the time of 
the Port-Royal Grammaire generate identified with the French 
language which was considered to show particular conformity 
with it.
Thoughts in sympathy with Du Marsais1 conception of it,
and its application to education, were to be found in certain
aspects of the work of two 17th century rationalists, Geraud
(2 )de Cordemoy and Le Labourer, described by Ricken . Cordemoy 
considered that the perfection of a language depended on 
an order of words which reflected the succession in which 
children learning languages assimilated different parts of
(3)
speech . Le Labourer’s theory postulated that since words 
were signs of thoughts, they should, in natural expression, 
follow the same succession as that of ideas. The true order 
of conception was subject-verb-object of action, the subject 
always taking first place since there can be no action 
without a subject. Thus, notes Ricken, ideas were again
(4)
conceived as logical categories .
1. Die Kontroverse Du Marsais und Beauzee gegen Batteux, 
Condillac und Diderot, in Parret, 1976; La liaison des 
Idees selon Condillac et la clarte du frangais, in 
Dix-Huitieme Siecle 1969, pp. 179-19 3; Grammaire et 
Philosophie au Siecle des Lumieres, PUL, 1978.
2. Grammaire et Philosophie au Siecle des Lumieres, p. 180
3. It is possible to see in this an antecedent to aspects 
of Condillac’s theory.
4. Ibid.
The apparent paradox of Du Marsais1 adoption of a 
rationalist doctrine of 'ordre naturel*, while following 
certain aspects of Locke’s sensation-based theories, is 
discussed by Ricken who attributes it to the fact that Du 
Marsais* a priori hypothesis of thought pre-existing language 
and being the cause of its laws could rest on Locke’s 
faculty of reflection, which co-existed with sensation and 
did not result from i t ^  .
Du Marsais himself provides a mixture of rationalist 
and empiricist based justifications for his postulation of 
’ordre naturel*, though all, in effect, conform to the 
traditional order of the logical proposition.
The order of speech is basically uniform everywhere
because it reflects the universal order of thought, another
(2 )reason for calling it natural' . This echoes Le Labourer’s 
view above.
The order follows nature because it expresses words
according to the way in which the mind conceives things, it
(3)moves from cause to effect, from agent to patient .
In the learning process, children follow a natural order
of first the objects, then the modifying or determining
(4)words , a similar view to that of Cordemoy, above.
Objects, of which impressions are received through the 
senses,are first in natural order, and, conforming to this, 
so are particular ideas0 General ideas are not possible
without first forming particular ideas through sense
. (5)impressions .
1. Ibid., p. 86.
2. Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 10.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
5. . Veritables Principes de la Grammaire, Oeuvres, Vol. I,
p. 185.
Ellipsis, for Du Marsais, is the most important of the 
figures of construction, since, together with the use of 
natural order, the inclusion of the ellided elements makes 
possible the reconstruction of the 'syntaxe simple' of any 
utterance. He attributes the omissions of words to man's 
tendency to abbreviate for convenience and to the eagerness 
of the imagination to express one's thoughts^.
It is defined as occurring when some word necessary to 
reduce the sentence to 'syntaxe simple* is not expressed 
but is nevertheless the sole cause of the modification of 
another word in the sentence. It is the suppression or 
omission of words whose value, or meaning exists in the mind. 
The ellipsis can be restored by any word which provides the 
meaning indicated by the adjoining ones and the circum­
stances ^  .
Du Marsais acknowledges the precedents of. Sanctius and 
other grammarians in recognising understood words and the 
practice, of Port-Royal in re-constructing,in the Nouvelle 
Methode latine, abbreviated expressions into Simple con­
struction. But he claims originality in making the procedure 
available to pupils, the Nouvelle Methode latine of Port-
(3)
Royal having been intended for teachers .
Critical in general of the arbitrary practice of re­
constructing sentences to allow for assumed ellipsis, because 
of the distortions thus risked to grammatical theory, Sahlin 
sees in Du Marsais* treatment of the practice a closer 
identification of the reconstruction with logic, whereas for 
Sanctius and Lancelot the practice was only a means of 
rationalising grammatical difficulties. For Du Marsais the
1. Methode Raisonnee, Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 16.
2. Articles Ellipse and Elliptique, Oeuvres, Vol. V, pp. 212-214
3. Methode Raisonnee, Oeuvres, Vol. I, pp. 19-20.
natural order of words and the words supposedly suppressed 
are always present in the mind of the speaker. He proves 
this by the fact that in an inverted proposition or ellipsis, 
the words have the same e n d i n g ^  as they would have had 
in a regularly constructed proposition.
Though, comments Sahlin, the method of re-constructing 
the phrase had been previously practised in French grammar, 
this was only sporadically; it was Du Marsais who made it 
into a system "et il 1 *applique constamment a propos de 
toutes sor.tes de questions grammaticales des que quelque
chose lui parait contraire a la logique: c'est la clef de
(2) • 
voute de son oeuvre grammaticale" .
The rules of 1syntaxe necessaire', drawn entirely from 
the principles of identity and determination, which account 
for all relations between ideas, and which are expressed 
by the relations between words of 'concordance1 and 'regime1, 
are based on knowledge of:
1. the nature of words, the properties of the different 
word classes.
2. the proposition and the way in which words are expressed 
and determined in speech.
(3)
3. the purposes of the endings of words .
1. "Tout changement suppose une cause aussi bien dans la 
grammaire que dans la physique - regie invariable de la 
nature; or puisque ces mots ont change leur simple 
denomination pour prendre la terminaison de l'ablatif,
il faut qu'il y ait une raison de ce changement; et comme
nous voyons par tant d'autres exemples que l'ablatif
est le cas naturel de la preposition, nous sommes
fondez a la suppleer". Methode Raisonnee, Oeuvres, Vol. I,
p. 18.
2. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 94.
3. Veritables Principes de la Grammaire, Oeuvres, Vol0 I, 
p. 204.
It is indicative of the dominant role of syntax in 
Du Marsais* theories that he calls item 1, the part of 
grammar concerned with the different word classes,'les 
preliminaires de la syntaxe*.
He deliberates in some detail on the different classes
of words, sometimes not coming to any firm conclusion.
Considered from a grammatical point of view in their separate
classes, an approach followed by Sahlin, there is a general
impression of a lack of consistent treatment. But Soublin
appropriately comments that it is because his total plan
has not been appreciated that certain of his work has been
misunderstood, for instance by Sahlin and Kukenheim^ .
Du Marsais* 'syntax' is a kind of universal metalanguage
which today would be called formal semantics or theory of
speech, and it is at this level that his contributions
(2)
affecting French grammar find coherence .
Du Marsais appears concerned to penetrate the nature
(3)
and function of words ,- and, given his postulation of a
division of thought into parts which are the counterpart of
w o r d s ^ , it is not surprising that he has regard to
(5)
semantic and logical considerations .
The following summary of some relevant comments by 
Sahlin are given as an indication of the kind of considerations 
he takes into account in forming his conclusions on the main 
classes of words:
1. Parret, 1976, p. 406.
2. Ibido, p. 404.
3. "C'est la difference du service ou emploi des mots, et
non la difference materielle du son, qui les fait placer
en differentes classes. C'est ainsi que l'infinitif des 
verbes est souvent nom, le boire, le manger". Oeuvres,
Vol. IV, p. 186. (Arrive and Chevalier, Grammaire, p. 73) .
4. See Chapter 3.
5. "Le grammarien determine le jeu des concepts en fonction
des realisations de discours qui sont les contextes et 
les substitutions, mais il les ordonne selon un ensemble 
logique. Est postulee 1'implication necessaire du jeu des 
formes par le jeu de la signification." Arrive and Chevalier 
Grammaire, p. 74.
Pronouns which, for Du Marsais, "ne sont employes que 
pour reveiller l'idee d'un autre mot ou pour le rappeler a 
I1esprit".
Sahlin comments that Du Marsais has not succeeded in 
resolving completely the nature of pronouns because he had 
not unified his diverse theories into a system. t\\&/e.YcVi«.U's'$y Ke, tm - 
tributed more than any other grammairien-philosophe to clari­
fication of the problem; none other envisaged the word under 
so many different aspects and within so complete a 
conception (1).
Verb. This was dealt with in the context of the pro­
position, in Chapter 4.
Nouns and Adjectives. Among the parts of speech "le nom
est celle que Du Marsais a traite le plus a fond et de la
(2)fagon la plus complete ..."
He takes little account of the theories of preceding 
grammarians, being more inspired by the philosophical ideas 
of Locke and Leibniz and by certain scholastic ideas, 
applying now one, now another, thus not succeeding in forming 
a system. Grammatical considerations are minimal. There 
is no comprehensive treatise on nouns but a resume from various
(3)
works provides a reasonably complete study' ' .
The main part of his theories relate to the distinction 
between substantives and adjectives.
His view of adjective reflects Locke's notion of sub­
stance^^.
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, pp. 289-290.
2. Ibid., p. 154.
3. Ibid., p. 167.
4. Essay, I, Book II, ch. XXIII.
"le nom adjectif est toujours ajoute £ un substantif 
qui est ou exprime ou sous-entendu". "L'adjectif est un 
mot qui donne une qualification au substantif} il en 
designe la qualite ou maniere d'etre"^.
Sahlin notes that through this reasoning, Du Marsais
provides a philosophical basis for accounting for an e lided
(2)substantive behind an adjective .
Du Marsais did not establish a principle for the division 
between adjective and substantive; his delimitation was 
more fluid than that of his predecessors, but his reflections 
went further, and he was one of those nearest to resolving 
the difference between the two, at least from the point of
(3)
view of logical grammar of the 18th century .
As far as his classification of adjectives is concerned, 
for Du Marsais there are as many kinds as there are qualities 
or 'manieres d'etre1, but he reduces them to the . two 
divisions of 'adjectifs physiques' and 'adjectifs metaphysiques', 
reflecting Locke's distinction between ideas resulting
(4)directly from the senses and those produced by reflection
With substantives, the same distinction is made between
'physiques' and 'metaphysiques'. He also distinguishes
between 'propres' and 'appellatifs', and 'abstraits' and
those *pris dans un sens concret'. Sahlin considers the
classification of substantives to be one of the areas where
Du Marsais' theories are the most philosophical and strangest
to grammar, being inspired apparently by Locke and certain
ideas of the scholastic philosopher, Occam, while using
(5)Leibniz' terms .
1. Article Adjectif, Oeuvres, Vol. IV, p. 85.
2. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, P. 171.
3. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
4. Ibid., p. 181.
5. Ibid., p. 189.
Chapter 6. Words as Signs
Du Marsais subscribes to the view that words have been 
invented by man as signs of their thoughts, and whereas 
thought is quite independent of any arbitrary usage, signs, 
at least in their first application, are arbitrary! .
(2 )The first objects to be named were the tangible ones
obvious through the senses, followed, by analogy, by those
(3)resulting from some action of the mind .
Words become known through their usage, and, consistent 
with Du Marsais* view of thought pre-existing language, they 
only become meaningful because man already knows what they 
signify. . But beyond this, full appreciation of their 
effectiveness depends on knowing how they are used in relation 
to thought.
. Or, comme on ne sauroit connoitre le signe en tant
que signe, si l ’on ne connoit pas. ce qu’il signifie, l ’on 
ne sauroit se former d*idee juste des mots et de leurs 
usages, sans s ’instruire de la liaison que les hommes ont 
mise entre leurs manieres de penser et les mots qu*ils ont
f 4)
etablis pour se communiquer leurs pensees." .
The Port-Royal concept of the idea of the sound stimul­
ating the idea of the object appears also with Du Marsais, 
but linked at the same timer as Auroux points out , with 
the conditioning involved in the process of signification.
The importance of usage in this process is also obvious? it 
is usage which instils the meaning of words.
1. Les Veritables Principes de la Grammaire, Oeuvres, Vol. I, 
p. 202.
2. The same idea is present in Condillac’s theory.
3. . Fragmens sur les Causes de la Parole, Oeuvres, Vol. Ill/
p. 381.
4. . Les Veritables Principes de la Grammaire, Oeuvres, Vol. I,
P. 201-202.
•5. La s^miotique des encyclopedistes, p. 24.
" ... les enfans ont lie la signification des mots aux 
idees que 1 *usage leur a fait connoitre que ces mots 
signifient.
A mesure qu*on nous a donne du pain, et qu*on nous a 
prononce le mot pain? d fun cote le pain a grave par les 
yeux son image dans notre cerveaux, et en a excite l 1idee; 
d'un autre cote le son du mot pain a fait aussi son impression 
par les oreilles, de sorte que ces deux idees accessoires, 
c*est-a-dire, excitees en nous en meme temps, ne sauroient 
se reveiller separement, sans que l*une excite 1 * autre."^^
Auroux considers this view of the sign, the 1 structure
quaternaire* to be an interpretation of the 1 structure
ternaire*, used in the 18th century. The idea of the sound
producing its own idea, which stimulates through association,
the idea of another object, does but justify the basic
essential that the sound is the sign of an idea, to which it
(2)has no natural relation
Although Port-Royal*s version, the ’quaternaire*, pre­
ceded the triple version, Auroux* conclusion that the latter 
was the basic form has some justification in that Pert-Royal * s 
formula provided an additional process merely to preserve 
the integrity of the ’idea*. On the other hand, the Port- 
Royal theory could be regarded as the inspiration for the 
later applications of the concept of the sign.
The choice of interpretation, comments Auroux, is not 
due to chance. That of the ’quaternaire* structure is 
in sympathy with idealism, in allowing for the dualism of 
those such as Du Marsais, who identify *ame* with the
1. Des Tropes, Oeuvres, Vol. Ill, p. 63.
2. Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 24.
capacity for language and exclude the possibility of animal 
language. The differences in interpretations of the process 
of signification are linked to the concept of the ideaf1 .^ 
Auroux expands as follows on the effect of the differing 
concepts.
For the whole of the 18th century the concept of idea
is of Cartesian heritage,. but with Descartes himself is
ambiguous. It is either "la forme de nos pensees par la
perception immediate de laquelle nous avons conscience de
ces memes pensees" (Reponses aux Secondes Objections) , soit
seulement "la forme de pensee qui possede une realite
objective" (Troisieme Meditation). The first definition
is purely psychological and corresponds to the signification
of words "je ne puis rien exprimer par des paroles, lorsque
j'entends ce que je dis, que de cela meme il ne soit certain
que j'ai en moi l 1idee de la chose qui est signifiee par
(2)mes paroles" . The use of the second would be impracticable 
in language since it would allow only 'true1 propositions. 
Authors studying language in general were essentially 
obliged, as were Arnauld and Du Marsais, to use Descartes' 
first definition, but, even holding to this, 'idea1 is 
subject to variation according to the orientation of the 
theory of knowledge within which the term is used. Whereas 
in the case of a Cartesian type dualism, ideas are only 
associated with ideas, in an empiricist position idea is 
associated with sensation and with the object to which it 
corresponds, thus eliminating one of the terms of the
(3)
1 structure quaternaire1
1. Ibid., p. 25.
2. These words are echoed in Du Marsais1 view above, p. 159.
3. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 25, 26.
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While it appears appropriate to identify the respective 
views of both Port-Royal and Du Marsais on the idea with 
Descartes' first definition, this does not take account of 
the major difference between the two on the origin of ideas, 
which, for Du Marsais, contrary to the Port-Royal belief, 
was through the senses. Descartes' definition m^have 
been a sufficiently adequate basis for Du Marsais, but Port- 
Royal 's formulation of the sign appears to rest on the more 
fundamental Augustinian concept of the idea^  .
A major feature of Du Marsais* work was the attention 
he gave to the different meanings of words, which materialised 
in his 'Des Tropes ou des differens sens dans lesquels on 
peut prendre un meme mot dans une meme langue*. Article IV 
of this work gives the definition "Les Tropes sont des 
figures par lesquelles on fait prendre a un mot une signi­
fication qui n'est pas precisement la signification propre 
de ce mot: ainsi pour entendre ce que c'est q.u'un trope, il 
faut commencer par bien comprendre ce que c'est que la
signification propre d'un mot". Article VI defines 'sens
(2 )
propre' as 'la premiere signification du mot' .
Sahlin notes that Du Marsais was not the first to intro­
duce Tropes into grammar, and refers to the work of Donatus, 
Thrax, and Isidore de Seville, but in French grammar it was
a novelty. "Quelque imparfait qu'il soit, le Traite des
(3)Tropes est le premier ouvrage de semantique ..." .
As Soublin emphasises, the word itself, for Du Marsais,
(4)
is inert and incapable of imposing any law by itself 
It is the use of words through the exercise of imagination, 
which gives them their force. "L'imagination, au contraire,
1. See Section 1, Ch. 7.
2. Oeuvres, Vol. Ill, p. 15 et seq.
3. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. 53.
4. Parret, 1976, p. 400.
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a ses lois universelles, le Traite des Tropes les met en 
evidence dans son secteur, en montrant que les changements 
de sens presentent des regularites inconnues des mots pris 
dans leur premiere institution.11^
While Du Marsais* expansive treatment of the subject
was innovative, some of the ideas on the subject had
already been aired.The acknowledgement of the role of
imagination in language was by no means novel and is traced 
(2)by Ricken . Instances of recognition of the part played 
by imagination had already been evident in the works of
(3)
Antoine Arnauld and Bernard Lamy . Variations in meanings 
of words in usage, including those through ideas (idees 
accessoires) added by the mind to the precise meanings of 
words, are in fact explicitly recognised in the Port-Royal 
L o g i q u e ^ . But certainly his specialist treatment of the 
subject appears to mark a new departure, and seems likely 
to have more lasting relevance than other aspects of his 
theory.
1o Ibid., p. 399.
2. Grammaire et Philosophie au Siecle des Lumieres.
30 Ibido , p. 74 .
4. Pt. I, Chapters XIV,and XV.
Chapter 7. Summary.
Although Du Marsais did not set out to formulate a com­
prehensive theory of language, the main stimulus in his work 
being didactic, his various works include elements which 
would have contributed to the basis of a theory of contemporary 
interest.
But rather than aiming at the formulation of such a 
theory, D'u Marsais appears concerned to;penetrate -
the elements of language and the reasons behind them, which 
find their expression in usage. Usage can always be related 
to a universal and fundamental form of syntax, which is 
determined by the universal nature of thought itself, but 
the variations from this basic form are acceptable and justi­
fiable by the added factors, inherent in man, cf imagination 
and the emotions. The effect of these influences is taken 
into account in Du Marsais1 1 Tropes1 in which he considers 
the different applications made by man of words beyond their 
first arbitrary signification. Such influences are also 
evident in his recognition that an enunciation, using moods 
other than the indicative, may be a proposition, which is thus 
not only confined to the judgment; and in his broader 
consideration of the word classes than is generally the case 
with predecessors and contemporaries.
These three features are quoted by Soublin as contributing 
to her interpretation that Du Marsais did not restrict his 
view of man to 11 *homme cogitans1, but regarded him in all his 
aspects, subject to the contradictory forces of reason and 
imagination, a concept that he carried into his grammatical
4-u (1)theory .
1. 1 ... c'est pour avoir inscrit au coeur de ce langage non
pas l fhomme "cogitans" mais les hommes, etres egalement 
soumis par nature aux forces contradictoires de la raison 
et de 1 1 imagination ..." (in Parret, 1976, p. 4 08).
The effect of Du Marsais1 approach, which is brought out 
in Soublin's interpretation of his work, was to invest the 
basic form of speech, the subject-predicate formula, rooted 
in reason, and of universal application, with the possibility 
of variations deriving from the imagination and from the 
urgencies of usage.
Nevertheless, the essential principles on which his method 
of instruction is based were founded not so much on imagination, 
as on a priori concepts of the nature of thought, influenced 
by the prevailing philosophy, particularly of Locke, and also 
incorporating features from antecedents. Important features 
which are a consequence of his view of the presentation, in 
language, of simultaneous thought, and the liaison of ideas 
within a total thought, are the theoretical concepts of the 
logical and the grammatical proposition, and the logical 
relations of identity and determination.
One can justifiably say that Du Marsais1 grammatical theory 
was dominated by considerations of syntax, and he was always 
conscious of the underlying reason which give rise to syntax, 
namely, the liaison of ideas which is represented by the 
relations between words. Also evident in his work is the 
strong emphasis on meaning, a feature not brought out by Sahlin, 
who concentrates on his "theories grammaticales proprement 
dites"^1  ^. Th,is emphasis is consistent with his views on the 
underlying causes of syntax from which his model of 'syntaxe 
simple' is formulated. It is also a necessary consequence of 
his approach to translation, for to translate involves 
penetrating the meaning of the writer, and this involves 
restoring glided words and relations to those of the 'syntaxe 
simple'.
1. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. viii.
His sense of the importance of meaning led him to include 
his 'Tropes' as the seventh part of his projected Grammaire 
(which remained incomplete), for he considered it an essential 
part of grammar, since explanation of the true meaning of words, 
and the way in which they are used in speech, falls within
4 - U  • *  (1)the province of grammar .
His 'Tropes' dealt with the more purely semantic aspects
of the word, but Du Marsais appears to have been no less
conscious of the diverse functional uses of them. His
application of the word 'sens' is not always explicit but
usually clear from the context. His tendency to consider all
aspects of words in their functional and grammatical appli-’
cation, and to provide descriptions or definitions of them
in this capacity, appears to be due at least in part to his
recognition that, as the meaning (semantic) of a word is
subject to different interpretations, so it is with the 'sens
grammatical'. This is implied in that he regards it as a
necessary rule, in the same way as one would not give a word
a different meaning in the same utterance, similarly to
(2 )maintain the same 'sens grammatical' .
Comparisons have been made between certain aspects of Du 
Marsais* theories and those of modern transformational gener­
ative grammar.
(3)
Chomsky himself refers to Du Marsais1 term 'syntaxe' 
as essentially the deep structure of an expression, and his 
'construction' its surface structure. This is an erroneous 
interpretation in view of Du Marsais' distinction between the 
terms, construction being applied only to the arrangement of
lo Des Tropes, Oeuvres de Du Marsais, Vol. Ill, p. 29.
2. Principes de Grammaire, Paris, 1793, Vol. II, p. 40.
3. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 47.
words, not the relations between them, except that in natural 
order, which is found in ‘construction simple1, or 'naturelle', 
the requisite relations between words are already present!1 .^
If any aspect of Du Marsais' theory can be equated with deep 
and surface structure, it would appear to be, respectively, 
'syntaxe simple et necessaire', embodying 'construction 
n a t u r e l l e a n d  'syntaxe figuree', applicable to expressions 
found in usage, and subject to ellipsis and 'construction 
figuree' or 'usuelle*.
Soublin considers that, in addition to having in common,
as Chomsky claims, though in broad terms only, a concept of
universal grammatical structure reflecting basic properties of
mind, Du Marsais and Chomsky share a similar epistemological
attitude in that they place the relationship between language
and thought not in reality, i.e. in the consciousness of the
individual, but in a descriptive theoretical process. Du Marsais'
theory however, shows notable differences in his recognition
(2 )
of the effect on language of man's nature in its totality .
It seems that the main difference derives from the two 
features which play a major role in Du Marsais' theory, namely 
the concept of syntax governing the relations between words, 
and the importance he attaches to meaning, both as a reason for 
syntax and in practical usage of a language.
Also of relevance is the fact that although he concedes a
(3)certain instinct in man and a natural inclination on the
part of the child, through the natural capacity for expression,
(4)and through imitation and curiosity , to learn a language, 
there remains much which has to be taught. The nearest equivalent 
to an internal universal structure appears to be the natural form 
of thought, which is however, with Du Marsais, pre-linguistic.
1. See Chapter 5.
2. Parret, 1976, pp. 407-8.
3. "... nous divisons, nous analysons, comme par instinct,
notre pensee: nous en rassemblons toutes les parties, selon 
1 'ordre de leurs rapports: nous lions ces parties a des 
sign.es . ..". (Article Construction, Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 6) .
4" Ibid.
Part 2. Section 3.
Nicholas Beauzee 1717 - 1789
Chapter 1. Introduction.
Beauzee's major work, his Grammaire generale the subject
(2)
of a full description and analysis by Barrie E. Bartlett ,
can probably be regarded as the most explicit and comprehensive
version of its kind, certainly in the history of general
(3)grammar m  France .
Details of his grammatical theories are also to be found
in the articles which he edited for the Encyclopedie in
collaboration with Douchet, following the death of Du Marsais,
the previous contributor, in 175 6. Bartlett notes that the
collaboration was apparently unsuccessful and, after the early
(4)articles, Beauzee appeared to be the only author . The
authorship of the articles, signed B.E.R.M., or E.R.M. (Ecole
Royale Militaire, where Beauzee taught), is discussed by
(5)Auroux , who deduces that those signed B.E.R.M. can be attrib­
uted to Beauzee. Of these articles, Auroux considers that
1. Grammaire generale ou exposition raisonnee des elements 
necessaires du langage, pour servir de fondement a l'etude 
de toutes les langues, 1767. All references are to the H.E. 
Brekle 1974 facsimile reprint, Friedrich Fromman Verlag, 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.
2. Beauzee's Grammaire generale, Mouton, 1975, hereafter ref­
erred to as Bartlett, with para, and page numbers. Auroux 
refers to this as "le premier ouvrage un peu complet sur 
Beauzee". He mentions some omissions from the Bibliography, 
including a work on phonetics, 1762, Beauzee's Petite 
Grammaire Frangaise 1826 and Thiebault, 1771 and 1773. 
(Historiographia Linguistica, IV: 3, p. 384.
3. Bartlett comments that its "comprehensiveness far surpasses 
that of contemporary and earlier universal grammars".
(3.1, p. 31).
4. Ibid., 2.21, pp. 26-7.
5. L 'encyclopedie "grammaire" et "langue" au XVIIIe siecle 
1973, p. 49.
"Grammaire" and "Langue" clearly express the linguistic con­
ceptions common at the time of the Enlightenment^. Some of 
the texts in the Encyclopedie articles are also included in 
Beauzee's Grammaire generale.
Beauzee's contemporary reputation appears to have been 
overshadowed by that of Du Marsais, who, of predecessors and 
contemporaries, had probably the greatest influence on his
grammatical theories. Bartlett’s work on Beauzee's Grammaire
„ „ (2) 
generale, quotes, inter alia, from Rivarol , "honnete homme
... qui a toujours vecu entre le supin et le gerondif, sans 
faire le moindre tort a personne". The somewhat colourless 
impression conveyed by this comment does not seem to do justice 
to Beauzee's work, which reflects a sturdy confidence and 
independent approach. Bartlett, who emphasises in his study . 
Beauzee's capacity for distinguishing the linguistic consider­
ations from logical and epistemological ones, considers
(3)
Kukenheim's description of him as'much less philosopher and 
much more grammarian than Du Marsais* as alone attributing to
(4)
Beauzee a well deserved reputation . To this may be added
Dieudonne Thiebault's view that Beauzee stands above Du Marsais.
" ••• la Grammaire de celui-ci (i.e. Du Marsais) n'est ...
qu'un echantillon, de celui-la (i.e. Beauzee), un ouvrage
(5)entier ... il a enrichi la Grammaire Philosophique." . Auroux' 
discussions on various aspects of his theories well illustrate 
his importance to the concept of Grammaire g e n e r a l e .
1. Ibid., p. 11.
2. Quoted in Grammairlens et amateurs de beau langage, M. Rat, 
Paris, 1963, p. 132, Bartlett, 2.21, p. 26. ^ ^  /<}IZ
3. Esquisse* historique de la linguistique frangaise,/p. 43.
4. Brekle's edition of Beauzee's Grammaire generale, p 11.
5. Dieudonne Thiebault, Grammaire Philosophique, Nouvelle 
impression en facsimile de 1'edition de 1802, 1977, Friedrich 
Fromman Verlag Gunther Holzboog KG, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt,
p. 181.
6. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, Payot, Paris, 1979.
Though his grammatical theories were identified with 
those of the Enlightenment, he can hardly be said to be rep­
resentative of the empirical tendencies of "the age. In dis­
cussing educational methods of the time, Chevalier considers 
Du Marsais to be closer to the empiricism of Locke whereas 
Beauzee inclines to the trend of Leibniz' theories. "Pour 
Beauzee, il faut decouvrir les verites universelles, qui se 
verifieront, peu a peu, dans 1'e x p e r i e n c e ^ . But he does 
appear to represent an alliance between rationalism and 
empiricism, a feature of his time. Chevalier comments, "se 
fier a 1 'empiricisme, c'est, selon une metaphore captieuse
employee par Beauzee, "leur donner le secours du flambeau de
(2)
la Logique, en portant ce flambeau derriere eux" . C'est
(3)
par la Logique grammaticale qu'il faut commencer ..." .
Beauzee himself proclaims that he follows in the footsteps of
Sanctius, Arnauld, Duclos, Du Marsais, Girard, Vaugelas,
(4)
Bouhours .
He shows himself to be firmly orthodox in his view of reason
and language (at least in its initial form) as God-given and
unique to man. Thought the fundamental sincerity of his
orthodoxy does not appear to be in doubt, Bartlett considers
Beauzee's adoption of the 'most orthodox of positions' on the
question of the origin of language to be based, not so much
on theological conviction as on logical necessity. "Language
stems from reason and rational processes, and if man has always
by definition been a rational creature then he has always
(5)possessed language in the form in which we know it" . As a
1. Histoire de la Syntaxe, pp. 658-9.
2. E.M., art. Inversion, II, p. 367, 2e col.
3. Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 666.
4. Grammaire generale, Preface, Vol. I, p. xxxij.
5. Bartlett, 2.12, p. 23.
consequence of acknowledging a God-given primitive language, 
Beauzee did not consider its f o r m a t i o n ^ . Beauzee's oppos­
ition to the theory of origin and successive developments of
(2)language is detailed by Daniel Droixhe , who notes from 
Beauzee's Encyclopedie article, 'Langue', how closely he 
participates in the movement of "resacralisation en train de
(3)
se developper" . But this was not taken to the point of
idealisation for a theory of language must take full account
- , (4)of Usage .
The teaching of languages was an important factor in the 
formulation of his theories, as is evident in his declared 
aim of facilitating language study by a method of introduction
(5)
to language on the pattern of Descartes' method
But his main interest was the deeper one of formulating a
theory of language which would "account coherently, consistently
(6 )arid exhaustively for the grammatical facts of all languages .
Bartlett's work, the only one to date which concentrates 
specifically on Beauzee's grammatical theory, is the main 
source for this. Other important sources are the works by 
Auroux, Chevalier, Droixhe, Ricken and Robinet, which will be 
referred to in context.
1. Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 51, 57.
2. La Linguistique et l'appel de l'histoire (1600-1800), 
Geneva, 19 78.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Ibid., p. 162.
5. Grammaire generale, Preface, Vol. I, p. xxvii.
6. Bartlett, 2 .24,p . 28.
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Chapter 2. The Basic Principles and Aims of Beauzee's Theory.
Beauzee announces in the preface to his Grammaire generale 
the basic principles on trhich his theory is founded, principles 
which contain features common to general conceptions of 
universal grammar, and which reflect the influences of his 
time, but which are formulated in terms of his own interpret­
ation .
The universality of thought and language is founded in 
reason. He echoes Cartesian concepts, also evident with Port- 
Royal, in accepting that both reason and language are God-given 
and unique to man, but invokes, not Cartesian precedent, but 
an earlier exponent of this view, Quintilian. Unlike Port- 
Royal, Beauzee implies a dependence of reason on language, 
which seems to stem from his recognition'-that man's sociability, 
and therefore communication's part of the Divine scheme ^  . 
This is evident in his emphasis on the importance of language 
in making reason effective through the communication of 
thought ^  .
This common aim of all languages is achieved through the 
use of speech sounds which, with their material, successive and 
divisible form appear most unlikely, comments Beauzee, to be 
able to represent thought which is purely intellectual and 
necessarily indivisible. But he postulates that this is made
1. Grammaire generale, Preface, Vol. I, iij-vj.
2. "... Mais cette raison, ....  a quoi nous serviroit-elle.
Comment se manifesteroit-elle en nous si nous n'avions la 
faculte d'exprimer nos pensees par la parole? C'est du 
Langage qu'elle emprunte immediatement les lumieres qui font 
sa gloire; c'est en quelque sorte dans le Langage qu'elle
a sa source; parce que c'est par le Langage qu'elle se 
communique et qu'elle transmet l'image de la pensee." Ibid.
-  JL /  J  -
possible through the analysis of thought in some way by logic 
with the help of abstraction. Logic considers separately 
the ideas which are the object of thought and observes the 
different relations between the ideas, relations which result 
from the connection all ideas have with the indivisible 
thought of which they are part. Based on this connection, 
the resulting analysis provides a succession, in order of 
priority, of partial ideas of the same t h o u g h t .
This succession of partial ideas is called by Beauzee the 
'ordre analytique1, because it is both the result of analysis 
of thought and the basis of analysis of speech in all languages. 
The principles of this analysis, founded in reason,produce 
universally similar results. The analysis establishes every­
where the same kind of words, to represent, under similar 
points of view, the same kinds of ideas; it subjects words to 
the same uses, and links words together in similar ways,in
conformity.with the relations between the ideas of which the
(2)words have become signs .
Language, based on this analysis, which is described by
Beauzee as its intellectual mechanism, thus becomes the
common instrument for manifesting thought and reason. Beauzee
also recognises language as a medium for the emotions and as a
(3)social necessity within the Divine scheme for human welfare ,
and its universality is consequently also linked with its
communicative role. Since sociability, which as part of the
Divine scheme, is subject to universal and unchanging laws,
so also must language,.as its necessary organ, be universal
and unchanging in its basic principles. Differences between
languages are purely superficial, due to time, place, customs
and interests, which, though resulting in endless variations,
(4)always have the same bases .
1. Ibid., pp. vj-vij.
2. Ibid., pp. vij-viij.
3. Ibid., p. viij.
4. Ibid., pp. viij-ix.
From the thought of sociability and language as part of 
the essence of man, and as unchanging as the divine law of 
which they partake, Beauzee leads into the concept of general 
grammar and the differences in principle between general and 
particular grammars. Those of general grammar, of unchanging 
truth and universal usage, derive from the nature of thought 
itself and are the result of its analysis, those of particular 
grammars have only a hypothetical truth and are dependent on 
accidental, arbitrary and changeable conventions^.
General grammar is a science because it is concerned with 
reasoned speculation on the unchanging and general principles 
of language, particular grammar an art, involving the practical 
application of arbitrary features of particular languages to 
the general principles of language.
Grammatical science is prior to all languages because its 
principles, which are the same as thos^e which guide human 
reason in its intellectual operations, merely envisage the
YV\
possibility of languages. Gramatical art is posterior because 
the usages of language must exist before they can be artific­
ially linked to the general principles of languages. The
analogical systemswhich form the art can only be the result
(2)of observations made anpre-existent usages .
(3)This definition of Beauzee's, in itself probably the 
clearest and most explicit of the various descriptions of 
universal and general grammar, was given methodical expression 
in his Grammaire generale.
Although the two kinds of grammar are distinct, Beauzee 
did not intend that the study of each should be pursued separ­
ately, for they benefit each other. On the one hand, the
1. Ibid., pp. ix-x.
2. Ibid., pp. x-xj.
3. There were earlier definitions of general and particular
grammars as grammatical science and grammatical art 
(Bartlett, 3.14, p. 35: Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, 
p.52 et seq.).
guidance of reasoned speculation is needed in applying the 
usages of particular languages to the principles of general 
grammar, and on the other, observations of combined usages 
and different practices is necessary to assist in generalis­
ation of principles ^  .
The 'reasoned speculation of the unchanging and general 
principles of language', the objective of general grammar, was 
formulated by Beauzee in terms of an "exposition raisonnee des 
elements necessaires a l'etude de toutes les langues", the 
sub-title of his Grammaire generale.
Although Beauzee's 'Elements necessaires' comprise those
elements which are indispensible in all languages for the
external presentation of analysed thought, they are not rigidly
prescribed but indicate the kind of need which particular
(2)languages should meet, by setting the limits of choice . He 
mentions/ for instance/ that not all languages use the same 
elementary sounds, but all those used are to be found in the 
classes which he specifies. Of grammatical features, cases 
are sometimes used instead of prepositions, and adverbs are in 
some languages expressed by a preposition and noun or by 
extensive use of cases with n o u n s ^ .
His discussions on the elements take account of his universal
a priori principles governing the relationship of language and
thought, and his own observations of various languages. In
spite of his claims of having consulted grammars of all kinds
(4)
of languages , his Grammaire generale is very much based on 
French, which leads Bartlett to describe it as a 'grammaire 
particuliere', since the theory of language and the universal 
grammar are mostly explained in terms of a French grammar 
established according to their principles.
1. Grammaire generale, pp. xij-xiij.
2. "Beauzee donne encore pour fonction a sa grammaire generale 
de "servir de fondement a l'etude de toutes les langues", 
mais ce fondement consiste moins en theoremes initiaux 
qu'en elements d'une theorie linguistique destines a guider 
le choix d'une pratique empirique." (Auroux, La semiotique 
des encyclopedistes, p. 24 0).
3. Grammaire generale, p. xviij.
4. Ibid., p. xv.
Bartlett therefore considers it necessary to distinguish 
sharply between Beauzee's theory of language, the universal 
grammar to which it gives rise, and the language specific 
grammars exemplifying its principles^.
'Theory of Language' is Bartlett's own term. It is not 
referred to as such by Beauzee, who merges the features which 
it comprises with treatment of specific problems of language.
It may be said to encompass the general principles behind 
the universality of language, and the way in which these 
principles, intrinsic to the nature of thought and man's 
conformation, become related to the necessary elements of 
language.
Bartlett identifies five a priori principles on which
(2)the theory of language is based :
1. Thought, as a phenomenon of knowledge and the datum to; 
be externalised by language is 'une et indivisible'.
2. Man's intellectual mechanism is universal.
3. The speech mechanism is universally the same. "Dieu, 
qui avoit destine l'homme a vivre en societe, avoit prepare 
en lui, l'organe de la parole, pour etre l'instrument de la
(3)
communication des pensees ..."
4. The meaning of words is arbitrary (i.e. in their first
signification). "La signification des mots est incontestable-
(4)ment arbitraire dans son origine."
1. Bartlett, 3.4, p. 32.
2. Ibid., 3.7, p. 33.
3. Grammaire generale, Livre I, Introduction , Vol. I, p. i.
4. Ibid., Livre III, Ch. IX, Vol. 2, p. 535.
5. Individual lexical items belong to only one particular 
word class and have essentially but one meaning. "C’est un 
principe incontestable que la nature des mots est immuable:.."^
1. and 2. are already obvious in Beauzee’s Preface, referred
(2)
to above, . The influence of 5. becomes apparent at the 
grammatical stage and appears to rest on Beauzee's contention 
that the nature of words reflects the nature of the things 
they represent, which is unchangeable.
" ... l'Adjectif le, la, les ne peut done jamais devenir
pronom, parce que les natures des mots sont immuables comme
(3) *celles des choses .
Another principle,which appears to qualify as an addition 
to the list,is Beauzee’s concept of the 'ordre analytique' 
which he regards as the universal form of analysis of thought 
and the basis of the analysis of speech in all languages.
Its importance becomes more evident in Beauzee’s discussion 
on syntax.
Bartlett detects a series of stages in Beauzee's theory, 
based on these a priori principles, which relate content, i.e., 
thought analysed, in semantic units, to the expression, i.e.
(4)
the Utterance . H e  defines these stages as the logical
proposition, an abstract concept representing thought analysed
in semantic terms, i.e. words; the grammatical proposition,
also abstract, but indicating the grammatical features of the
content, e.g. by assigning word classes; and a phonological
component to the utterance, which also had its 'deeper' stage
in being selected from a universal choice of speech sounds
(5)possible to man
1. Ibid., Livre II, Ch. V, Vol. I, p. 522.
2. P. 172.
3. Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. Ill, Vol. I, p. 326.
4. Bartlett, 3.8, p. 33.
5. Ibid., 5.15, p. 67, 6.86, p. 157.
"These levels of organisation are inter-related by realis- 
ational processes that allow or determine specific choices 
(or sets of choices) from amongst the possible alternatives 
delimited by the general grammar; the totality of these stages 
of organisation and their realisations characterise the 
particular grammar of a specific language."^
The stages and processes defined by Bartlett are substant­
iated from Beauzee's text, where they are not methodically 
presented in this form, but become apparent, in varying degrees, 
as levels differentiated in the course of his detailed con­
sideration of the various components of his Grammaire generale.
The grammatical proposition is the most evident and import­
ant in Beauzee's exposition since it represents the abstract
stage of general grammar. The logical proposition as such is
(2)not made explicit by Beauzee but that he visualises the
proposition in its semantic content only is implicit in various
parts of his commentary. Moreover it seems likely that he
(3)would agree with Du Marsais* use of the logical proposition.
1. Ibid., 3.8, p. 33.
2. Ibid., 5.18, p. 68.
3. See Section 2, Ch. 4,
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Chapter 3. The Thought Processes.
Whereas Beauzee accounts in some detail for the processes 
which occur after thought has been analysed, up to the stage of 
the utterance, he is less explicit about the nature of thought 
and its processes in the pre-linguistic state. His view of 
it as "une et indivisible" prior to analysis by language, 
conforms to the Enlightenment conception, already evident in 
Du Marsais* theory.
Though he does not specifically discuss the question, he 
accepts the origin of ideas (at least, simple ones,s i n c e ^  
he acknowledges the action of the mind in forming complex ideas) 
through the senses. This fact is referred to incidentally 
in his criticism of Diderot for basing the analysis of language 
on the order of priority of interests, and ofEatteux for 
aligning it with the sequence in which ideas are generated in 
language ^  .
Thoughts are defined as the intuitive or reasoned perception
of the relations which exist between ideas present at the time
(3)
in the mind . As he regards it as the first aim of language
(4)to clearly express our thoughts , the inference is that the 
content is in some way identifiable before language presents 
it in successive order. Presumably some process has been
1. 'Noms appellatifs1, or common nouns, are 'idees factices', 
which the mind in some way forms from all the ideas of 
common attributes which it abstracts from individual ideas. 
(Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. 1, Vol. I, p. 237.).
2 . " ... l'ordre de la generation est tout aussi variable que 
celui de 1 'interet:elle tient necessairement a la succession 
accidentelle des causes qui peuvent introduire les idees 
dans notre intelligence par les portes des sens; ..."
(Ibid., Livre III, Ch. IX, Vol. 2, p. 508).
3. Ibid., .
4. Ibid.
involved in selecting the ideas, which are present at a partic­
ular time,in order to form a thought. But Beauzee does not 
enlarge on this. The reference to logic analysing in some 
way the purely spiritual operation of thought^ appears to 
apply after the content of a specific thought has been formed.
Beauzee's reference to thought as a purely spiritual oper­
ation supports Auroux1 view of the indivisibility of thought 
being attributable to the mind's action./ as against the object 
of the act. Auroux describes the distinction as relatively 
fragile, because it cannot be confirmed that thought rests in 
the act to the exclusion of its object, nor in the object 
to the exclusion of the act. Single and simultaneous thought 
is simply a global idea consisting of other ideas. Though 
it may be argued that the global idea could be expressed in
any number of ways, including a continuous sound, language is
(2)essentially discontinuous . The fact that the 18th century 
does not regard thought as a continuous entity,- which express­
ion could divide arbitrarily, is due to the role played by 
the idea in the prevailing concept of the science of language;
" . . . les idees pre-existent logiquement a une langue qui n'a
(3)pour fonction que de les communiquer." 7
Nor, in Beauzee's theory, does language appear to be 
necessary for the analysis of thought. Auroux, in considering 
this question, compares Beauzee's attitude with the more 
extreme one of Condillac, for whom "toute langue est une methode 
analytique, et toute methode analytique est une langue". That 
language presents analysed thought rather than functions to 
analyse it is also indicated by Beauzee's comment, quoted by 
Auroux, "Nos mots sont comme les resultats de la composition
(4)
analytique des idees; .."
1; Ibid., p. 467.
2. Auroux refers to Diderot's text on disconuity, Art. Encyclo­
pedic , t. 5.
3. Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 7 3-76.
4. Ibid., pp. 80-82; Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. Ill, Vol.I,
p. 289.
Bartlett, on the other hand, interprets Beauzee's view of 
thought 'une et indivisible' as being dependent on sense 
impressions, and essentially pre-rational in that it is un­
structured. Beauzee, he comments, appears to believe that 
thought can only be brought under the control of mind by the 
interdependency of reason and language, to become knowledge, 
or, in linguistic terms, content. Bartlett further deduces 
from Beauzee's comment on the dependence of reason on language, 
"C'est du langage qu'elle emprunte immediatement les lumieres 
qui font sa gloire; c'est en quelque sorte dans le langage 
qu'elle a sa source, - ..." and on the inseparability'of thinking
and speaking, "... parler et penser sont lies inseparablement
(2 )
..." , that thought, reason and language represent an unordered
(3)triad . This implies that Bartlett sees language as 
participating, in Beauzee's theory, in the analysis of thought.
The relationship of language to thought in Beauzee's theory 
is further complicated by the possible interpretations which 
can be placed on the fact that a simultaneous act of thought 
corresponds to a sentence. Auroux, in discussing this point 
comments that thought can be either an original fact of which 
the analysis reproduces the origins of our ideas, or it can 
be any thought which we ourselves have composed. To concede 
that the words of a sentence represent ideas which would only 
occur in the mind in the original unity of a thought correspond­
ing to the meaning of a sentence, would amount to denying that 
a word can signify a composition of ideas of which the elements 
had not occurred together, and that a sentence can consist of 
terms not having previously appeared simultaneously in the mind.
This would limit the act of thought to facts, and exclude
(4)abstract concepts . Auroux considers that it is the act
1. 'Ibid., Preface, Vol. I, p. vi.
2. Ibid., Livre II, Ch. I, Vol. I, p. 253.
3. Bartlett, 3.32-3.39, pp. 42-45.
4. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 81.
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of analysis itself which is ambiguous as a result of the 
different roles it plays. It can explain the genesis of 
abstract ideas, by analysing general ideas from those which 
originate through the senses and are necessarily of individ­
uals, and, in the case of the linguistic proposition, it 
provides the multiplicity of words which form the unity of 
thought. He sees the latter application as assuming a dual 
function for language; to present partial ideas successively 
to the mind, but in order to provide the total meaning, a 
single idea. The interpretation of this function in terms of 
the analysis of simultaneous thought can be regarded as an 
inadequate attempt to provide a basis for i t ^ . It seems 
that Auroux sees the problem in terms of seeking an explan­
ation for the function of language rather than providing a 
convincing account of the nature and functioning of thought, 
a view which has some justification in the case of Beauzde who 
particularly concentrates on the linguistic processes.
The role of analysis in deriving general ideas is evident
in Beauzee's account of the acquisition of knowledge and the
communication of thought, which he describes as two very
(2 )
different processes. To acquire notions (referred to by
(3)Bartlett as content ), complex ideas are decomposed into the
1. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
2. These appear to be similar to Condillac's conception of 
ideas which result from the mind's action. "Idee, notion.
II me semble que le second ne peut se dire que des idees 
qui sont l'ouvrage de l'esprit. On dit la notion de la 
justice, et on ne dit pas la notion d'un arbre". (Condillac, 
Dictionnaire des Synonymes, Oeuvres philosophiques, ed. Le 
Roy, 1947-51, Vol. III).
Bartlett however notes that for Condillac, notions were 
a synthesis of simple ideas: for Beauzee they seem to 
result from the analysis of some complex of perceptions. 
(2.17, p. 24).
3. Bartlett, 3.31, p. 42.
J L U J
most simple, which are the most general and the easiest to
assimilate. These abstractions provide the mechanism for
reasoning and a means for drawing on memory and intelligence^.
To communicate thoughts the synthetic method is used. For
convenience, to shorten communication we start at the point
where we have arrived by degrees and proceed from the most
simple to the most complex idea so that the picture presented
by the succession of words which together express the thought,
(2)is the reflection of the image in the mind .
Obviously the method of synthesis involves language, and
by implication, since this process depends on the results of
(3) 'analysis, so does the decomposition of complex ideas . It 
would seem that the analysis to simple ideas provides a basic 
fund of knowledge on which reason and memory can draw for the 
various mental processes, including the formation of thoughts.
Items in such a fund of knowledge would more conveniently 
be identified by signs, and such signs could represent complex 
as well as simple ideas. However, although complex terms 
are necessary to shorten communication, it appears that they 
would be of limited use as ready reference in the mental 
process, since the process of analysis from complex to simple 
ideas would still take place, because it is related to the 
capacity to understand. This may be another indication that, 
for Beauzee, thought is to some extent independent of language.
Bartlett sees this analytic process as making Beauzee’s
theory of knowledge (Bartlett's term) dependent on his theory
(4)
of language . He also refers to the analysed elements 
providing not only the means by which man takes advantage of
1. Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. I, Vol. I, pp. 252-25 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Bartlett considers that Beauzee places the language mechanism 
firmly within that of reason, i.e. man's ability to analyse, 
make abstractions and generalisations, and to synthesise, 
classify and sub-cldssify. (3.30, pp. 41-42.)
4. Ibid., 3.32, pp. 42-4 3.
his memory and intelligence but also representing the data 
from which the language utterance is synthesised^.
The use of the term 'synthesis1 in this context seems to 
relate not only to the synthesis of simple ideas into complex 
ones, identified by words, but also to the composition of 
the utterance from words representing simple or complex ideas, 
or a mixture of both.
The position seems to be confused, however, in that while
Beauzee states that, for ease of communication, synthesis,
the reverse process of analysis,presents the idea in its
(2)pre-analysed form , the presentation of a total thought in
(3)a sentence is stated to be in analytic order .
The process of synthesis evidently applies in Beauzee's 
illustration regarding complex ideas which are represented by 
'noms appellatifs', "qui designent les etres par-1 'idee 
generale d'une nature commune a plusieurs". They express the 
total idea ("l'idee totale") of the nature which is common and 
this total idea is the sum of the partial ideas ("comprehension 
de l'idee") forming the total. Homme, for example, includes 
the partial ideas of 'corps vivant' and ’ame raisonnable', 
which in turn include ideas subordinate to them, e.g. 'ame 
raisonnable' assumes ideas of substance, unity, intelligence 
etc.(4)
Thus the more general and simple ideas would be synthesised 
to the more complex idea of 'homme'.
1. Ibid., 3.31, p. 42.
2. Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. I, Vol. I, pp. 252-25 3.
3. Ibid. , pp. vi j-v.iij .
4. Ibid., Livre II, Ch. I, Vol. I, pp. 235-6.
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But Beauzee says that while the more general and simple 
ideas take precedence in synthetic order, proper nouns 
(noms propres) representing individuals, take priority on 
analytic order, because knowledge of individuals comes first 
in experience^. 1 Order* , it seems, refers to the stage from 
which the processes of analysis and synthesis proceed.
Beauzee's use of the same term 'analysis' in opposition 
to synthesis, both for abstracting simple ideas which are then 
compounded (synthesised) in the expression and for the present­
ation of partial ideas of the same thought in the expression, 
adds to the confusion. There appears to be a difference of 
kind between a mental process forming a total idea by the 
addition of semantic features which are included in the com­
prehension of an idea and are represented by a word, and saying 
something in a sentence by presenting a succession of ideas, 
all amounting to the expression of an 'acte indivisible'. It 
may be that Beauzee would regard the two functions as part of 
a total process since, in effect, the analysed simple ideas 
and the words in a sentence are all partial ideas of the same 
thought. It is for convenience of communication that simple 
ideas are synthesised to complex ideas. Such a view would 
nevertheless seem to confuse semantic analysis with the question 
of ordering of ideas.
'Order' can admittedly apply to both the analysis and syn­
thesis of separate ideas (i.e. in the sense of the stage from 
which one proceeds) and to the order of priority of ideas in 
a sentence, but there seems to be a difference which Beauzee 
does not acknowledge, though possibly deliberately, if he 
views the process as common to both aspects.
1. Ibid., pp. 252-253.
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A further question is prompted by Beauzee's references 
to the synthesis of simple ideas and the resulting succession 
of words which express a thought. Beauzee's simple and complex 
ideas appear to concern only objects which can relate to 
reality directly or indirectly and in terms of word class would 
be represented by nouns, whereas the process by which the 
utterance is formulated would require other kinds of semantic 
units, representing for instance relationships, manner, etc., 
having their grammatical counterpart in other word classes.
Such units would also need to be available to memory.
This point does not appear to have received Beauzee's 
specific attention, but his recognition of the distinction 
between wqrds expressing objects of thoughts and those express­
ing the mind's view is of interest. He agrees in principle 
with Port-Royal's division into these two classes but criticises 
it as arbitrary and insufficiently r e a s o n e d ^ . His own 
distinction is made on the quite different basis of whether 
words are marked for number, and therefore can be regarded as
objects of our thoughts. He excludes .'affectifs', i.e. inter-
(2 )
jections from the division , which only applies to 
'discursifs', which "servent a 1 'exposition analytique des
(3)
pensees de 1*esprit" . Nouns, pronouns, adjectives and verbs 
represent objects of thought, because they are the only parts 
of speech which express things (les etres); prepositions, adverbs 
and conjunctions represent the mind's views.
Commenting on the difference between the Encyclopedie class­
ification of words signifying objects of thought arid those 
signifying manner of thought, and that of Port-Royal, Auroux 
points out that within the Enlightenment view of a proposition 
merely corresponding to a total idea expressing a fact, manner
of thought is not related to an act of mind but is a point of
(4)
view whereby the object or idea is regarded by the thought
1. Ibid., Livre III, Ch.. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 91.
2. These were classified by Port-Royal, together with con­
junctions, as signifying the operation of mind which joins 
or disunites things.
- 3. Ibid., p. 94.
4. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 9 6-7.
Chapter 4. The Word in Beauzee's Theory.
Bartlett refers to the word as the cornerstone of Beauzee's
theory since it is the basic linguistic element at each stage
of his theory of language. He considers that Beauzee obviously
sees the word as the basic linguistic unit synthesised from
analysed thought to establish semantic elements in the logical
proposition; it has formal grammatical class membership in the
grammatical proposition; as a phonological unit it is subject
to phonological/phonetic constraints, and, in the utterance it
manifests the specific choices made at each of the underlying
(1)stages .
Beauzee's definition of the word is included in the Encyclo­
pedie. "Une totalite de sons, devenue par usage, pour ceux
(2 )qui l'entendent, le signe d'une idee totale" .
He recognises the meaningless nature of the word, in itself.
The arbitrary association of meaning with a word was referred 
to at Chapter 2, above, as one of the a priori principles of 
his theory ^  .
He dismisses the usual signification of the words of a
language as a matter for the dictionary, stating that Grammaire
generale, which is only concerned with general principles
common to all languages, aims at defining the specific character
of the classes in which words are arranged. The basis of these
classifications is to be found in the nature of their common
(4)functions relative to the analytical expression of thought .
1. Bartlett, 4.4, p. 48.
2. Ibid., and the article "Mot", Encyclopedie, 10, p. 752.
3. Les elements de la parole, consideres en soi, ne sont que des 
sons physiques, purement materiels, et vides de sens;" 
(Grammaire generale, Livre II, Intro., Vol. I, p. 232.)
"C'est pour faire usage de la parole, dit tres-bien l'abbe 
Girard que le mot est etabli. La premiere est naturelle, 
generale, et universelle chez les hommes; le second est 
arbitraire, et varie selon les divers usages des peuples ...
On a le don de la parole et la science des mots". Ibid.pp. 233-4.
4. Grammaire generale, Livre II, Intro., Vol. I, p. 234.
Beauzee distinguishes between the 'signification objective1
of a word, "l'idee fondamentale qui est l'objet individuel
de la signification du m o t " ^ , relating to semantic content,
and the 'signification formelle ou specifique', "la maniere
particuliere dont un mot presente a 1 'esprit l'idee individu-
(2 )elle dont il est le signe" . This in effect signifies its
syntactic function and identifies it as a word class, since
the basic idea, or meaning, is applied in a particular way.
This is illustrated by Beauzee's example of the common root
'am', the basic idea of aimer, amitie, ami, amical, amicale-
ment. The different inflexions add to this 'idee objective'
a particular application which gives the formal signification,
aimer being a verb, amitie, an abstract noun, ami, a substantive
(3)noun, amical, an adjective, and amicalement, an adverb .
Together, the 'signification objective' and 'signification 
formelle' give the 'signification totale' of a word, comprising 
all the possible meanings and grammatical uses which it can 
have in language ^  .
*
Beauzee's classification of the word is also subject to
sub-classification of the 'idee totale', namely, to the
categories 'idees principales' and 'idees accessoires', terms
which are to be found in various contexts in his Grammaire
generale. In relation to the 'signification formelle' of a
(5)word, case would represent an 'idee accessoire' . Bartlett 
sees the 'signification objective' of a word as consisting 
of its semantic distinguishes, which are its 'idees principales'
1. Ibid., Livre III, Ch. VI, Vol. 2, p. 346.
2'. Ibid. , p. 345.
3. Ibid., p. 346-347.
4. Bartlett, 4.7, p. 49.
5. "...on ne peut plus douter aujourd'hui que la diversite des
Cas ne depende de celle des terminaisons, destinees a 
designer les idees accessoires des differents rapports a
l'ordre analytique de 1'enonciation." (Livre III, Ch. IV,
Vol. 2, p. 151).
and its semantic markers, its 'idees accessoires'. As examples 
he instances 'amour and amitie'. as markers and 'haine and 
amour' as distinguishers (the last two examples are Bartlett's 
own) .
The term 'acception formelle' is also used by Beauzee in
relation to the word in all its aspects. Bartlett notes that
this appears to bridge content and expression. Content
relates to a choice of variables made by the speaker which
range from denotation, connotation and accessory features,
such as singularity and plurality,; to a wide choice of affective
meanings, e.g. sens propre, sens figure, sens accidentel and
Others listed in Beauzee's Encyclopedie article, 'Sens', which
(2)is compiled largely from Du Marsais' Traite des Tropes
The fact that Beauzee considers the possibility of meaning­
ful syllables is referred to by Robinet as an original feature 
which contributes to the difference between his definition 
of the word and the views of Port-Royal, Du Marsais, Duclos
and Fromant. Beauzee, in addition to considering the Port-
(3)Royal definition as a pleonasm, referred to it as inexact 
because it did not take account of the fact that each syllable 
signifies something in our thoughts. A more fundamental 
difference is Beauzee's view of the object represented, not in 
the capacity of an idea, but in that of a being. Robinet 
describes Beauzee's interpretation as 'non arnauldienne',
(4)
Aristotelian and ontological, far removed from Port-Royal's
1. Bartlett, 4.8, p. 49.
2. Ibid., 4.12, p. 51.
3. "des sons distincts et articules dont les hommes ont fait
des signes pour signifier leurs pensees", Gramm.gen.,Pt. II,Ch. I
4. "Cet aristotelisme du plein XVIIIe siecle est la raison de 
la divergence constatee et longuement explicitee entre PR 
et l'ERM, qui accentue la tendance amorcee par Du Marsais."
(Le Langage a l'Age Classique, p. 69).
distinction between the 'idee representee1 and the 'idee 
representante', for, independent of the signifier and the 
signified is the b e i n g ^ .
Beauzee's recognition, illustrated by the identification
of 'am' as the 'idee objective', that units not forming a
(2)complete word may nevertheless be meaningful prompts certain 
questions.
One relates to possible anomalies arising from his use of
the terms 'idee partielle' and 'idee totale' which appear to
be relative terms (e.g. homme is an idee totale in relation
to the idees partielles which it contains, such as male,
animal, ame etc., but an idee partielle in relation to the
term homme pieux). This aspect is discussed by Bartlett in the
context of Beauzee's open-ended view of the word.. Though
recognising that single syllables or single sounds m a y  be
meaningful and therefore capable of being the sign of an idea,
Beauzee considers them as only idees partielles, not words,
which, by his definition above, are the sign of an 'idee
totale'. But an 'idee' as a sum of semantic features (e.g. the
subject and its complement, or the proposition, which can also
be 'idees totales' in relation to the 'idees partielles' of
which they are formed) may transcend the word boundary. The
existence of the word in all its differing capacities at the
same time also makes it difficult to define it in terms valid
(3)throughout . However, the stage at which the word is being 
considered is usually evident from the context, so that the 
lack of a clear distinction denoting its various capacities 
presents no real p r o b l e m ^ .
1. Ibid., p. 70.
2. In the article "Mot", Encyclopedie, Beauzee considers 
amaverimus as five individual features. "Chaque syllabe 
est un son distinct et souvent articule, qui quelquefois 
signifie quelque chose de nos pensees." (Bartlett, p. 53 
and Robinet p. 69 refer).
3. Bartlett, 4.13-4.19, pp. 52-55.
4. Ibid., 4.19, p. 54.
Another point relates to the content of the meaningful 
units which are smaller than the word. Although these units 
are elements from which the expression becomes synthesised, 
their role in this respect does not seem to be considered by 
Beauzee. Their semantic nature appears to be different from 
that of the simple ideas analysed from complex ideas which 
also form elements of analysed thought, but which appear likely 
to each provide an 1 idee totale1 capable of being represented 
by a word.
Setting aside the interjections (affectifs), which re­
present the 'langage du coeur', and are segregated as word 
classes from the discursives, which 'servent a 1 1 expression 
analytique des pensees1 , Beauzee defines the basic signifi­
cation, common to the four declinable word classes, nouns,
•pronouns, adjectives and verbs, as presenting 'les etres',
(2 )real or abstract, which can be the object of thought .
Bartlett notes that it is the nominalist existence, the 
'existence intellectuelle' as a result of the act of judgment 
that confers on the referents of word classes the common
(3)
property of being 'des etres' .
Within this basic principle, words are allocated to classes 
according to their nature, which, as noted in the above 
definition, rests on how they signify beings. In illustration:
" ... les Noms sont des mots qui expriment determinement 
les etres, en les designant par l'idee de leur nature.
Les Noms appellatifs sont ceux qui designent des etres par 
l'idee generale d'une nature commune a plusieurs.
1. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 94; 
Bartlett, 5.31, p. 73.
2. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. Ill, Vol. 2, p. 89.
3. Bartlett, 5.32, p. 74.
Les Noms propres sont ceux qui designent les etres par 
l'idee singuliire d'une nature individuelle."^^
... on ne doit regarder comme des Pronoms, que les mots qui
(2 )expriment des etres determines par l'idee de leur personne.
Sub-classifications of the word classes are made according 
to the semantic features common to them, as indicated by the 
above-sub-classification of nouns to common and proper nouns.
Beauzee's definitions of word classes relate to their
unchanging nature. The way in which the words are used in a
particular language, i.e. in the utterance, may vary from
(3)this due to the use of ellipsis
1. Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. I, Vol. I, pp. 235-6.
2. Ibid., Ch. II, p. 275.
3. Ibid., Livre II, Ch. V, Vol. I, p. 522.; Bartlett, p. 72.
Chapter 5. The Proposition.
If content were regarded as a mass of semantic entities, 
without a pre-destined form, subsequent realisation in speech 
should present endless possibilities. But Beauzee is con­
strained by the concept of the proposition as a judgment, 
though he gives it his own independent definition and material­
isation from thought 'une et indivisible' to the utterance.
According to his interpretation, knowledge is nothing 
other than the intellectual recognition of beings with their 
attributes, which logicians call judgments, the act whereby 
the mind perceives in itself the existence of a being with 
its attribute. If the relationship in reality is as it 
exists in the mind, our knowledge c£:it is correct, but it 
is false if it does not correspond with reality
Bartlett interprets the 'acte* of judgment as the act of 
analysis which produces two discrete entities in some relation­
ship to each other, the entities probably being in some gross 
or undifferentiated semantic terms. The structure resulting 
from the subsequent act of synthesis is the 'logical propos­
ition', abstract in that it does not depend on a specific 
form of lexicalisation but on expression of the intellectual 
existence of the subject and its relationship with the 
attribute ^  .
1. Grammaire--gdnerale, Livre II, Ch. IV, Vol. I, pp. 394 .
2. Bartlett, 5.16-5.18, pp. 67-68.
Auroux discusses some consequences deriving from differing 
conceptions of the proposition, including those of Beauzee 
and Du Marsais. Beauzee's 'existence intellectuelle' made 
the truth or falsehood of a proposition depend on the 
relationship of the entire proposition to reality. Du 
Marsais' definition amounted to the possibility of making 
truth or falsehood dependent on an act of mind. (La semio- 
tique des encyclopedistes, pp. 93-4). Beauzee's arguments 
against Du Marsais' theory are included in his Grammaire 
generale (Livre III, Ch. I, Vol. 2, p. 4 et seq.).
Beauzee does not appear to be explicit on whether or not 
the act of judgment involves some internal form of lexical 
differentiation. In his description of the function of a 
proposition, his reference to 'sujet determine* and 'attribut 
determine1 implies a formal distinction, corresponding to 
the intellectual existence of the subject with its attribute^^.. •
While not describing the logical proposition and grammatical
proposition as such, Beauzee does imply such distinct levels
(2)at other contexts of his commentary - . The distinction is
illustrated in a description of the content of "la gloire
qui vient de la vertu est superieure a celle qui vient de la
naissance". He defines "la gloire" and "superieure" as
grammatical subject and attribute respectively, and "la gloire
qui vient de la vertu" and "superieure a celle qui vient de
(3)la naissance" as logical subject and attribute . The 
logical subject and attribute are thus identifiable with the 
grammatical subject and attribute and their respective 
complements. Although, as Bartlett points out,the logical 
proposition is regarded from purely the aspect of content 
and although the total content overlaps with that of the total 
expression, there is no necessary one to one relationship
(4)
within the content . The latter point is well illustrated 
in Bartlett*s account of the distinction made by Beauzee between, 
on the one hand, the definition of simple and compound logical 
subjects and attributes and bn the other, between non complex 
or complex grammatical subjects or attributes. In the first 
case, the subject is simple if it derives from a single 'idee 
unique1, compound if it consists of more than one 'idee 
unique', irrespective of the number or form or words used to
1. "Une proposition doit etre 1'image de ce que 1'esprit 
apergoit par son jugement, et par consequent elle doit
enoncer avec exactitude ce qui se passe alors dans 1 'esprit,
et montrer sensiblement un sujet determine, un attribut 
determine, et l'existence intellectuelle du sujet avec 
relation a l'attribut". Livre II, Ch. IV, Vol. 2, p. 394.
2. Bartlett, 5.74, pp. 91-92 and Beauzee Grammaire generate, 
Livre II, Ch. IV, Vol. I, p. 395.
3. Ibid., Livre III, Ch. II, Vol. 2, p. 57.
4. Bartlett, 5.16, p.67, 5.117-5.130, pp. 109-115.
express this; and in the second,non-complex if it depends on 
one word, complex if more than one word is used^1 .^
Bartlett notes that in this respect Beauzee uses the same
distinction as Arnauld between simple and compound ideas as
(2)opposed to complex and non complex terms .
Although Beauzee*s definition of the role of the verb etre
in the proposition moves away from Port-Royal*s view of it
as an operative act of mind, joining the subject to its
(3)attribute , it attributes an important and distinctive
character to the verb, vesting in it the idea of the intell-ect-
(4)ual existence of the subject in relation to the attribute '•
Beauzee distinguishes between the usual function of the
verb etre expressing intellectual existence, and its use to
express real existence, when, in addition to the abstract form,
is added the accessory feature of the determined idea of real
(5)existence . The existence of other adjectival or concrete 
verbs is explained by the suppression of the root of the 
substantive or abstract verb (i.e. etre) leaving only the 
accessory idea of the attributeQ Only the endings recall 
the idea of intellectual existence, a necessary element in 
the total signification of concrete v e rbs^^.
.1. Beauzee, Grammaire generate, Livre III, Ch. I, Vol. 2, p. 14.
2. Bartlett, 2.18, p. 250
3. Auroux, p. 96-7; Robinet, Le Langage a l*Age Classique,
pp. 68-72 discusses Beauzee's objections to the Port-Royal 
concept of affirmation.
4. Grammaire generate, Livre II, Ch. IV, Vol. I, p. 395.
5. Ibid., p. 410.
6. Ibid., p. 411.
196 -
He defines the grammatical content of the proposition as 
the sum total of the integral parts of which it is composed, 
reduced by analysis to the subject and attribute. The 
attribute, viewed as grammatical content, includes the verb ^  .
In relation to the total parts which should constitute
the proposition, Beauzde considers that the sentence (i.e.
utterance) may be complete, in its natural state (plenitude),
or have a lack, or surplus of some parts (defaut or redond-
(2)ance) . Ellipsis, the lack of some part of the natural
state of the phrase is the form of deviation most important
to Beauzee's theory, and he attributes it to the desire to.
(3)recapture the unity of thought . The ’art' of restoring
the e.lided parts is fundamental to his theory since it
allows: for the completion of the sentence in agreement with
the grammatical principles he establishes regarding the nature
of words and their relationship within the sentence, i.e.,
(4)the principles which form his Grammaire generale
Bartlett considers it quite apparent that Beauzee regards 
this 'art* of reconstructing the underlying form of the 
utterance, consciously undertaken by the grammarian by applic­
ation of a set of rules drawn from some general grammar, as 
part of the language user's competence. Bartlett interprets 
the decoding process as involving successive stages to 
determine first the grammatical structure, then the underlying 
semantic organisation. "The hearer analyses the utterance . c , , 
and proceeds, by means cf his unconscious knowledge of the grammar
1. Ibid.,. Livre III, Ch. I, Vol. 2, p. 7. Auroux distinguishes 
between 'Theorie-1' and 'Theorie-2' of the proposition. 
'Theorie-2' - which is relevant to Beauzee's conception is 
the addition of several ideas to form a single one. It is 
true if the global idea corresponds to a fact. For 
'Theorie-1' (appropriate to Port-Royal), the proposition is 
true if the idea of the predicate is included in that of 
the subject. (Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes,
p. 166) .
2. ..Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. VIII, Vol. 2, p. 395.
3. Ibid., pp. 396-7.
4. Ibid., p. 3980
 .....  to synthesize its underlying grammatical structure.
This, in turn, is analysed to obtain the semantic organisation 
of the logical proposition, leading finally to the synthesis 
of thought 'une et indivisible* ^ .
Beauzee’s reference to a special marking, "marque in-
 ^ . / 2 \
fatLlible"; which would signal that something had been omitted 
from the utterance/provides some support for Bartlett's 
conclusions. Furthermore, the fact that Beauzee bases the 
art of reconstruction on the grammatical principles which he 
has established,in accordance with the principles regarding 
the nature of words and the grammatical forms which relate 
the words within the total sentence, provides justification 
for a view that in a decoding process, the grammatical structure 
is determined first. Against this, Beauzee quotes Du Marsais' 
recommendation that the words expressed must arouse the idea 
of those which are understood, but not expressed, so that
(3\
the mind can, by analogy, reconstruct the entire sentence . 
This implies that semantic considerations are also taken into 
account. Bartlett in fact acknowledges that a reconstruction 
process which a language user would apply, would draw on 
such "unconscious knowledge as the meaning and word-class 
membership of lexical items accruing in the utterance to 
correctly and unambiguously derive the underlying grammatical 
and semantic structures." .
1. . Bartlett, 5.10-50.1.1’,'p. 65.
2. "S'il autorise done une phrase elliptique, afin de donner 
au tour le merite de la brievete ou de l'energie; il a soin 
d fy conserver quelque chose, qui puisse caracteriser la 
suppression: de maniere qu'il est toujours possible de 
reconnaitre a quelque marque infaillible ce qui manque a
la plenitude de la phrase, et ce qu'il convient de suppleer 
pour en retablir 1 *integrite". (Grammaire generale, Livre III 
Ch. VIII, Vol. 2, pp. 398-9).
3. Ibid., p. 398.
4. Bartlett, 5.10, p. 65.
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Bartlett sees ellipsis especially, but also redundancy
and the natural construction, as elements of the realisation
processes leading from one stage to another, and as a means
of accounting for the lack of one to one correspondence
between content and expression^^. While it is clear that
ellipsis is liberally used in the context of relating the
grammatical proposition to the utterance, its application
between the logical and grammatical proposition is not
apparent. Bartlett considers that it seems reasonable to
conclude that Beauzee saw ellipsis also occurring between
(2)logical and grammatical propositions . Since both forms 
of proposition appear to correspond in their outer limits, i.e. 
content and expression overlap, any possible use of ellipsis 
would appear to be limited to internal organisation, involving, 
for instance, semantic content not reconcilable with the 
rules of general grammar allowed for in the grammatical 
proposition.
1. Ibid., 4.2, pp. 46-7, 5.5, p. 63.
2. Ibid., 6.72, p. 151.
Chapter 6. Syntax.
With Beauzee, as with Du Marsais, the arrangement of the 
words in a sentence, their mutual relationship and their 
relationship to the whole sentence is of vital importance 
in conveying the meaning of the sentence as a faithful 
image of the thought it expresses, for it reflects the 
relationship between the ideas contained in the thought, ideas 
which the words themselves e x p r e s s .
The principles whereby these aims are achieved in Beauzee's 
theory are the analytic order of words in a sentence (l'ordre 
analytique), the notion of complement, and the relations of 
identity and determination.
Beauzee's views on syntax and construction, endorsing
the definitions formulated by Du Marsais, accommodate these
principles. Syntax is the art of ordering words and their
accidental forms within the proposition, in conformity with
the analytical order of ideas, and the relations of the basic
(2)
ideas of the thought .
Beauzee acknowledges the fundamental importance of the
role of construction in syntax. The accidental forms of
words depend on the analytical order of the ideas which they
represent, and through them the natural construction is
achieved, the image of the analytical succession of ideas
(3)and the faithful portrayal of the thought .
He is emphatic about the importance of the 'ordre analy­
tique ' and forcefully declares it to be fundamental to the 
faithful representation of thought in language and the
1. Grammaire generale, Livre H I ,  Ch. IX, Vol. 2, p. 4 66.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., Livre III, Introduction, p. 3.
universal and unchanging prototype in all languages, without 
which there would be no common terms of reference. It is 
the indispensible basis of the rules of syntax in all languages. 
"Aneantissez l'ordre analytique: les regies de la Syntaxe 
sont partout sans raison, sans appui; bientot elles seront 
sans consistance, sans autorife, sans effet; les mots, sans 
relation entre eux, ne formeront plus de sens; la parole ne 
sera plus qu'un vain bruit. Mais l'ordre analytique une 
fois admis pour terme de comparaison, la communication est 
etablie generalement partout, avec les seules difficultes 
qui naissent des differentes manieres de peindre le meme 
objet." (1)
These unequivocal views of Beauzee on the importance of
the concept of 'ordre analytique', or natural order, lead
from references to Batteux' opinion that inversion could
be equally regarded as normal order, a doctrine accepted by
Condillac in his Essai sur l'origine des connaissances
(2 )
humaines and by Pluche and Chompre . The differing lines 
of thought are discussed in relation to Condillac's theory, 
at Part 2, Section 4, Chapter 8.
Beauzee refers to the two possible means whereby the 
influence of the 'ordre analytique' can be made known in 
the outward expression of thought, either to follow, in 
speech, the same order as that of ideas in the 'ordre 
analytique', as in the languages described by Girard as 
analogues, which include French, Italian, Spanish, English or, 
as with the transpositives, to convey the 'ordre analytique' by
(3)
inflexions, allowing a free order, as in Latin . His own 
interpretation of the ordre analytique is constrained by the 
order followed by the analogues, and specifically French, 
and his formula for it lacks conviction at least as a universal 
basis ^  .
1. Ibido, Ch. IX, Vol. 2, pp. 467-468.
2. Ibid., pp. 464-6.
3. Ibid., p. 468.
40 Bartlett, 6.56-6.66, pp. 145-149.
The vital weakness is that Beauzee's postulated order of 
analysed thought, reflected in the 'ordre analytique' which 
is the ideal order in the sentence, in effect derives from 
the order normal to the French language and is influenced 
by the traditional view of the logical proposition. His 
natural order of parts of speech is for the subject to precede 
the verb, because the mind sees a being before observing its 
manner of being: the verb is followed by its complement, 
because all action must commence before achieving its con­
sequence: similarly the preposition is followed by the 
complement, because the complement completes the meaning 
initiated by the preposition: adjective follows the noun 
with which it is associated: incidental proposition follows 
the antecedent it modifies^1- .
He claims that 'ordre analytique' meets the natural
succession representing the relation between the 'idees
objectives' (i.eQ the semantic content) of a thought which
(2)
accords priority to the one and posteriority to the other .
He argues that Condillac's 'liaison des idees' is insufficient
(3)
to present this relationship . Bartlett, criticising the 
circularity and unconvincing nature of Beauzee's argument 
in favour of 'ordre analytique', considers that Condillac's 
point of view, though counter to Beauzee's basic premises 
about the structure of content, could have proved productive
(4)
as a formal device in his theory
Du Marsais, with his distinction between the logical and
the grammatical proposition, and the introduction of the
notions of identity and determination in respect of logical
(5)relations, had paved the way for the notion of complement , 
but it was Beauzee who formulated the notion.
1. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. IX, Vol. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 472.
3. Ibido, p. 536.
4. Bartlett, 6.61, p 0 148.
5. Chevalier, quoting Fr. Thurot, remarks that, to the 18th
century, Du Marsais was the inventor. Histoire de la Syntaxe, 
p. 651.
Beauzee*s definition is related to the meaning of the 
word. It is an addition to a term which changes or completes 
its meaning. " ... le Complement d*un mot est une addition 
faite a ce mot, afin d'en changer ou d'en completer la 
signification: ... " ^  . His definitions regarding complement 
are also included in the Encyclopedie article Regime. On 
the basis of this definition, everything in the sentence can 
be reduced to the description of the subject and attribute 
and their complements, forming a total idea of the subject 
and attribute respectively.
Beauzee distinguishes two kinds of words which are subject 
to complementation, those having a general meaning (signifi­
cation generale), which can have different degrees of com­
plementation, and which do not necessarily require such 
amplification, since they are already *idees totales* in them­
selves1; and those with a relative meaning (signification 
relative)for which complementation is indispensible to com­
plete their meaning. In the first category are common nouns, 
certain adjectives, certain adverbs and most verbs, and in 
these cases, complementation would change the meaning. In 
the second category are included words whose meaning implies 
a counterpart, including the 1simplement relatifs1 such as 
'pere, oncle etc*, which require a *correlatif*, and the
1reciproquement relatifs*, which express a constant relation-
(2)
ship between two terms, such as’frere, collegue, cousin etc*
■l.o Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. II, Vol. 2, p. 44.
2. Ibid., pp. 45-48. Bartlett notes that Beauzde's consider­
ation of such points regarding words having a relative 
significance (signification relative) shows an interesting 
approach to the componential analysis of words, which, 
however, he fails to develop to any greater extent.
(50138, p. 118).
Prepositions unconditionally require a complement, a noun, 
pronoun or i n f i n i t i v e ^ .
Complements can be considered relative to their expression 
or their meaning. Considered in relation to their meaning, 
there can be as many kinds of complements as there are possible 
ways of determining the meaning of the word, and Beauzee 
attempts a distinction according to the different circumstances 
which can affect a fact, quoting 'quis, quid, ubi, quibus, 
auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando1 ^ .
In relation to its expression, i.e. viewed grammatically,
a complement can be incomplex, when it is expressed by one word,
a noun, pronoun, adjective, infinitive or an adverb; or complex,
when expressed by several words, each of which modifies the
others. A word which is already complement to another may itself
be followed by another, and so on, until the last in the series
(3)is semantically complete . In such cases, the word which is 
first in the 1ordre analytique1, to which the remaining words are 
subordinate, needs to be distinguished, and if the word is an 
adjective, noun, pronoun or infinitive it can be called the 
* complement grammatical1 because in languages subject to declens­
ion these word classes are affected by their syntactic role in 
the complement. Viewed in its entirety, the complement is the
1 complement logique', "parce que c'est 1 'expression de l 1idee
(4)
.totale que la raison envisage comme le vrai complement"
1. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. II, Vol. 2.
2. .Ibid.,pp. 52, 57. Chevalier refers to the similarity to the
former classical divisions, in Beauzee's treatment of the 
content of complements, which includes classification 
according to place, means, cause, manner and time, but 
considers that the modifications made by Beauzee are far 
from being an improvement (Histoire de la Syntaxe, p. 720).
3. Bartlett, 5.139, p. 119. Bartlett records that the idea of 
semantic completion, i.e. there should remain no relations 
whose antecedents and consequent terms are not fully specified/ 
formed part of the modistic concept of syntax, cf. Bursill-Hall 
Aspects of modistic grammar, 143. (Bartlett, p. 119).
4. Bartlett (5.141, p. 120) relates the logical complement to 
Bloomfield's endocentric construction. (Bloomfield, Language, 
p. 194) .
Where the first word of a complex complement is indeclinable
i.e. an adverb or preposition, it is the 'complement initial*, 
and the entire complement is the 'complement total' ^  .
Beauzee's conception of the complement has its repercussions 
in his definition of the incidental propositions, which serve, 
as determinative or explicative complements to partial ideas 
belonging to another proposition, this being principle in 
relation to the incidental, which is only part of it. Together, 
the incidental and principal proposition form a complex pro­
position.
Using the Port-Royal terms of explication and comprehension, 
Beauzee defines the role of the explicative incidental pro­
position as developing the comprehension of the partial idea to 
which it is linked; that of the determinative adds an accessory
idea to the comprehension of the partial idea to which it is
linked ^  .
He criticises both Du Marsais' and Port-Royal's definitions 
of the incidental proposition. Du Marsais' definition was 
inadequate in that it assumed that the incidental proposition 
merely applied to the subject of the principal clause. "celle 
qui se trouve entre le sujet personnel et 1 'attribut d'une 
autre Proposition qu'on appelle Proposition principale". That 
.of Port-Royal, though allowing for the incidental to apply 
to both subject and predicate limited it to cases introduced 
by the relative pronoun. "Les Propositions incidentes sont
(3)
celles dont le sujet est le relatif qui" 7.
A consequence of the differing approaches of Port-Royal
and Beauzee to the incidental proposition is that whereas Port- 
Royal saw in such propositions the possibility of underlying 
propositions, in terms of judgment,Beauzee's view of them as 
complements with similar functions to any other complements,
1. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. II, Vol. 2, pp. 53-57.
2. Ibid., Ch. I, Vol. 2, p. 30.
3. Ibid., pp. 23-29.
required no deeper structural explanation in this respect.
Auroux comments that, whereas Port-Royal's interpretation could 
be compared in this respect with the modern conception of 
transformational generative grammar, that of Beauzee could 
not. Chomsky himself noted the difference between Beauzee and 
Port-Royal ^  .
Of interest are the criteria identified by Beauzee for the 
two different categories of incidental propositions. The 
incidental explicative can, instead of being joined to the ante-r 
cedent by a conjunctive, become a principal proposition by the 
use of causal conjunctions or equivalent phrase, or it can be 
omitted without altering the sense of the principal proposition. 
The antecedent to the conjunctive word of the incidental can 
be substituted for it, transforming the incidental into a 
principal, without changing the truth of the proposition.
In the case of the determinative incidental, the incidental 
can be made principal by replacing the conjunctive word by a 
conditional conjunctive, e.g. si, or some phrase having both . 
the conditional and conjunctive sense. Contrary to the 
explicative, the incidental determinative cannot be suppressed 
without changing the sense and the truth of the principal. 
Similarly the antecedent of the conjunctive word of the 
incidental determinative cannot be substituted for it, thus 
making the incidental a principal, without falsifying the pro­
position, e.g. *la gloire qui vient de la vertu' cannot retain
(2 )
its truth in 'la gloire vient de la vertu'./
Beauzee invokes the Port-Royal Logique's point that all 
additions distinctly marking proper nouns are explicative, since 
their comprehension is already complete and requires no further 
' determination^.
1. Auroux, pp„ 189-190. Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, note 72, 
p. 70.
2. Port-Royal noted similar *, restrictions. See Section I, . 
Chapter 5.
3. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. I, Vol. 2, pp. 30-36.
Indicative of the persistence of the authority of the Port- 
Royal Logique is also Beauzee's comment that further points on 
incidental propositions are more appropriate to logic than gram­
mar and it would be better to consult La Logique ou l'Art de
(1)penser .
Auroux emphasises that the criteria defined by Beauzee for
recognising explicative and determinative incidental propositions
do not depend on differences of deep structure but on intrinsic
properties of the surface structure, deriving from semantic
and epistemblogical considerations. Auroux adds that the
most advanced studies on this subject recognise the need to use
three levels of analysis: I. a level linked to the relative
autonomy of language, using morpho-syntactic surface structures
for a given language to define distinctions: 2. a level affected
by criteria linked to the utterance: 3. a level where the
interpretation of sentences is guided by knowledge of the world
(formation discursive), which determines the meaning. He
considers the importance of this approach to be overlooked by
treatment of the distinctions in terms restricted to a first
(2)generative approach to grammar .
Both Du Marsais and Beauzee developed the Port-Royal dis­
tinction of syntaxe de concordance and syntaxe de regime on 
the same lines as each other, in that both were concerned in 
expounding semantic distinctions which had syntactic values 
marked in the expression. But, Auroux comments that, compared 
with Du Marsais' lack of a clear distinction between the 
relations of identity and determination, and his merging of 
both of them under 'concordance', Beauzee defined them and 
distinguished their separate markings of concordance (agreement)
and regime (government) respectively, and clarified their
(3)relationship in regard to complementation
1. Ibid., p. 35.
2. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 176-180.
3. Ibid., pp. 184-185.
Accounting between them for all relations between words 
joined together for the expression of an 'idee totale1, 
identity submits words to the rules of concordance, determin­
ation to the rules of regime
Under Beauzee's definitions, the agreement of inflexions 
(concordance) resulting from the relation of identity leads 
from that of the dominant term, the inflexion for this having 
been first determined by the principle of regime. The remaining 
terms related to the dominant one take corresponding inflections, 
common nouns being the dominant term for adjectives, any noun 
or pronoun for verbs ^  .
Words joined together in a relation of identity result,inv
content,in one indivisible idea? la loi naturelle, la loi
politique, la loi evangelique are three different and single
(3)
ideas, as is le soleil luit
The inclusion of le soleil luit as an example of identity
producing one idea appears to suggest that with Beauzee, the
grammatical relationship of regime (luit being governed by
soleil, the word which it determines), is not excluded by the
relationship of concordance. Auroux, on the other hand, notes
that "le complement (du nom, du verbe ou de 1 1 adjectif) complete
ou determine le terme qui le regit sans qu'il y ait identite
(4)entre les etres signifies par les deux termes .
Regime, or government, which Beauzee regards as a consequence 
of determination, is made distinct, in his interpretation, 
from complement, with which it had previously been identified.
1. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Intro.> Vol. 2, pp. 3-4.
2. Ibid., Ch. VII, Vol. 2, p. 382.
3. Ibid.
4. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 185.
"II me semble que tout cela etablit la necessite de 
distinguer le Complement, qui, ... est un objet essenciel de 
la Logique grammaticale; et le Regime, qui ne dispose que 
des formes des mots, comme d'autant d'ettiquettes qui en 
caracterisent les rapports ... 1 ^
Apart from some apparent anomalies regarding identity and
determination,deriving from the differing interpretations of
(2)
Du Marsais and Beauzee , the concept of determination itself 
appears open to confusion.
Bartlett in analysing Beauzee*s uses of the term notes that 
Beauzee himself was well aware of the dangers inherent in his 
use of it. Beauzee distinguishes the determination of the 
extension of a word from determination of the meaning of a word, 
which can be interpreted as representation of a certain idea 
by an arbitrary sign, differentiation by context, or the
(3)
explanation of it by definition .
The. extension of a word, or term goes back to Port-Royal's
definition of comprehension and extension, but Beauzee’s use
of it derives from a different interpretation of the concepts.
(4)
Bartlett points out the greater clarity of Beauzee's
as
definition of comprehension/"la totalite des idees partielles
(i.e. semantic content) qui constituent l'idee totale de la
 ^ (5>nature commune exprimeepar les Noms "and  the marked differ­
ence in the sense in which the term extension is used. Whereas 
Port-Royal's definition indicated an hierarchy of knowledge
1. Grammaire generale, Livre III, Ch. II, Vol. 2, p. 84.
This corresponds with the definition in article 'grammaire^
E.R.M. (Auroux, Encyclopedie "grammaire" et "langue^au 
XVIII siecle, p. 82).
2. Auroux discusses certain ambiguities and differences between 
Beauzee and Du Marsais. (L1encyclopedie "grammaire" et 
"langue" au XVIII siecle, pp. 35-38. La semiotique des 
encyclopedistes, pp. 181-186 .^
3. Bartlett, p. 57, Beauzee's Grammaire generale,. Livre II,
Ch. Ill, Vol. 2, pp. 385-6.
4. Bartlett, 4.22-424, pp. 55-56.
5. Grammaire gendrale, Livre II, Ch. I, Vol. 1, p. 236.
within the term in question, representing a purely Aristotelian
classification, Beauzee's definition, rejecting the implied
restriction, extended the signification of the term to the
number of individuals to whom the idea of the nature announced
by the term applied/^.Bartlett sees in this interpretation a
much clearer distinction than is the case with any of Beauzee's
contemporaries between "la logique toute pure" (i.e. the
hierarchical organisation of knowledge and logical argumentation
from premises) and "la logique grammaticale" (i.e. "the
application of the mind's rational processes to the linguistic
( 2 )means by which thought is manifested as language") which 
was Beauzee’s prime consideration.
Of interest in regard to the use of prepositions in 
complementation, such as 'livre de grammaire*, is Beauzee's 
view of them as expressing only general relations which are 
modified by different complements. The preposition, vers, 
for example, can relate to place, time, or a term. The 
meaning it takes in context is not in the word 'vers' but 
derives from its relationship to the antecedent and consequent 
terms.
"Disons-le de bonne foi, ces differentes significations ne
sont point dans le mot vers: les rapports sont compris dans
la signification des termes antecedents, et c'est l'ordre; les
termes consequents les determinent specifiquement; et la
Preposition ne fait qu'indiquer que son complement est le
terme consequent du rapport qui appartient au terme antecedent
(3)et dont elle est le signe" .
1. W. & .M.Kneale, while also referring to lack of clarity in the
Port-Royal concepts, concede that they probably meant the 
set of individuals to which a geheral term applies.’ See 
Part 2, Section 1, Chapter 4.
2. Bartlett, 4.24, p. 56; 4.32, p. 59.
3. Grammaire generale, Livre II, Ch. V, Vol. I, p. 537.
The inference from this, which also applies, though in 
different degree, to the 18th century view of relation between 
words generally, is that the association of one or more words 
together adds to or modifies the intrinsic content of the 
w o r d ^  . Prepositions appear to be a special case in being 
regarded as 1 semantically empty1, but in any relationship 
where two or more expressions, through being associated, take 
on a different or additional meaning over and above that each 
contains separately, there appears to be the suggestion that 
the total is greater than the sum of the constituent parts.
The 'idee totale' of Beauzee comprises 1idees partielles1 and , 
also the relations of identity and determination, effective 
in providing the 'ordre analytique1. Whether the relationship 
itself contributes an addition appears open to discussion.
1. Auroux quotes Beauzee's definition of prepositions as
"mots qui designent des rapports generaux avec abstraction 
de tout terme antecedent et consequent" (art. Preposition, 
t. 13, ERMB, p. 301 and Grammaire generale, Livre II,
Ch. V, Vol. 1, p. 515) in commenting that the notion of 
determination can be understood as a 'theorie intensionnelle 
de relations'. Auroux also mentions his own article Logique 
et grammaire? une theorie archaique des relations,
Dialogue XVII-I, pp. 1-18, mars 1978. La semiotique des 
encyclopedistes, p. 190.
Chapter 7. Summary.
As Beauzee's aim in formulating the reasoned elements 
of his Grammaire generale was to account for the grammatical 
facts of languages rather than to explain how thought is 
represented in language, the fact that his consideration 
of the thought processes and their relationship with language 
does not receive the explicit and detailed attention which 
he gives to the linguistic stages of his theory is understand­
able. The linguistic stages nevertheless partly depend on 
the a priori form of thought 'une et indivisible', which may 
be regarded as the starting point for the theory. It is 
feasible that, as Bartlett suggests, he envisaged thought at. 
this stage as an unstructured collection of sensory impressions, 
as did his contemporary, Condillac, but in his stipulation 
that God-given reason played a leading role in analysing 
thought, Beauzee maintained a more orthodox position. Nor did 
he go so far as to say that language analyses thought, though 
according to Bartlett's interpretation, this was a function 
of reason in co-operation with language.
In formulating the stages through which simultaneous 
thought progresses to the utterance, Beauzee was able to benefit 
from features used in Du Marsais* theory, which led from the 
view that relations between words contribute to the total 
meaning. Such were the abstract concepts of the logical and 
grammatical proposition, which distinguished between the 
content and its grammatical formulation, and the relations of 
identity and determination, which Beauzee developed further, 
in conjunction with his detailed formulation of the notion 
of complement. But, though drawing on aspects of traditional 
and contemporary theories, Beauzee showed a high degree of 
sophistication and of independence in his interpretation.
Bartlett refers to his postulation of deep and surface structure
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as possibly unique and comments that although his under­
lying assumptions and the rationalist metalanguage and 
methodology were shared by contemporaries, it can be claimed
that his^theory is unique, firstly, in his attempt to explain
(2)language in its own terms , and secondly, in his use of
(3)the concepts of identity and determination .
Within Beauzee’s theory, there is a commendable propensity
for analysis, arising from the distinction in his terminology
between the different features of content and formal expression,
including the differing roles of the word at each stage of
the theory, and from his recognition that there need not be
a one to one correspondence between the different stages.
Since the nature of the content is regarded as universal, and
the constituents of the grammatical proposition aim to provide
a selection of elements from which particular grammars may
make their selection, in theory, the general grammar allows
for numerous permutations for expressing the same kind of
content. The potential for separate consideration of the
various features and stages, which Beauzee’s method appears
to offer is, however, inhibited by the restricted a priori
view of the content. In spite of Beauzee’s independent
formulation, this remains influenced by the traditional view
of the logical proposition and by the a priori basis of his
theory. Bartlett refers to the theory constituting a body
of circular argumentation, with rational principles providing
"the basis for the assumptions, the processes by which the
internal developments of the theory are largely determined,
(4)and the data for which the theory must account." .
Though the question is, of course, unfair in relation 
to Beauzee’s stated aim of the Grammaire generale, as an 
’exposition raisonnee des elements necessaires du langage, 
pour servir de fondement a 1 ’etude de toutes les langues’, 
it is interesting to consider whether, especially since
1. 7.7, p. 174.
2. 7.30, 7.31, p. 181.
3. 7.33, p. 182.
4. 7.24, p. 179.
Beauzee’s grammatical formulations are so related to his view 
of content, the Grammaire generale could be considered
as providing a structure which would avoid irregular semantic 
associations. The regular ordering postulated in Beauzee’s 
concept of the ’ordre analytique', and the logical relations 
of identity and determination with their grammatical counter­
parts of concordance and regime might be regarded, though 
only for the French language, as elements constituting an 
ordered structure, to which the ’signification objective’ of 
words would add the required semantic features.
The inbuilt deficiencies already referred to, which derive 
from the a priori basis and the circularity of his theory, 
would constitute an obstacle to the effectiveness of the theory 
in such a capacity even if this were Beauzee’s intended aim.
The components of the structure itself may have a certain 
validity, since, notwithstanding Beauzee's description of them 
in terms which relate to a priori assumptions, they are to be 
found in usage of the French language. The presentation of 
the elements of Grammaire generale in sets from which specific 
languages may make a choice may be regarded as providing a 
'transformational* quality to Beauzee’s theory. However, some 
of the formulations of choices depend on Beauzee's a priori
r
assumptions regarding content, which could make them invalid 
as structures, and, as far as semantic features are concerned, 
these appear to have been inadequately explored and defined.
The framing of components of general grammar as elements 
capable of accounting for the particular grammars of all 
languages rather than for language utterances also argues 
against regarding the theory as providing a structure in the 
transformational sense. Also relevant is Bartlett's point 
that "there is no formal means of establishing the processes
1. Bartlett, 7.26, p. 180.
acting as realisational relations between stages' , a reason
(2 )
why ad hoc solutions may plausibly be adopted . The point 
made by Bartlett that there is no theoretical principle
(3)against increasing the number of word classes in his theory , 
indicates that the components for his theory are not 
necessarily finite.
Features which also run counter to the possibility of
syntactic autonomy in Beauzee's theory are the apparent
reliance, at least in part, on semantic considerations, in
recognising the ’marque infaillible1, by which ellided elements
(4)can be deduced , and the need to take into account semantic
and contextual aspects in identifying explicative and
(5)determinative incidental propositions .
An interesting feature of Beauzee’s theory is his distinct­
ion between the processes of acquiring knowledge and of commun­
icating thought. Although his theory appears to call for 
amplification in this respect, as Bartlett indicates, it 
contributes, in conjunction with the encoding and decoding 
propensity of the various stages of realisation, an explanation 
of the mechanism involved in communication, as well as con­
tributing to what Bartlett describes as a theory of knowledge.
Another noteworthy feature is his definition of the judgment, 
which appears to be more analytic than that of other philosopher 
grammarians, because of his distinction between the intellectual 
existence of the subject and attribute as opposed to their 
real existence. This seems to be reminiscent of the Modistae’s 
recognition of reality and appears to offer a more positive 
basis than is evident in other theories of general grammar, 
for exploring the truth conditions of a proposition.
1. Bartlett points out that the relations of identity and
determination stem neither from Beauzee's basic assumptions, 
nor from developments within the theory. Although they 
"depend on the concepts of comprehension and extension in 
nouns, this fact does not in itself give rise to these 
relations." (7.15, p. 177).
2. 7.27, p. 180. 3. 7.29,p. 181. 4. Chapter 5 above.
5. Ibid.
Part 2, Section 4
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, 1714 - 1780 
Chapter I. Introduction.
Although language is a vital part of Condillac’s theory 
of human understanding, he has, until relatively recently, 
been associated more with the general philosophy of the 
Enlightenment than with theories of language and grammar.
As regards his role in philosophy, Georges Le Roy comments
that although he was influential among the, Philosophes, they,
as much as Condillac himself, were inspired primarily by
English empiricism and shared a common admiration for the
philosophy of Locke and Newton. It was with the Ideologues
that his influence became most marked, though they differed
from him in their interpretation of sensualist doctrine
After his death his philosophy became associated with the
French Revolution through the medium of the Ideologues, whose
programme, Ideologie, inspired by his work, received academic
status as the official philosophy of the French schools during
(2 )
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods .
Knight notes that, because Condillac was a philosopher, 
he has been written about mainly by other philosophers, most
(3)studies of him being intended as evaluations of this thought .
It appears that, up to recent times,such publications about 
Condillac only incidentally dealt with his views on language,
1. Georges Le Roy, Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac, 
(Paris 1947-51) Introduction pp. xxxi - xxxii.
20 Isabel F. Knight, The Geometric Spirit, The Abbe de
Condillac and the French Enlightenment, New Haven, 19 68, 
p D 3.
3. Ibid., p. 303.
if at all, and Hans A a r s l e f f s t r o n g l y  criticises the 
general neglect and misunderstanding of Condillac's theory 
in relation to language and .the lack of • appreciation of 
its impact on the question of the origin of language and on the 
18th century view of 'universal grammar* and 'grammaire 
generale'.
Among the 20th century works on Condillac, Georges Le
Roy's La Psychologie de Condillac is: referred to by Knight
as the best and most analytic twentieth century study of
(2)Condillac , and this work, as well as Knight's own, are
(3)included by Robert G. Weyant among the few exceptions to
the generally brief and superficial discussions of Condillac's
psychology. However, a caveat on Knight's work comes from
Aarsleff who considers that it can only tend to perpetuate
(4)conventional errors about Condillac . Georges Le
(5)Roy's edition of the complete works, of Condillac
is also commended by Aarsleff and K n i g h t ^ .  Roger Lefevre's
(D
Condillac provides a straightforward account of the main 
features of Condillaq's theory. Of relevance to the philo­
sophy of the period are the well known work of Ernst Cassirer,
( O \
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment / and Pierre Juliard's
1. The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of 
Language in the Eighteenth Century and the Debate in the 
Berlin Academy before Hetder. In Dell Hymes: Studies in
the History of Linguistics, Indiana University Press, 1974.
2. The Geometric Spirit, pp. 310-311.
3. Condillac. An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge 1756.
A Facsimile Reproduction of the Translation of Thomas 
Nugent, Florida, 19 71, p. xx.
4. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 145.
5. Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac (3 vols. Paris 1947-51)> 
hereafter referred to as Op, with Part, Section, chapter, 
VoIa and page numbers.
60 The Tradition of Condillac, pp. 143-4; The Geometric Spirit, 
p. 301.
7. Condillac ou la joie de vivre (Edns. Seghers, Vienne, 1966).
8. Princeton 1951.
Philosophies of Language in Eighteenth Century France. 
Condillacs role as a leading empiricist grammarian is 
discussed by Guy Harnois ^  , and his views on the origin and 
development of language feature in works which concentrate 
on this topic, for example, Paul Kuehner's Theories on the 
Origin and Formation of Language in the Eighteenth Century 
in France, and James H. Stam's Inquiries into the Origin of 
Language.
It is, however, more recent works, notably those of 
Hans Aarsleff, Sylvain Auroux, Eugenio Coseriu, Daniel Droixhe , 
Ulrich Ricken, Andre Robinet and Patrick Tort, which have 
really concentrated on the linguistic aspects of Condillac's 
theory and these provide the main secondary sources for 
this section.
Of Condillac's own works, his first’publication, Essai 'sur
(2Yl'Origine des Connaissances Humaines, 1746 may be regarded
(3}
as his key work and is described by Knight as containing 
in germ nearly every idea to appear in his subsequent works.
The title is indicative of what Knight calls a nearly
universal conviction that the explanation of everything lies 
r 4)
in its origins . But this interest was not in origins, as 
such, but only as a means of explaining man's present state.
(5)
Aarsleff notes that the 18th century was really trying to
1. . Les Theories du Langage en France de 1660 a 1821.
Etudes Frangaises, Vol. 17, 1928.
2. In Op. Vol. I, hereafter referred to as Essai.
3. The' Geometric Spirit, p. 50.
4. . Ibid., p. 28.
5. Aarsleff, The Tradition of Condillac, pp. 97 and 104.
explore and perhaps explain the nature of mind and man ^  .
Much influenced by Locke*s Essay concerning Human Understand­
ing, Condillac nevertheless considered it did not go far 
enough in explaining the processes of understanding, and a 
main aim of Condillac*s Essai was to advance his theory that 
every operation of mind derives from sensation, thus taking 
a more extreme position than Locke,who allowed reflexion to 
be a separate principle.
Le Roy, in particular, emphasises that, for a proper under­
standing of Condillac's theory, the importance of the dual 
influence of Locke and Newton on his thinking must be 
appreciated.
"A Locke il a plus particulierement emprunte l'idee d'une
etude descriptive de 1'entendement, a Newton celle d'un
( o \
principe unique, expliquant toute la nature",
(3)This 'principe unique' , the source of knowledge through 
which all experience can be explained, is the liaison of 
ideas, which is only possible through language. It is in 
order to develop and prove this principle that he follows 
through the mind's operations and investigates the origin
1. "II faut remonter a l'origine de nos idees, en developper 
la generation, les suivre jusqu'aux limites que la nature 
leur a proscrites, par la fixer l'etendue et les bornes 
de nos connaissances et renouveler tout 1 'entendement 
humain." (Condillac, Essai. Introduction. Op. Vol. I, p. 4).
2. Le Roy, La Psychologie de Condillac, p. 33.
3. Condillac's single principle was mistakenly taken to be 
sensation by Coseriu (Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie 
von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Vol. II, p. 223. Tfibingen 
1975). This point was noted by Rttdiger Schreyer 
(Historiographia . Linguistica, VI/2, p. 36, 1978).'
of signs and the use made of t h e m ^  , matters which form the 
bulk of the content of the Essai.
(2 y
Condillac!s next work, the Traite des Systemes, 1749 ,
takes up the theme that true systems, as opposed to rationalist 
philosophies founded on hypotheses and metaphysics, are based 
on a limited number of observable facts. This expresses both 
his empiricist philosophy and also his inclination, stimulated 
by Newton's law of gravitation, towards a universal principle 
capable of explaining everything concerning human understanding; 
a principle which would cut through the diversity of observable 
data(3).
(4)
Condillac's Traite des Sensations, 1754 , aims to strengthen,
by demonstrating the impact of impressions received through 
the senses on a hypothetical statue, his concept, announced in 
the Essai, of sensation as the unique principle from which 
understanding is derived. . More especially it was intended to 
answer a challenge by Diderot that his theory did not allow
for the separate existence of reality, merely for modes of
' ’ (5) understanding it. .
To avoid a possible label of: materialism arising from 
comparisons of his 'statue' of the Traite des Sensations 
with a similar concept of Buffon's, Condillac wrote a brief 
Dissertation sur la liberte and the Traite des Animaux^^, 
in which he refuted both Descartes * view of animals as machines
1. Essai, Op. Vol. I, p. 4.
2. In Op. Vol. I.
3. Knight, The Geometric Spirit, pp. 26-28, Le Roy, La
Psychologie de Condillac, pp. 29-30. The same trend towards
deriving all human knowledge from a single source is 
detected by Ernst Cassirer in English empirical philosophy 
(The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton, 1951,
pp. 99-100).
4. Op. Vol. I.
5. Aarsleff, The Tradition of Condillac, p. 100, and Le Roy,
La Psychologie de Condillac, pp. 9 0-108.
6. Op. Vol. I.
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and Buffon's notion that animals possess only a "corporeal" 
soul(1).
Other works by Condillac, of relevance to his views on 
the thought processes and language, are included in his Cours 
d 1Etudes, published 1767-73 and embodying material written 
for the Prince of Parma to whom he was tutor 1758-1767.
These comprise a Grammaire; De L'Art d'Ecrire, a handbook on 
style'? De L'Art de Raisonner, a textbook of scientific 
method; and De L'Art de Penser, an analysis of the psychology 
of thought ^ 2 ^ .
Condillac's last works, La Logique, published 1780 ,
written at the request of the Polish Government for a text-
(4)book on elementary logic, and La Langue des Calculs, 1778 ,
(5)are praised by Le Roy for their clear and precise definition 
of Condillac's concepts. The Logique is of particular 
interest for its clear presentation of Condillac's ideas, 
previously made known in the Essai, on the development of 
thought and language.
. A work, Les Monades , which Condillac had published
f 6}anonymously in 174 8, has recently been edited . It appears 
that the implications of this work have yet to be fully 
evaluated, but it demonstrates Condillac's interest in meta­
physics and gives evidence of the influence of Leibniz'
IV' Knight, The Geometric Spirit, p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 12o All these works are in Op. Vol. I.
3. Op. Vol. II.
4# Ibid.
5. Introduction to Oeuvres Completes.
6. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Les Monades, edited with an 
introduction and notes by Laurence L. Bongie. Studies 
in Voltaire, No. 187, Oxford, 1980.
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thinking/1  ^#• aspects which had attracted: his criticism.
Bongie refers to the work as providing explicit evidence of
philosophical affinity with Leibniz and support for Le Roy's
suggestion that a basic rationalism lay behind much of
(2 )Condillac's psychology .
1. Leibniz' theory, described by Bertrand Russell in History 
of Western Philosophy, Book III, Ch. XI, postulated an 
infinite number of monads, subject to laws of harmony.
2.,, Bongie, Les Monades, p. 15.
Chapter 2. The Development of the Thought Processes
Since Condillac sees the origin and development of 
language as interdependent with that of the process necess­
ary for acquiring knowledge, whereby the mental faculties 
develop and the higher forms of thought become possible, 
an understanding of his view of the relationship of language 
to thought inevitably involves an account of the essential 
features of this process.
Condillac retains the Cartesian distinction between soul 
and body, supporting it by his own argument that the body, 
composed of several substances, cannot be a repository of 
thought, since, even when thought is formed of a number of
distinct perceptions, there needs to be a point of re-union,
, (1)a soul,
(2)
So, for Condillac, the soul or mind persists as the 
thinking substance. But, to reconcile his explanation of 
the origin of ideas through the senses with the orthodox 
view of the soul,he attributes the loss of the soul's 
capacity to form ideas, independently of the senses, to the
(3)
fall from grace .
Condillac differentiates between the soul's operations,
which relate more especially to the understanding, and those
of the will. His theory is limited to the processes of 
(4)
understanding . This lack of attention to mental activity
involving the will was to become a topic of criticism by
(5)Maine de Biran 0
1. Essai, I, I, Ch. I, para 6, Op. Vol. I, p. 7.
2. Condillac's definition of ame is "Substance qui sent, qui 
pense. Parce que cette substance est le principe qui nous 
fait agir et mouvoir on dit qu'un homme est l'ame d'une 
entreprise, lorsqu'il en est le principal instrument".
(Op. Vol. Ill, Index Des Notions).
3. Essai, I, I, Ch.. I . para 8 , p. 7.
4. Ihid., I, II, Op. Vol. I, p. 10.
5. Le Roy, Op. Introduction, Vol. I, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
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The first operation of understanding, and the one from 
wriich all the others develop, is perception, the impression 
on the soul, or mind, caused by the action of the senses,
It provides the first and smallest degree of knowledge, 
cannot be acquired through language and is not possible 
without the mind's ability to perceive^.
He deduces a state of mind which he calls consciousness,
the mind's knowledge of perception. This leads to 'degrees'
of perception in that the mind can be more conscious of
some perceptions than others. There are no perceptions of
which the mind is not conscious and they are in effect the
same operation, the name of perception being given to it
if considered as an impression on the mind, consciousness in
(2)so far as it alerts the mind to its existence . Should
consciousness reach such a degree that the perceptions related
to it appear to be the only ones of which we are aware, the
state of 'attention', has been reached, which-results from
(3)the attraction objects have in relation to our needs .
Reminiscence, made possible by attention, whereby the percept-
(4)ions caused by impressions of objects persist in the mind , 
results when there is consciousness that the same perception 
occurred previously.
1. Ibid., I.II, Ch. I, paras 1 and 2, Op. Vol. I, pp. 10-11.
•2. Ibid., para 13, p. 13.
3. Ibid., Ch. Ill, para 28, p. 17.
4. Ibid.,1.11, Ch. II, para 17, Op. Vol. I, p. 14.
A distinction is made between imagination, which renews the 
perceptions themselves, memory, which brings to mind only their 
signs and circumstances, and reminiscence, whereby we discern 
perceptions as those we had p r e v i o u s l y ^ .
The perceptions retained in the mind when the objects
perceived are absent are generally preserved in the same order
in which the object presented them. A connection between the
perceptions is thus formed, making possible imagination, con-
(2)templation and memory .
Condillac sees this liaison of ideas, the key principle 
in his system, as both facilitating imagination, contemplation 
and memory and enabling a framework of knowledge to be developed. 
Since things attract our attention only by the relationship 
they bear to our needs (in the broad sense), the same attention 
joins our needs and the things relevant to them.
Needs are" interrelated, and the perception of objects
satisfying them can be regarded as a succession of basic ideas
to which everything which contributes to knowledge can be
related, this basic series being extended by other connected
ideas, e.g; of location, association, or emotion. In this way,
all knowledge forms a chain, with its subsidiary chains joining
(3)at certain links and separating at others .
This interdependence facilitates recollection since 
attention to certain ideas would bring to notice others with 
which they are connected. For perception, consciousness 
and attention, signs are unnecessary, and limited habits of 
imagination and reminiscence are possible through accidental
1. Ibid., I, II, £h. II, para. 25, Op. Vol. I, p. 16.
Coseriu describes the distinction between 1 reminiscence* and 
'memoire* as a very old one, appearing in the title of an 
essay by Aristotle (Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von
der Antike bis zum Gegenwart, V o l . II, p. 223).
2. Ibid., Ch. II, Op. Vol. I, pp. 14-17.
3. Ibid., Ch. IV, para 38, Op. Vol. I, p. 19.
signs, which are simply objects brought into association 
with perceptions by chance external circumstances, and not 
within the mind’s power to recall. Similarly, with natural 
sounds, expressing emotions or needs, which become signs 
through repetitive association with the emotion experienced, 
imagination depends on chance association of the sign with 
the object or emotion^.
But with instituted signs, those chosen by man, which bear
(2)only an arbitrary relation to the ideas they signify ,
the mind gains control over its operations, and imagination,
contemplation and memory become habits not dependent on
(3)external stimuli but within the mind’s power .
A gradual progress in the range of the mental operations
is envisaged, with the exercise of memory and imagination and
the usage of artificial signs reciprocally reacting on each
other in a process of mutual development. With•imagination
arousing ideas (i.e. perceptions) and memory recalling the
signs of the perceptions, reflection develops. This is the
practice of directing attention at will to various objects,
or to different parts of the same object in turn. And
reflection is the major step forward in man's understanding;
(4)through it the mind's full potential begins to be realised
(5)Patric Tort gives a full appreciation of Condillac's 
account of the development of the processes of the mind in 
association with that of artificial language. He stresses 
the importance of the transition from the pre-reflexive stage, 
lacking the analytical facility of language, to the reflexive 
stage, noting that it is the internal disposition of man to 
convey a message which marks the transition "alors qu'au
1. Ibid., Ch. IV, para- 38, Op. Vol..I, p. 19...
2. Ibid.,- para 35, p. 19.
*3. Ibid., paras 44-6, p. 19.
4. Ibid., Ch. V, paras.47-51, Op. Vol. I, pp. 21-22.
5. Dialectique des signes.chez Condillac, in History of Linguistic 
Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, Parret, 19/6, pp.488-502.
stade pre-reflexif, aucunedemande d'ecoute n'etait effectue^ 
aussi qu1en temoigne la description de l'homme qui ne possed- 
erait que des signes accidentels et des signes naturels."
Once separate consideration of ideas becomes possible through 
reflection, the way is open for the connection of ideas, since 
they can be compared, and combined as appropriate. General 
ideas can also be formed through the abstraction of qualities 
common to different objects^.
The process of abstraction has an epistemological consequence,
for Condillac sees it as a means of classifying knowledge which
(2)would otherwise be beyond the grasp of human intelligence
It thus provides a system for all knowledge, "le resultat,
(3 y
l 1expression abregee de nos decouvertes." .
It is from the comparison of ideas that Condillac deduces 
the operation of judgment, whereby two ideas are connected,
or affirmed, by the verb est, or separated by negation, thus
(4)forming the proposition . From the operation of judgment
arises that of reasoning, simply a succession of judgments
(5)dependent on each other .
Whereas, for Port-Royal, 'concevoir' is the first of the
mind's operations, Condillac defines the term as 'being
conscious of the exact ideas resulting from the aforementioned
(6 Voperations', all of which form understanding .
1. Essai, I.II, Ch. VI, paras 55-59, Op. Vol. I, pp. 23-24.
2. De L'Art de Penser, I, Ch. VIII, Op. Vol. I, p. 139.
3. Ibid., Ch. X, p. 748.
4. Condillac's conception of judgment is further considered 
in conjunction with the proposition, see Chapter 8 .
5. Essai, I.II, Ch. VIII, paras 69-71, Op. Vol. I, p* 28.
6. Ibid., paras 72-73, p. 28.
Condillac emphasises the supreme role of reason in the 
process of understanding and defines it as knowledge of the 
manner in which we should control the mind's operations^.
But, together with common sense and intelligence, reason 
results from the liaison of ideas made possible by the use 
of signs, an assertion which would seem to imply that for 
Condillac, it is not the innate faculty of the kind acknowledged 
in rationalist theories.
"Le principal avantage qui resulte de la maniere dont j'ai
envisage les operations de l'ame, c'est qu'on voit evidemment
comment le bon sens, l 1esprit, la raison et leurs contraires
naissent egalement d'un meme principe, qui est la liaison des
idees les unes avec les autres; que, remontant plus haut, on
voit que cette liaison est produite par 1 'usage des signes.
(2)
Voila le principe."
The liaison of ideas, Condillac's key principle, is described
by Aarsleff as 'the unique instrument of reflection', and, like
(3)reason behind it, 'natural and innate' ; it is "uniquement 
dans la nature de l'ame et du corps. C'est pourquoi je regarde 
cette liaison comme une premiere experience qui doit suffire
(4)
pour expliquer toutes les autres."
To describe reason as 'natural and innate' appears to con­
tradict the earlier quotation above, which sees reason as 
a consequence, rather than a cause of the liaison of ideas.
But, on the other hand, Condillac's immediately following 
passage quoted below justifies Aarsleff's view, in that it 
makes reflection dependent on reason, reflection,in turn, 
making possible the liaison of ideas. However it is not clear 
that the liaison of ideas is natural and innate, though the 
capacity to form ideas may be:
1. Ibid., Ch. IX, para 92, p. 33.
2. Ibid., Ch. XI, para 107, Op. Vol. I, p. 36.
3. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 102.
4. Essai, I.II, Ch. IX, para 92 and 107, Op. Vol. I, pp. 33 & 36.
"On est capable de plus de reflexion a proportion qu'on 
a plus de raison. Cette derniere faculte produit done la 
reflexion. D'un cote, la reflexion nous rend maitres de 
notre attention; elle engendre done 1 'attention: d'un autre 
cote, elle nous fait lier nos idees; elle occasionne done 
la memoire. De la nait 1'analyse, d'ou se forme la remini­
scence, ce qui donne lieu a 1 'imagination." ^  •
The apparent contradiction has been the subject of some 
discussion. Rudiger Schreyer, in contesting Ulrich Ricken's 
argument that, to Condillac, reason was but a further develop­
ment of sensation, agrees with Aarsleff's conviction that it 
was fundamental to man. Schreyer submits that Condillac 
distinguishes between the operations of the mind, linked with
sensation, and the faculties,which Condillac assumes to be
(2)an innate, though latent part of human nature .
(3)Coseriu also points out that certain mental faculties 
must be assumed in Condillac's theory for the mind's 
operations to be possible: that the sense perception cannot 
account for the subsequent 'operations de 1 'ame', which must 
be regarded as such, namely either resulting from the mind 
itself, or from capabilities characteristic of man. The one 
principle, the liaison of ideas, by which Condillac seeks to 
explain everything, is itself not composed of sense experience,
(4)
but of a^formal principle of arrangement . The basic factor 
with man is not sensation itself, but the capacity to dis­
tinguish himself from sensation and regard himself as an 
observer
1. Ibid., para 107, p. 36.
2. Compte Rendu of Ulrich Ricken's translation of Condillac 
'Essai uber den Ursprung der Menschlichen Erkenntnisse' , 
Philipp Reclam juni 1977, in Historiographia Linguistica,
Vol. V, No. 3, 1978, pp. 328-332.
3. Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von der Antike bis zum 
Gegenwart, Vol. II, pp. 224-225.
4. "Das elgentliche Prinzip, auf das Condillac alles zuruckfiihrt, 
ist nicht der Stoff der Erkenntnis, d.h. die sinnliche 
Erfahrung, sondern nur ein formales Ordnungsprinzip, d.h.
die Operation der Interpretation vom Einfachen zum Komplexen." 
 ^(Ibid., p. 225).
5. Ibid.
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The question of Condillac's view of innate faculties is 
considered further at Chapter 3.
The limited capacity of the mind's operations without the
use of language is demonstrated in Condillac's "Traite des
Sensations"^, though it was not specifically the aim of this
(2)work to do so. As Aarsleff emphasises , Condillac used the
structural device of a statue existing in isolation, lacking
all but the most rudimentary form of reflection as well as being
deprived of the use of signs and language, to demonstrate a
/ ■ 
habitual and instinctive assurance of the existence of the
outside world, which was all that he set out to do to meet
Diderot's charge of Berkleyism. Condillac does this through
separate consideration of the impressions made on the statue by
each of the senses, demonstrating that only touch was in itself
(3)capable of proving the existence of reality . It is through 
this sense that the other senses learn to know reality.
Aarsleff acknowledges that Le Roy clearly demonstrates the 
conception of the statue ; but says that he did not consider some 
significant additions which Condillac made to the final version, 
which very strongly underscore the meaning of the statue's 
lack of language, as if Condillac were eager to reduce any
(4)
possible conflict with the Essai .
Though the statue lacks the faculty of language, Condillac
postulates that through merely the impressions received through
the senses it becomes capable of giving attention, of
remembering, comparing, judging, discerning, imagining,
of having some abstract notions, such as ideas of number and
duration, of knowing general and particular truths, experienc­
es)
ing desires and emotions and of forming habits .
1. Op. Vol. I, pp. 221-314.
2. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 100.
3. Extrait Raisonne, Op. Vol. I, p. 325.
4. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 100.
5. Traite des Sensations, Ch. VII, para 2, Op. Vol.1, p. 239.
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In view of this imposing list of capabilities, - possible’' < 
.without language ,one might wonder if Condillac had compromised 
his view, expounded in the Essai, that language is necessary 
for the more advanced states of mind, even though these, in 
turn derive, through the succession of processes, from 
sensation.
This point is dealt with by Condillac himself, when he
admits that he may have given the impression that the statue
has more knowledge than it can possibly a c q u i r e ^ . He
(2)points out in this connection the need to distinguish 
between theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical 
knowledge consists in a succession of distinct ideas which 
need signs for their classification and definition.
Practical knowledge (appropriate to the statue, and animals) 
comprises indistinct ideas, to which we react without knowing 
how. "Idees confuses qui reglent nos actions sans que nous
(3)soyons capables de remarquer comment elles nous.font agir."
1. Ibid., IV, Op. Volo I, p. 298.
2. Ibid., II, Ch. VIII, para 35, Op. Vol. I, p. 268. Also 
Grammaire, I, and Logique, Essai I.II, Ch. IV.
3. Ibid., IV, Op. Vol. I, p. 298.
Chapter 3. Innateness in Condillac’s Theory
Though the statue*s limitations can be taken to illust­
rate the effectiveness of language, this does not deal with 
the question of language as a specifically human character­
istic, surpassing the statue’s capabilities which, as 
Aarsleff points out, are similar in Condillacrs view to 
those of animals ^  .
It is in his Traite des Animaux, 1755, that Condillac
comments further on this aspect, and on the nature of man,
as distinct from that of animals. This work, in Lefevre’s
words, ’resolves the irritating problem of the soul of
animals which had inflamed libertines and apologists for
(2)200 years’ . The Traite refutes both Descartes, for 
whom the soul, immortal, was exclusive toman, animal being 
only matter, not progressing beyond the first degree of 
sense, and Buffon's opposing theory, which explained instinct 
through the action of organic molecules. Condillac explains 
the distinction between man and animal in terms compatible 
both with his own theory that all the operations of under­
standing derive from the one faculty of sensation, and with 
orthodox religious beliefs.
Language marks the difference between man and animal.
If animals have a language, it is only one of action, vari­
able with the organisation and needs of the species and
(3)
limited to each
1. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 101.
20 Condillac, p. 53.
3. Lefevre, Condillac, p. 56, and Condillac, Traite des
Animaux, II, Ch. IV, Op. Vol. I, pp. 360-2.
"II y a des betes qui sentent comme nous le besoin de 
vivre ensemble mais leur societe manque de ce ressort qui 
donne tous les jours a la notre de nouveaux mouvements, 
et qui la fait tendre a une plus grande perfection.
Ce ressort est la parole ... " ^
But the difference itself is one of nature. There are 
various references in the Traite referring to the superior 
nature of man to animal, but Condillac accepts the facts 
of this difference as being known only to the Creator. We 
can only judge the difference by what becomes evident from 
observation. "La bete n'a pas dans sa nature de quoi 
devenir homme, comme l'ange n'a pas dans sa nature de quoi 
devenir Dieu." ^ .
Thus Condillac allows for an innate essence, different 
in each species, which we cannot know. All he is seeking
to do is present a theory of the operations of the minds
of man and animal.
While it is reasonable to conclude from the foregoing 
that Condillac acknowledges some kind of innate 1 directing 
force1 behind the progression of the mind's operations 
from the one innate faculty, sensation, indications in the
(3)
Traite des Animaux, as in the Essai,} that Condillac 
acknowledges a higher degree of innate intelligence in 
man appear to be qualified by other references which imply
that such a capacity is dependent on'sensation.. The following
(4)extract from the Traite des Animaux , though maintaining 
the role of sensation as that from which other faculties 
derive, does, however, infer that reason is man's innate 
intelligence.
1.:. Ibid., Op. Vol. I, p. 360.
2. Ibid., p. 361-2.
3. See p. 228.
4. Ibid.
"La faculte de sentir est la premiere de toutes les 
facultes de l'ame, elle est meme la seule origine des 
autres, et l'etre sentant ne fait que se transformer. II y 
a dans les betes ce degre d'intelligence que nous appelons 
instinct; et dans l'homme ce degre superieur que nous 
appelons raison.
Whether or not instinct and reason are the closest
Condillac will allow himself to a definition of the innate
force behind the mind's operations, it is also implied in
the Logique that Condillac admits an original principle
from which they derive, in the following extract referred
to by Aarsleff in support of his firm view that reason
(?)was, for Condillac, an innate faculty .
"Principe est synonyme de commencement, et c'est dans 
cette signification qu'on l'a d'abord employe, mais ensuite, 
a force d'en faire usage, on s'en est servi par habitude, 
machinalement, sans y attacher d'idees, et l'on a eu des 
principes qui ne sont le commencement de rien ... car 
quoique toutes ses facultes ne soient, dans le principe, 
que sentir, cette verite n'est pas un principe ou un 
commencement pour nous, si, au lieu d'etre une premiere 
connaissance, elle est une derniere. Or elle est une 
derniere, puisqu'elle est un resultat donne par 1 'analyse."
Ne disons pas qu'il faut, dans nos recherches, avoir pour
principes des,definitions: disons plus simplement qu'il faut
bien commencer, c'est-a-dire, voir les choses telles
qu'elles sont; et ajoutons que, pour les voir ainsi, il
(3)faut toujours commencer par les analyses."
Here, in Chapter VI of the Logique, is the thought that 
one can only know through observation and analysis.
Condillac is not disputing the existence of innate faculties
1. Ibid., p. 379.
2. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 105.
3. La Logique, £>t. II, Ch. VI, Op. Vol. II, p. 403-4
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other than that of sensation, indeed he acknowledges them 
in the Creator's endowment of man's superior nature 
but he can only observe and analyse the effects, not the 
nature itself.
1. See p. 233.
Chapter 4. The Development of Artificial (i.e. Human)
Language
Of relevance to the preceding discussion on Condillac's 
view of innate faculties is his own acknowledgement of an 
apparent inconsistency, in that one would expect the process 
of reflection to be needed for the creation and use of 
artificial signs, whereas he postulates that it is only 
by the use of signs that the practice of reflection is ‘ 
acquired, a point he says he will resolve in his account 
of the history of language. The relevant passage is 
quoted by Aarsleff in support of his view that, "thanks to . 
man's unique possession of reason the gestural language 
suggests the utility of signs and the possibility of develop­
ing artificial, voluntary signs."^
"II semble qu'on ne sauroit se servir des signes
d'institution si l'on n'etait pas deja capable d'assez de
reflexion pour les choisir et pour y attacher des idees.
Comment done, m'objectera-t-on peut-etre l'exercice de la
reflexion ne s 'acquerroit-il que par 1 'usage de signes?
Je reponds que je satisferai a cette difficulty lorsque
(2)je donnerai l'histoire du langage ..."
Condillac's explanation of the transition from natural
to artificial language, briefly summarised in the following
paragraphs, is neither sufficiently explicit nor convincing
to satisfy various critics. Starting with Herder's
criticism of the 'emotive' theory of the transition, Droixhe
summarises the various adverse remarks directed at this
(3)hypothesis . Herder's sharp criticism of Condillac is
(4)also described by James H. Stam
1. The Tradition of Condillac, pp. 109-110..
2. Essai I.II, Ch. V, para 49, Op. Vol. I, p. 22.
3. La Linguistique et l'appel de l'histoire, pp. 164-165, 
216-217.
4. Inquiries into the Origin of Language, New York, 1976, 
p. 119.
Condillac explains the development of artificial language 
as a gradual process deriving from the primitive language 
of action which used gestures and natural vocal sounds to 
communicate needs and emotions.
It has been noted that the device used by Condillac to
speculate on how language was invented, namely two children
left on their own after the deluge, was not novel. It had
an antecedent in Bernard de Mandeville's work ^  . Aarsleff
refers to Condillac being heavily indebted to Bishop
William Warburton's Divine Legislation of Moses (1737-41)
(2)for the doctrine of the language- of action , and Condillac
(3)himself acknowledges this source . Condillac's implied 
basic agreement with Warburton is viewed by Stam as a means 
of protection against attacks from theological quarters, 
but at the same time Stam points out that this implication 
distorted the source, for Warburton found the natural
Ae. ( 4  \
explanation a temptation to urjgenerate reason . In
addition to referring to the above mentioned sources, Ellen
(5)H m e  comments that the origin and development of language 
by natural means had been supported much earlier by Richard 
Simon. Tort refers to the idea of a necessary apprentice­
ship in natural signs apparently being one of the topics of 
genetic theories of language in Geraud de Cordemoy's Discours 
Physique de la Parole ^ .
1. Ibid., pp. 37-47 and Rudiger Schreyer, 'Condillac, Mande- 
ville and the Origin of Language', Historiographia 
Linguistica, Vol. 1/2 1978, pp. 15-43.
2. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 95.
3. Essai, II.I, Op. Vol. I, p. 60.
4. Inquiries into the Origin of Language, p. 47.
5. Condillac and the Problem of Language, in Studies on
Voltaire, Vol. 106, 1973, p. 51.
6. Dialectique des signes chez Condillac, p. 17.
Other branches of expression, m i m i n g ^ ,  dancing,
prosody', music and poetry stemmed from the language of
action but the development of artificial language from
the language of articulated sounds was to become 1 le
(2)plus commode de tous" .
Through habit the gestures and sounds came to be 
associated with the needs or emotions they expressed, 
leading to a reciprocal improvement in the range of the 
operations of mind. Having become accustomed, through the 
habit developed by nature, to connecting ideas with natural 
or accidental signs, man was led to forming, by analogy, 
new sounds, which led to further improvement in the oper­
ation of mind,in turn stimulating progress towards the
perfection of artificial language, albeit a very slow
(3)process
Condillacs view of the parallel progression in all forms 
of expression, from the visual and the sensuous to the more
(4)
abstract is emphasised by Stam . The evolution of
(5)
writing followed a similar course from picture writing 
to hieroglyphics, and finally the more abstract and conven­
tional alphabets.
1. Stam, records that.Condillac1s theme of chironomic and 
pantbmimic media of expression, a theme which was to 
become important for aesthetic theories of the day, was 
taken up by Diderot in his letter on the Deaf and Dumb 
for the use of Those who Hear and Speak (1751) and was 
given practical application in the sign language devised 
for the instruction of deaf mutes (Inquiries into the 
Origin of Language, pp. 4 8-4 9 ) .
2. Essai, lid, Ch0 IX, Op. Vol. I, p. 82.
3# Ibid., Cji. I, Op. Vol. I, pp. 60-62, Logique, Op. Vol. II,
p . 3 71.
4. Inquiries into the Origin of Language, p. 49.
5. Essai, II, I, Ch. XIII, 0po Vol. I, pp. 94-960
Chapter 5. The Origin and Development <5f the Word Classes
Though not entirely without credibility, Condillac's 
explanations of the development of the word classes to their 
contemporary state,with specific reference to those of the 
French language, lack the authenticity of researched etymo­
logical accounts. But although speculative, some of his 
explanations, especially in their recourse to agglutinations 
and analogy, are akin in nature to those of later transform­
ational theories.
The first words, and the only ones in existence for a 
long time,were those for which there was most need: material 
objects such as tree, fruit, etc., immediately evident 
through the senses. As the capacity for analysis grew, 
signs were invented for thfe more simple ideas, e.g. the 
trunk, bough, greenness, etc., of a tree. With .attention 
being directed to the qualities and circumstances relating 
to the objects, came adjectives and adverbs. The sensations 
of the mind, experienced e.g. by seeing, hearing, willing, 
loving, remained for a long time without adequate expression, 
and some form of action accompanied the names used. As man 
gradually became used to identifying such ideas, verbs were 
introduced at first merely to express the disposition of mind 
in the active or passive s t a t e ^ .
The natural order of ideas, that used in the language of
action where immediate needs were the first objective, was
for the name of the object, as the most familiar sign, and
the easiest for communication, to be given first, before the
verb. This is relevant to Condillac's view on 'inversion'.
The order 'fruit wants Peter' is no less natural than 'Peter
wants fruit', a fact which is proved from the Latin tongue,
(2)in which both are used
1. Essai, II,I, Ch. IX, paras. 80-83, Op., Vol. I, pp. 82-83.
2. Ibid., para 84, p. 83.
Similarly, words which came to be invented to take the 
place of the gestures which were earlier used to supply the 
tenses, mood, numbers and persons to verbs originally in­
determinate, also followed the noun and verb. Condillac there­
fore concludes that the order would be 'fruit to eat to come 
me1, instead of 'I will eat some fruit1^ . Conjugations
developed from a tendency to add to the verb those sounds
(2)which determined its signification . The verb was then 
considered as a noun "which, though indefinite in its original 
form, became, by the variation of its tenses and moods, an 
appropriate means of expressing, in a determinate manner,
(3)
the active and passive state of everything" . Change to 
the present order was very slow, through a long succession • 
of idioms ^  .
Whereas Port Royal's justification for the affirmative 
role of the verb 'to be* rested bn its representation of an 
act of mind, Condillac deduces its origin by analogy with a 
functional role observed in other linguistic features.
Observing that the word added to the verb to determine 
its person, number, tense and mood, also had the property of 
connecting the verb with the noun which governed the determin­
ing elements, the verb to be was therefore used to connect 
the adjective with its substantive, its character being to
(5)
mark the affirmation . This word joining the substantive
1. Ibid., paras. 85-86.
2. Coseriu instances Condillac's view of the formation of
endings from independent words as an idea of some 
importance (Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von 
der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Vol. II, p. 233.
3. Essai, II, I, Ch. IX, para. 87, p. 84.
4. Ibid., para. 88, p. 84.
5. Ibid., para. 94, p. 85.
and adjective became merged with the adjective, forming one 
word susceptible of conjugation, which became a third class 
of verb, signifying neither the passive nor the active state. 
With adjectives having been changed into verbs the const­
ruction of languages altered^1! The place of the new verbs 
varied as did the words from which they were derived, some­
times being placed before, sometimes after the substantive 
which they governed. This practice gradually became extended 
to other verbs. The new form of verb came to be considered 
as a word signifying affirmation with the distinction of
persons, numbers, tenses and moods, and from that time, 'etre'
(2)was the only true verb . Conjugations and declensions
followed, with constructions varying as there was no need
(3)to adhere to a constant order in the expression .
Other conjectures of a similar nature follow. As the 
different qualities of mind are no more than the effect of 
the different states through which it passes, the adjectives 
expressing them must have been introduced after the verbs, 
e.g. 'to speak' must have been in use before 'eloquent*. 
Abstract substantives developed long after adjectives.
Condillac attributes the need for general terms, to human 
limitations in providing names for each particular object.
The order of development of general terms followed the 
sequence of mental operations. As the most general notions 
result from ideas derived directly from the senses, the most 
abstract terms would come from the first names given to tan­
gible objects, thus accounting for the use of words such as 
movement, rest, inclination being applied to e.g. the idea 
of soul ^  .
1. Ibid., paras 95-7, p. 85-86.
2. Ibid., para 98.
3. Ibid., paras 9 8-100.
4# lipid. , II.I, Ch. JC, paras 102-31,,pp. 86-87. Coseriu > 
notes a similarity, in this respect with Vico who envisaged 
a .similar development though for different reasons. (Die 
Geschichte der Sprachphilos.ophie von der Antike bis zum 
Gegenwart, Vol. II, p. 232.
Arrive and Chevalier remark on the fact that Condillacfs 
hypothesis of the creation of language provides a sequence 
which follows the strata of word classes and grammatical 
features detected in Port Royal's t h e o r y ^ .
1. "o.. chose remarquable, dans cette hypothese de source
lockienne et explicitement anti-cartesienne se retrouve 
la disposition en strates proposee par Port-Royal."
(La Grammaire, p. 85)«
Chapter 6. The .Analysis of Thought by Language
The importance of analysis, the method instilled by 
nature, as a process of thought, is particularly apparent 
in Condillac's Logique where he refers to its superiority 
over the method of synthesis. They are not mutually 
exclusive, for analysis, as well as synthesis, composes 
as well as decomposes, but the analysis starts with de­
composition, the order followed by nature Le Roy
considers that, though their respective philosophies vary, 
in the concept of analysis there is much similarity between 
Condillac and Leibniz. "Tous deux revent de donner a leur . 
pensee une expression ou se retrouvent les caracteres memes 
de la logique.1
Condillac likens the process.of analysis to the obser­
vation in consecutive order of the qualities of an object
so that they can be presented in the mind in the simultaneous
(3)form in which they exist ' .
It is the only way in which knowledge is acquired and 
nature herself, in giving us the capacity to see things 
one at a time, in addition to taking in the whole view
(4)
at once, has taught us the method ■ ... Similarly, items 
of knowledge presented simultaneously to the mind need to 
be put in consecutive order to re-establish them in accord-
(5)
ance with the relations existing between them. .
The method of analysis is already evident in the gestural 
language of action, whereby the 'listener' or 'viewer', to 
whom the ability of decomposition is natural, needs to
1. La Logique, II, Ch. VI, Op. Vol. II, p. 405.
2. La Psychologie de Condillac, P; 227.
3. La Logique, I, Ch. I, Op. Vol. II, p. 376.
4. Ibid., pp. 374-5.
5. Ibid., I, Ch. II, Op. Vol. II, p. 376.
observe the simultaneous gestures of the /speaker1 as 
successive signs, in order to .understand them. This 
analysis follows the order of needs and circumstances.
The use of this method is extended by a n a l o g y ^ .
Thought, prior to being analysed by language, consists
of several ideas and operations existing simultaneously
in the' form of sensation. . To decompose thought is to
present successively the ideas and the operations which
develop from sensation, i.e. sensation considered success-
(2 )
ively under different points of view .
(3)
Aarsleff 'refers to the Essai having shown how the 
inescapable linearity of speech had forced man to decompose 
the initial unitary signs of the language of action into 
discrete and arbitrary signs, of human language, thus making 
analysis and ordered reflection possible - "Si toutes les 
idees qui composent une pensee sont simultanees dans I 1esprit, 
elles sont successives dans le discours: ce sont les langues 
qui nous fournissent les moyens d ’analyser nos pensees"^^.
Condillac’s view of simultaneous thought being composed 
of several ideas and operations can be taken to‘imply 
nothing more than thought, in the form of sensation, en­
compassing ideas and ’potential* operations deriving from 
•sensation, namely content at a pre-reflexive stage. But 
he also refers to the more advanced operations of judgment 
and reasoning existing without means of analysis.
. "La sensation enveloppe done toutes nos idees et toutes 
nos operations; et l ’art de la decomposer, n'est que l ’art 
de nous representer successivement les idees et les oper­
ations qu’elle renferme ...
1. . Ibid., Ch. II, p. 397.
2. Grammaire,' I, ChG III, Op. Vol. I, p. 436.
3. The Tradition of Condillac, p. 103.
40 . Grammaire, I, Ch. Ill, Op. Vol. I, p. 4 36.
La decomposition d'une pensee suppose 1*existence de cette 
pensee; et il seroit absurde de dire que je ne commence a 
juger et a raisonner, que lorsque je commence a pouvoir me 
representer successivement ce que je sais quand je juge 
et quand je raisonne." ^
It is not clear from this whether he regards judgment 
and reasoning in a latent form within perception, or 
whether they have already materialised in a prelinguistic, 
or internal linguistic form as a separate and advanced 
operation. A form of internal thinking which would require 
the function of judgment (i.e. comparison of ideas), is 
indicated by Condillac's example of the sequence arising 
from the occurrence of desire, though it concerns a function 
of the will, which Condillac has set apart from the process 
of understanding.
. 11 ...clest ainsi que pour decomposer ma pensee, lorsque
je forme un desir, j1observe successivement 1 *inquietude
ou le malaise que j'eprouve, I 1idee que je me fais de
l'objet propre a me soulager, l'etat ou je suis pour en
etre prive, le plaisir que me promet sa jouissance, et la
(2 )
direction de toutes mes facultes vers le meme objet."
It seems that some form of internal sign is necessary 
to reconcile the internal mental states indicated in the 
above quotations with his postulated need for artificial 
language to order, or analyse thought. He does not appear 
to be explicit on this point.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
Tort points out that Condillac does not clearly differ­
entiate between the genetic progress of the mind's operations 
and their systematic functioning^. Condillac appears 
to identify, in a way, the learning functions of a child 
withlthe genetic progress. It is possible, therefore, that 
he regards the functioning of the higher operations as 
having been systematically instilled in the process of 
signification starting from the child's 'pre-linguistic* 
stage to the extent that in the advanced linguistic state 
of man, there is no longer a 'sensation* stage as such, 
the higher operations being a normal process. The following 
extract adds support to this.
"Puisqu'il n'y a point d'homme qui n'aitete sans 1'usage
des signes artificiels, il n'en est point a qui les idees
et les operations de son esprit ne se soient offertes,
pendant un temps; tout-a-fait confondues avec la sensation?
etrtous ont commence par etre dans 1 'impuissance de demeler
ce qui se passoit dans leur pensee... Vous avez neanmoins
surmonte cette difficulty et vous devez juger que vous
(2)en pouvez surmonter d'autres" .
The need of language for the existence of thought in 
Condillac's theory is explored by Auroux within the context 
of his consideration as to whether the language-thought 
relationship implicit in the nominalism of the Enlightenment 
is compatible with his hypothesis of 'langage-traduction'...
(3)
This, based on Enlightenment views of signification , 
postulates that (briefly). the speaker produces an image of 
an idea represented by the sound, and the listener by 
the inverse process, receiving the sound, produces the 
image of the i d e a ^ .
1. Dialectique des signes chez Condillac, p. 4 89.
2. Grammaire, I, Ch. IV, Op. Vol. I, p. 4 38.
3. See Section 2, Ch." 6 for Auroux's comments on the triple 
structure of the sign.
4. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 69-70. Auroux refers 
to D. J. O'Connor's 'translation-theory' of meaning
(J. Locke, Dover, 1966, p. 125) as the source of this idea.
OThe hypothesis of langage-traduction, commentsAuroux, 
is equivalent to acknowledging that language adds nothing 
to thought "Elle laisse supposer qu*a tout son (qui est 
du langage) correspond quelque chose dans l fesprit de celui 
qui parle, a savoir l ’idee dont il est signe."^: Against 
this, the nominalist aspect of Enlightenment thought, 
based on the view that only individuals existed, was reflected 
in beliefs that general ideas were not possible without 
language. Auroux considers the matter in regard to Condillac 
because he provides an explicit and important theory, as 
opposed to general opinions, and in it he adopts a more 
radical position than most of his contemporaries.
Condillac1s view that signs are necessary to the develop­
ment of ideas may appear inconsistent with the theory of 
1 langage-rtraduction1 which postulates the separate existence 
of idea from sign but Condillac, on the other hand, confirms 
that thought exists before its expression in his account of 
its de-composition by language.
Auroux concludes that his hypothesis and Condillac’s 
concept of signification are compatible since for Condillac 
language thus adds nothing to the content of thought.
Although indistinct prior to analysis by language, it never­
theless exists without it. The role of language in trans­
lating the form of content from simultaneity to succession
does not in itself explain its necessity. The need for
(2)signs is the submission of thought- to the will
While Auroux*s conclusion that, for Condillac, language 
adds nothing to the content of ^thought is justifiable taken 
in the quantitative sense in which it is meant, qualitatively, 
as Auroux well appreciates, it is indispensible.
1. Ibid., p. 102.
2. Ibid. , .pp„ 102-107.
Chapter 7 The Sign in Condillac's Theory
Auroux and Tort^^ emphasise the all-pervasive importance 
of the sign in Condillac's theory. The nature of its close 
involvement with all aspects of Condillac's theory, which 
makes it difficult to consider it in isolation, is aptly 
summarised by Auroux:
"Des qu'il veut analyser la classification condillacienne
des signes, l'historien se trouve ainsi plonge dans une
problematique plus large. II n'y est pas seulement question
de dire ce qu'est le signe, mais de determiner comment
l'homme pense, agit et constitue un langage. La nature du
signe linguistique n'est pensee que dans le deploiement
patient des rapports qui unissent l'homme au monde, les
(2 )hommes entre eux, et tout homme a lui-meme ..."
Auroux's discussion on the distinction between the ration­
alist and the empiricist conception of the sign was referred 
to in Part 2, -Section" 2, Chapter 6. He also notes that whereas 
the first part of the Encyclopedie article 'sign' used the 
Port-Royal definition, the second part
reproduces Condillac's text defining three forms of the sign;
accidental, those which are linked to ideas by chance; natural,
sounds endowed by nature to express emotions; and artificial
signs, chosen by man, and which have only an arbitrary
(3)relationship with ideas . These three kinds of signs 
correspond to his postulated stages of development of language,
(4)
m  association with thought .
1. Tort, La Dialectique des signes chez Condillac; Auroux, 
La s^miotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 26-35.
2. Ibid., p. 34.
3. Essai, I, I, Ch. IV, para0 35, Op. Vol. I, p. 19.
4. See Chapter 2.
Auroux comments on the lack of homogeneity between the 
two parts of the Encyclopedie text: Condillac's classification 
only concerns the third type of Port-Royal's three divisions 
of signs, namely the distinction between those which are 
natural and those which have been instituted, and it intro­
duces a new approach^^ .
With Port-Royal's definition, the sign is always related 
to an idea (which stimulates the idea of the object). Condillac's 
evolving process of signification involves a single relation­
ship between an idea and an external object and the idea 
always has its source in perception.
In the case of the accidental sign, the signifying relation­
ship is that which links an idea to an object and allows the 
recall of the idea. The relationship of the natural sign is 
basically the same, but; it also depends on the universality 
of the liaison of natural sounds with human emotions and 
therefore becomes reciprocal, the sound producing the idea 
of the emotion, the emotion producing the sound. The third 
and most important category which has evolved from the earlier 
signs through the processes of analysis and analogy is free
from external stimulus, having an arbitrary relationship with
(2 )the idea which is designated .
(3)Auroux and Tort point but some ambiguities in Condillac's
terminology relating to the sign, notably in his references
to 1arbitraire'. In the Essai, it appears that the language
(4)of action is both natural and arbitrary . In the Grammaire
(5)it is presented as originally natural . Tort refers to 
Condillac's indiscriminate use of 'signes arbitraires et 
d'institution' at the stage of the operations of memory, the
1. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 26-27.
2. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. Ibid., p. 30.
5. Ibid., p. 31.
apparent change in terminology in the grammar indicating that
artificial signs relate either to natural conventionalised
signs or to signs formed by analogy with natural signs
Condillacs definition in the Grammaire makes clear his view
of arbitrary, and in this it is representative of the 18th
(2)century opposition to the term .
In this definition he makes a clear distinction between
artificial signs, invented by analogy with the language of
action and based on a choice made by reason, and arbitrary
(3)signs, having no rational foundation .
Although the artificial sign has such a vital and per- 
vasive role in his theory, Condillac does not say much about 
its relationship with the idea or object which it represents.
(4)
Coseriu notes that Condillac strongly emphasises the
importance of the "Operation par laquelle nous donnons des
(5)signes a nos idees" but is not very informative about the 
operation itself, saying merely that it results from the 
imagination presenting to the mind signs not previously in 
use, and attention which links them with i d e a s ^ .
The mnemonic nature of the sign is evident in the role 
attributed to it by Condillac in developing the mind’s oper­
ations. He also refers to this in relating the sign to
1. Dialectique des signes chez Condillac, p. 501.
2. Droixhe, La Linguistique et l'appel'de l ’histoire, pp. 25-26. 
Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 69.
3. Grammaire, I, Ch. I, Op. Vol. I, p. 428-9.
4. Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von der Antike bis zur 
Gegenwart, Vol. II, p. 230.
5. Essai, I, IV, Ch. I, Op. Vol. I, p. 40o
6. Ibido
different kinds of ideas . It is vital in enabling features 
which form complex ideas to be related in the mind .
1. Condillac’s definition of idea distinguishes between images 
resulting directly from perceptions and ideas formed by 
the action of the mind, to which the term 'notion1 is 
appropriate.
"Idee. Image que nous formons des choses, maniere dont 
nous les concevons.
Idee, notion. II me semble que le second ne peut se dire 
que des idees qui sont l'ouvrage de 1'esprit. On dit la 
notion de la justice, et on ne dit pas la notion d'un arbre". 
(Op. Vol. Ill, Index des Notions).
Chapter 8 Condillac's Theory related to Grammar
For Condillac's theory of the origin and development of 
language and his account of how language analyses thought 
to be compatible with the prevailing state of language, one 
would expect his version of grammatical theory to endorse 
his postulations, or, at least, not to contradict them, since 
the contemporaty state of language is the developed stage, 
to which grammar relates.
It has already been noted that his explanation for the
deyelopmeht of specific word classes conveniently carries
them to their current fonr/1  ^. . Though thus allowing in detail
for successive stages of development, globally, as Auroux
(2)
points out 1 it is only practicable to distinguish two stages, 
the primitive, and the fully developed. Condillac himself 
makes' this point:
"Si on pouvait observer une langue dans ses progres 
successifs, on verroit les regies s'etablir peu a peu. II 
ne nous reste qu'a observer notre langue, telle qu'elle est
aujourd'hui et a chercher les lois qu'elle suit dans l'analyse
, ■ . . „(3)de la pensee. .
This, however, appears to leave open the question of how 
words relate to ideas in the perfected state of language, for, 
as the ultimate point reached in the course of the development 
of language may be considerably removed from the original 
relationship between words and the ideas which they express, 
this may appear to present a problem.
1. . See Chapter 5.
2. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 29 3.
3. Grammaire I, Ch. VIII, Op. Vol. I, p. 447.
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For Condillac, since language analyses thought, its 
principles are to be found in the way in which it does this, 
and the more perfect the language the greater will be the 
precision of the analysis On this basis, whatever the
stage reached, the function of language is the same, though 
its efficiency may vary. One can deduce from this that 
Condillac assumes different stages of development in different 
languages, which would imply therefore the possibility of 
further development.
Condillac's Grammaire is really intended for the French,
but he refers to the first part of the work, De 1'analyse
du Discours, dealing with the signs provided by language to
analyse thought, as a general grammar revealing the elements
(2)of language and the rules common to all .
Although Condillac's Grammaire is essentially concerned
with the developed language, all principles of.language at
whatever stage, rest on analogy and analysis which guided
(3)the development of language from the language of action
Languages have words of different types because ideas 
relate to different classes of knowledge, the system of 
language therefore being formed on the system of knowledge. 
They use means of connecting words only because we do not
(4)
think except in so far as we connect ideas
Because the system of ideas everywhere has the same basis,
the system of language is basically the same everywhere.
They all have words of different kinds and signs to mark the
relationship between words. They differ in usirg different
words for the same ideas and using different signs to mark
(5)the same relationship .
1. Foreword to the Grammaire, Op. Vol. I, p. 427.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 431.
4. . Ibid., Ch. II, p. 433.
5. . Ibid., p. 435.
Languages become more perfect according as they become 
more effective in analysing thought, that is in distinguishing 
ideas, and in combining them and in considering them under 
all possible relationships^.
The universality of language lies, then, in its universal 
function, the analysis of thought, with its universal type 
of content, which derives from common sources of knowledge, 
•perceived through the senses. Grammar, Condillac defines as 
the science which teaches the principles and rules of this 
analytic method. It is general if it lays down rules 
appropriate to all languages, particular if the rules apply 
only to individual languages. Since speech consists of a 
judgment or succession of judgments, it is sufficient to
(2)
observe the analysis of a few judgments to know the method
With Condillac's theory being applicable to any state of 
development of language, language described as thought 
analysed, i.e. with its ideas and operations presented success­
ively, and grammar viewed in terms of the method by which 
thought is analysed, with existing forms of parts of speech, 
at least in French, reconciled to his account of their origin, 
it seems unlikely that Condillac's version of grammar would 
present any radical aspects. Knight, in fact, refers to the 
Grammaire as being drawn mostly from standard French grammars
(3)
of the day . It is mainly in keeping with prevailing theory 
expressed through the Encyclopedie articles, which, in any 
event, reflect the influence of Locke, as does Condillac's 
theory. Condillac's main principle, the liaison of ideas, is 
consistent with the strong emphasis of prevailing grammatical 
theory on the relations between words and the view of thought 
as 'une et indivisible'.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., Ch. VI, p. 443.
3. The Geometric Spirit, p. 22.
There are some features peculiar to Condillac, deriving 
from his theory of the origin of language, but they 
mainly ' relate to reasons why the grammatical structure 
came to be formed, rather than create new rules of grammar. 
These are his own interpretation of the proposition as a 
judgment, his view of the order of words, and his limited 
number of true word classes.
It is indicative of Condillac's view of the directness 
of the analysis of thought by language that he uses a speech 
cf Racine's to illustrate and comment on how this is effected.
The form which language takes is that of the judgment, 
or series of judgments, expressed in the proposition. But 
Condillac's account of the mental process which form the 
judgment differs from that of his predecessors.
He describes judgment as the same as perception, in so 
far as they are the same mental operation, but viewed 
differently. To perceive a large tree, the relationship 
between tree and large can be considered in the perception 
of this relationship, or in the ideas large and tree which 
present the. object as existing outside ourselves. In comparing 
these ideas, the judgment becomes an affirmation^.
From this it seems that the judgment has two faces, both 
expressed by the proposition. But the ability not merely 
to perceive the two ideas but to affirm the relationship 
between them depends on artificial signs. For without words 
it would be impossible to consider separately each idea and 
therefore to affirm the relationship of one to another, 
thus forming a proposition.
"... L'affirmation est, en quelque sorte, moins dans votre
esprit que dans les mots qui prononcent les rapports que
„ (2)vous apercevez."
1. Grammaire, I, Ch. IV, Op. Vol. I, p. 437.
2. Ibid., p. 437-8.
The fact that although language makes possible the 
function of affirmation, it does not allow for a distinction 
between this and perception, is discussed at Chapter 9.
A judgment is always simple but a proposition can include 
several judgments and can therefore be decomposed into 
several propositions^.
Because a proposition is the expression of a judgment,
it must consist of three words, two being signs of the two
ideas compared, the third thatof the mind's operation, when
the relation between the two ideas is judged. The subject
is the thing of which one speaks, the attribute that which
is judged to apply to the subject, and the verb, the third
(2)word, relates the attribute to the subject .
It is interesting to compare the view of Condillac of 
the judgment as perception or an affirmation with that of 
Port-Royal, for whom judgment arose also from comparing two 
ideas together and affirming or denying one or the other, 
with the verb 'est* representing the operation of mind which 
effects the affirmation .•*
Though the practical effect in the proposition of the
(3)
affirming role of the verb appears to be the same , the
respective explanations for the role differ in that, whereas
Port-Royal attributed it to a direct and innate action of
(4)mind, with Condillac, it has a genetic origin and though 
described in the above quotation as an operation of mind, 
this originates in perception.
1. Ibid., I, Ch. XI, Op. Vol. I, p. 453.
2. Ibid., Chs. XI and XII, Op. Vol. I, pp. 452, 453.
3. Arrive and Chevalier (La Grammaire, p. 89) also noted the
similarity: ".. on retrouve en ce developpement 1 *analyse 
port-royaliste de la proposition".
40 See Chapter 5.
Leading from this difference, Robinet sees a wide gap 
between the respective positions of Port-Royal and Condillac, 
due to the following innovations in Condillac's theory:
the etymological approach to all grammatical terms;
the originating role of perception in thought, and the 
genetic derivation from it of conception (an original 
operation of mind with Port-Royal);
the co-existence of affirmation within the idea of analysis 
of thought by language;
the confused state of simultaneous thought prior to 
analysis by language, far removed from one of pure 
intelligibility;
the creative role of language in the clear formulation 
of ideas;
Condillac's conclusion that the possibility of affirmation 
rests in the words themselves and is not an act of mind-^ .
Whereas these points find justification in Condillac's texts, 
an interpretation of the operations of mind as latent
(2
faculties providing a content of thought pre-existing language 
would make the apparent gap between the two approaches appear 
less extreme.
In discussing the subject and attribute, and their resp­
ective roles, Condillac conforms to the Encyclopedie notions
(3)
of complement and the relations of identity and determination
1. Andre Robinet, Le Langage a l'Age Classique, Paris 1978, 
pp. 218-9.
20 See Chapter 3.
3. Grammaire, I, Ch. XII, Op. Vol. I, pp. 453-456.
Modifications to substantives, (i.e. partial ideas of 
the subject or attribute), are possible through the use of 
adjectives, incidental propositions or a substantive 
preceded by a preposition. Condillac specifies a semantic 
restriction in cases where the attribute of a proposition 
is a substantive.
The substantive as subject must be less general than 
the substantive as attribute, e.g. one can say Corneille 
est un poete, but not un poete est Corneille. Condillac 
explains this feature by his derivation of general ideas 
from individual ones, whereby the subject is a partial idea 
of the general one. " 1 poete est ecrivain'1 is equivalent 
to saying 'l'idee d'ecrivain est une partie de l'idee de 
poete1, but 1un ecrivain est un poete* is invalid because 
the idea of poet is only part of that of ecrivain!1 -^
To overcome the apparent problem of explaining the
affirmative role of the verb in negative propositions,
Condillac introduces the idea of the verb etre expressing
the affirmation that the quality in the attribute exists
among the other qualities of the subject, and therefore ■
expresses the coexistence of the attribute with the subject.
In this way, the proposition is affirmative if it affirms
that the subject and attribute co-exist, and negative if
(2)
affirming that they do not .
Adhering to his explanation of the development of the 
verb from its original role of affirmation to its adjectival 
forms, Condillac states that adjectival verbs have come about 
through man's desire to abbreviate, uniting the verb etre 
with adjective, e.g. etudier for etre etudiant, etc. . The 
accessories to which verbs are susceptible are the object, 
circumstances of time and place, action, the means, the 
cause, the aim or motive. Circumstances of time and place 
are appropriate to the verb etre, others to.the adjectival verb.
1. Ibid., p. 455.
2. Ibid., Ch. XIII, p. 456.
He distinguishes between the verb substantive etre implying 
existence, and etre signifying judgment. "Corneille etoit 
du temps de Racine* implies he existed, but 'Corneille est 
poete* does not imply real existence, since Corneille no 
longer exists, but represents a view of the mind which sees 
Corneille and poete as two ideas co-existing^ .
Only four types of words are necessary; substantives to
name all objects of which we can speak, adjectives to express
the qualities, prepositions to indicate the relationships,
(2 )and a single verb to express all judgments .
To reconcile other parts of speech to these four types,
Condillac deduces that they take the place of one or more
elements. Adverb, pronoun, and conjunction, though single
words, really contain several elements and should not count
as parts of speech. Adverbs are abbreviated expressions
equivalent to a noun preceded by a preposition. The pronoun
is equivalent to an entire phrase for it takes the place of
(3)a noun, with all its accessories, to avoid repeating this 
Conjunctions mark the liaison between thoughts, in addition 
to the thoughts being associated by means of the order in 
which they are presented. Condillac deduces that they function 
as substitutes for complex expressions because they have 
the effect of recalling expressions already made, which can 
be referred to by complex expressions. Thus, 'alors* is 
equivalent to 'dans ce temps-la', 'ainsi' to 'de la sorte', 
'done* to 'par consequent'.
'Et', 'ni' and 'que' are similarly regarded as conjunctions
(4)
since they mark the passage from one proposition to another
1. Ibid., p. 45 7.
2. Ibid., p. 456.
3. These are similar explanations to those of Port-Royal
regarding the adverb (Grammaire Generate, Pt. II, Ch. XII, 
p. 65) and the pronoun (Ibid., Ch. VIII, p. 44), except 
that Condillac allows for the notion of noun and complement 
being replaced by the pronoun.
4. Ibid., Ch. XIV, Op. Vol; I, pp. 459-60.
So far, Condillac's explanation of grammar as the method 
of analysing thought, summarised, though superficially, in 
the following quotation, shows no notable differences from 
prevailing Encyclopedie grammatical theory, except for the 
introduction of the 'subordinate proposition'.
"Nous avons vu le discours se decomposer en differentes 
parties. Nous y avons decouvert des propositions principales, 
subordonnees, incidentes, simples, composees. Nous avons 
trouve dans ces propositions, des noms substantifs, des 
adjectifs, des prepositions et des verbes. Nous avons 
observe les differens accessoires dont le sujet, le verbe et 
l'attribut peuvent etre modifies; et nous avons remarque 
tous les signes dont on se sert pour exprimer toute espece 
d'idees et toute espece de rapports. Voila done le discours 
reduit a ses vrais elements, et nous avons acheve 1 'analyse." .
However, an important difference between Du Marsais and
Beauzee on the one hand and Condillac, Batteux and Diderot
on the other is that of the order of words, a matter discussed
(jn
by Ulrich .Ricken, whose commentary is summarised below.
According to the 17th century rationalist view of natural 
order, leading from the scholastic theory of 'ordo naturalis', 
the succession of logical categories of subject-verb, object 
was regarded as a feature of universal reason. An opposing 
trend of thought developed, however, from Descartes' 'psycho- 
physiologie', whereby the soul, in rationalist theory the 
producer of immaterial thought, received 'mechanical impressions' 
via the brain's nervous system. The holders of the 
viewpoint opposing the rationalist theory regarded imagination, 
thereby materially influenced, as an unconditional component 
of speech. With B. Lamy came the first opposition
1. Ibid., p. 458.
2. 'Die Kontroverse Du Marsais und Beauzee gegen Batteux, 
Condillac und Diderot',in Parret, 1976. Also, La Liaison 
des Idees selon Condillac et la clarte du frangais, 1969 
and Les Grammairiens-Philosophes et le Probleme de l'Ordre 
Des Pensees et Des Mots, in Grammaire et Philosophie Au 
Si^cle des Lumieres, 1978.
to the natural order. As numerous impressions appeared 
simultaneously in the brain, the imagination presented 
several thoughts simultaneously. The analysis inevitable 
with linear speech necessitated presentation of simultaneous 
thought in successive units, but the simultaneous action of 
the imagination therefore ran counter to order which followed 
logical categories. The need to grasp the thought in its 
combined form (i.es uninfluenced by the natural sequence of 
logic) was favourable to a freer word order. This opposition 
had materialised by the last quarter of the -17th century, 
with the rationalist language theory resting on Descartes1 
concept of immaterial thought, the opponents applying their 
interpretation of Cartesian psychophysiology to language.
Thus the contradiction between Descartes physics and meta­
physics was carried to linguistic theory.
Du Marsais, though representing sensualist principles 
in important points of his language theory, maintained the 
logical word order as the natural, universal one (as did 
Beauzee) and in his concept of the origin of language also 
saw in language the consequential result of an already formed 
thinking capacity^.
Condillac's theory of the origin of language and the 
reciprocal development of the operations of mind and language 
eliminated any universal order of logical categories* His 
.universal principle was the liaison of ideas, without any 
fixed word order, the French order which he regarded as a 
consequence of the more abstract form of thought and language 
of the French, being equally acceptable as the inverted 
Latin order. The important point is the closest possible 
connection between the ideas which belong to each other. 
Ricken adds that although Condillac's sensualist approach 
called into question the rationalist criteria of word order, 
it was not a direct polemic against that theory.
1. Oeuvres, Paris, 1797, Vol. Ill, p. 379.
Condillac's views on the order of words are included in
his treatment of syntax and construction. His definitions
of syntax and construction follow those of Du Marsais, whom
he quotes , and of the Encyclopedie, syntax being concerned
with the relations between words, construction, the order of
words, but always conforming to the syntactic requirements.
The aim of syntax is to bring together several ideas to form
a whole, comprising all the details and the relationships
(2)of the thought expressed
The relations between words can be marked by the words' 
positions: by different forms taken by the words: by pre­
positions which mark them as a second term , of a relation: by 
conjunctions which link incidental propositions with the
substantives they modify; and by conjunctions which mark the
(3 )connection between the principal parts of speech .
)
Condillac describes 'construction directe'. as that in which
ideas follow in unbroken sequence, 'construction renversee'
or 'inversion' occurs where the order is transposed. Both
are equally natural since,in the mind, all ideas which are
judged occur simultaneously and would be uttered, as perceived
simultaneously, if this were possible. So it is only in the
(4)utterance that there can be a direct or inverse order .
Condillac.explains the apparent anomaly of any question
of order in relation to thoughts perceived simultaneously by
the fact that the mind is able to consider ideas separately
and therefore distinctly through the use of language; it is
only due to the resulting succession of ideas that the
(5 )question of direct or inverse order arises
1. Grammaire, II, Ch. XXVI, Op. Vol. I, p. 502.
2. Ibid., Ch. XXVI, Op. Vol. I, p. 499.
3. Ibid., p. 500.
4. Ibid., Ch. XXVII, Op. Vol. I, p. 503.
5. Ibid.
It is due to the mind's operations of judging and 
reasoning that, although simultaneous, ideas are arranged in 
a certain order of precedence, with a relationship of 
subordination linking one with the other. The more this 
connection can be preserved in language, the clearer will 
be the e x p r e s s i o n ^ .
It is noteworthy that this extract indicates that judg­
ment and reasoning are effective prior to their linear 
expression in language since they arrange ideas in a certain 
order. The liaison of ideas, i.e., the connection between 
dependent ideas, must always in the expression be in direct
order, but since thought is composite, the whole.expression
(2)must be subject to inversion .
Ellipsis is not a necessary feature of Condillac's theory 
except in so far as he uses it in explaining certain word 
classes. He acknowledges that omissions are frequent in 
all languages, and attributes them to man's natural inclin­
ation to present thought in its original simultaneous state, 
thus omitting unnecessary words, a feature which is also 
welcome to the listener or reader, since it presents several
(3)
ideas together, as they exist in the mind
1. De ‘I 1Art d'Ecrire, Livre premier, Ch. I, Op. Vol. I, p. 520.
2. Grammaire, II, Ch. XXVII, Op. Vol. I, p. 5 04.
3. IBid., I, Ch. XIII, Op. Vol. I, p. 458; De l'Art
d'Ecrire, Livre premier/ Ch. X, Op. Vol. I, p. 539.
Chapter 9. Further Developments in Language
Throughout Condillacfs work, his views on the natural 
progression of mental operations and language are qualified 
by his recognition of the limitations of human nature, of 
varying capabilities within the human race, and of the 
negative sides to the faculties and operations which he 
postulates.
While he appears to envisage an ongoing 'natural' progress, 
since he regards some languages as more analytical than others, 
he is also concerned more specifically with deliberate measures 
which would refine the existing imperfect state of language 
and move towards an ideal language.
Although nature provides the pattern and stimulus towards 
perfecting a language, with the first steps resulting from 
man's own conformation, further progress being achieved 
through analogy, general usage has introduced imperfections, 
through imprecise use of existing signs, and the proliferation 
of signs which are not the most suitable for analysis.
Simple ideas do not present a problem, but the words for 
complex ideas are very susceptible to abuse
James Knowlson, discussing the importance of Condillac 
in late 18th century consideration of theories of ideal 
languages, neatly summarises Condillac's view of the defect­
iveness of languages as methods of analysis.
"As languages have become more elaborate and richer in
terms, they have also tended to become less effective as methods
of analysis, incorporating words that reveal less clearly the'
(2 )
true resemblances or analogies existing between ideas."
1. Essai, II, I, Ch. XI, Op. Vol. I, pp. 89-92 and Langue
des Calculs, Op. Vol. II, p. 419.
2. Universal language schemes in.England and France, 1600-18 00,
p. 169.
The criticisms' made by Condillac are expressed in his 
1 La Langue des Calculs', in the context of consideration of 
the requirements for a perfect language. Here, he expresses 
his mistrust of usage, together with the idea noted by 
Coseriu as astonishingly modern ^  ,■ that leading writers do 
not create but discover languages and develop them further.
The ideal language forms all its words by analogy and
uses the least possible number of words to express the greatest
(2)
possible number of ideas .
The improvements envisaged by Condillac would imply a 
semantic, rather than a structural re-organisation, and 
would depend on a more stringent analysis, or abstraction.
This, in turn, would enable greater precision in knowledge.
A point in Condillac1s theory which could invoke a re­
organisation of syntax, at least in the French language, is, 
however, dealt with by Tort. Condillac argues that thought 
can appear to be obscure because language does not precisely 
indicate the sense in which judgments such as 'la neige 
est blanche' is to be taken. It is true, if, by 'blanche*, 
the physical cause of our perception is meant, and not some- .
(3)
thing similar to our perception itself , i.e. the mind's 
view of it, a distinction which is not made in the propos­
ition ^  .
At issue, comments Tort, is not only the lack of differ­
entiation between objects and words caused by the lack of 
something which might amplify the idea of referent, but also 
the problem of syntactic structure, the predication of quality
in the proposition being dependent on the relationship between
(5)the substantive and adjectival categories .
10 Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von der Antike bis zur 
Gegenwart, Vol. II, p. 233, 238.
2. La Langue des Calculs, Livre I, Ch. II, 0po Vol. II, p. 427.
3. Essai, I, I, Ch. II, para. 14, Op. Vol. I, p. 10.
4. See Chapter 8.
5. Tort, Dialectique des Signes chez Condillac, pp. 490-491.
Chapter 10. Summary.
Condillac's thinking results in a theory of language and 
understanding, rather than of general grammar, his declared 
aim being to demonstrate how one principle, the liaison of 
ideas through language,is vital to the organisation of human 
knowledge. This liaison, a mental operation in itself and 
therefore unobservable, is not possible without human language 
(or equivalent system of artificial signs) which is observable.
As Condillac attempts to achieve his demonstration through 
the empirical principle of observation and the process of 
analysis, which he describes as that observed in nature, his 
theory may, with some justification, be called empirical.
But since it can be concluded that his explanation of the 
interdependent progression of language and thought, and the 
development of all the mental faculties from sensation, would 
not be possible without man's innate intelligence, it seems 
that he accepts an ultimate a priori basis to his theory.
The occasional ambiguity in his account appears to stem
from the opposition between his acceptance of God-given human
intelligence, and his aim to use only empirical data in
demonstration. His religious convictions are reconciled with
the empirical bias to his theory through his assumption that,
after the fall, the soul no longer retained the capacity for
perfect knowledge, but only such faculties as depended on
(1)sense impressions .
1. "D'ailleurs s'il nous importe beaucoup, comme on n'en 
sauroit douter, de connoitre les facultes, dont Dieu, 
malgre le peche de notre premier pere, nous a conserve
l fusage, il est inutile de vouloir deviner celles qu'il 
nous a enlevees, et qu'il ne doit nous rendre qu'apres 
cette vie. ...
Notre unique objet doit etre de consulter 1'experience, 
et de ne raisonner que d'apres des faits que personne ne 
puisse revoquer en doute."
(De L 'Art de Penser, I, Ch. V, Op., Vol. I, p. 719).
But, unlike the earlier philosopher grammarians, who 
accepted reason as the unconditional universal basis for langu­
age, Condillac envisaged that man's faculty of intelligence, 
though having a dominant role in the process of understanding, 
could not achieve expression without the prior functioning 
of his other innate characteristics. To remove, for instance, 
perception, attention deriving from man's needs, involuntary 
memory, imagination or reminiscence, would invalidate his theory.
As a consequence of Condillac's emphasis on factors which 
are more amenable to observation, the universality of the 
relationship between language and thought is seen not to 
depend unconditionally on the innate faculty of intelligence 
or reason, but on man's complete nature, and is expressed by 
the universal function of language in analysing thought.
Without language, thought beyond the stage achieved by animals 
would not be possible.
A strong epistemological link is also indispensible to 
Condillac's theory and its universality. Language is a 
necessary condition for the acquisition, deduction, communic­
ation and storage of knowledgecr and the connection of ideas, 
made possible by language and reflection, plays a vital role 
in this, through linking objects with needs and with each 
other, in an interlocking system. Powers of abstraction, 
effective through language and the connection of ideas, provide 
a system of knowledge. The ideas and therefore the words 
which represent them are themselves of a universal type because 
they represent objects which are similar throughout the world.
So, the universality of the content of language and the way 
the content is organised, is largely dependent on reality 
itself.
Although Condillac subscribed to the usual view that general 
grammar contains elements and rules common to all languages, 
the basis for the common elements and rules is, therefore, no 
longer reason, or logic. The universality of Content and of 
the word classes is related to the universality of knowledge.
The universality of the structure of language relates to the 
way in which thought is analysed, and this, in Condillac's 
account of the development of language, is common to all men, 
and therefore to all languages, since it derives from impressions 
made on the mind through the senses, and from man's nature 
which equips him for this analytic method, which is grammar.
Thus, he sees principles of general grammar inherent in 
the manner in which man uses language to analyse thought. In 
fact, since he regards any language as a means of analysing 
thought, specifies a maximum number of parts of speech as 
necessary for this and takes a relaxed attitude on the order 
of words in the proposition, it is possible that he could not 
go further in framing rules for a general grammar without 
compromising the elasticity of the basis of his theory. Given 
this broad basis of general grammar, there appears to be no 
call for a detailed formulation such as that provided by Beauzee. 
Nevertheless, apart from his opposition to the.theory of 
natural order, his ideas seem unlikely to conflict in principle 
with those of the Encyclopedie, especially since the prevailing 
Encyclopedie view of total ideas and the grammatical relation­
ships of identity and determination were in sympathy with his 
emphasis on the closest possible connection of ideas to 
achieve suitable representation of the simultaneous form of 
thought.
A noteworthy feature of Condillac's theory is its similarity 
with that of Port-Royal, in the very close identification of 
thought and language though the respective bases of the 
relationship vary. For Port-Royal, the mental processes in 
the form of logical operations are directly represented in the 
proposition; for Condillac, language directly analyses thought,
1. Ellen Hine regards Condillac as a discipline of Port-Royal 
in the close relationship of language and thought. But 
while Port-Royal regarded grammar as the art of speaking, 
and logic as the art of thinking, Condillac saw grammar as 
the first part of the art of thinking. (Condillac and the 
problem of language, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth 
Century, Vol. 106, 19 73, pp. 36-37).
and this provides a less rigid hypothesis than that of Port- 
Royal. In grammar, however, both subscribe to a similar view 
of the proposition, for, in spite of a different departure 
stage from that of Port-Royal, and other divergent factors, 
Condillac's'analysis of thought by language' also materialises 
into the elements of the judgment, expressed in the proposition.
In view of the major difference in his grammatical theory 
from those of his predecessors, namely, his opposition to a 
theory of natural order, and the very direct relationship he 
envisages in his analysis of thought by language, it.appears 
irrelevant to consider his theory in terms of an underlying 
structure to the surface expression. Apart from the difference 
in form, thought being indivisible, and language linear, the 
inference is that the content of language is the same as that 
of pre-ahalysed thought, assuming the analysis correctly 
presents the thought. Condillac does allow for ellipsis in 
his theory, though he does not make use of it to reconstruct 
specifically an ideal form of expression or a 'natural order' 
such as prescribed by Du Marsais, or Beauzee's 'analytic order'. 
Ellipsis results from man's natural reluctance to move away 
from the simultaneous form of thought present in the mind, to 
the linear, analysed form applied to it by language.
There is an apparent paradox in Condillac's description 
of language, the analyser of thought, advisably being made as 
economic as possible in the terms used in order to achieve the 
simultaneity and unity of thought in its natural state, while, 
at the same time, as Condillac's theory proclaims, thought 
needs to be analysed, or decomposed for clarity. There is 
also apparent contradiction in that Condillac refers to the 
analysis made by language following the closest liaison possible 
of ideas which relate to each other. If ideas relate to each 
other, they are already in some form of order. Condillac
acknowledges that they are in an order of precedence, though 
simultaneous: this is the order provided by the processes of 
judging or reasoning, which places the ideas and terms in 
the natural order of precedence. But as Condillacfs theory 
claims that for such operations language is necessary, the 
inference is that some 1 internal' use of language is involved 
in these mental processes, and this could be another stage, 
about which Condillac is not explicit.
Whatever criticism of Condillac's theory may be justified, 
he did, in keeping with the enquiring attitude of the Enlighten­
ment, open up aspects affecting language to an extent that 
could encourage thinking about language outside the narrower 
relationship with thought envisaged in the theories of general 
grammar which had a rationalist basis. Apart from the main 
themes of origin and development of language, which may have 
stimulated interest in etymology, Condillac introduced a 
stronger epistemological link (words reflect the system of 
knowledge), recognized a relationship between the character of 
a language and its people allowed for the communicative
role of language (the speaker decomposes or analyses, the 
listener composes or synthesises), and through his criticism 
of the inadequacies of language, and views on a perfect one, 
stimulated thinking about reform of language and ideal languages.
His dissatisfaction with the state of language might have 
been more constructive had he been more knowledgeable about 
languages. His Grammaire, compiled for instruction, was 
obviously, apart from the limited general features already 
mentioned, intended as a French grammar, and his method of 
analysis tied to the French construction. Had he had the access 
to the languages of completely different structure, even though 
they may not have allowed for the distinction between reality 
and the mind's action which he noted as an omission in his own 
language, they might have brought to notice other analytical 
features novel to Western European languages. In his view of 
the progress of language, interdependent with that of thought, 
he did, however, concede a dynamic characteristic to language.
1. Essai, II, I, Ch. XV, Du Genie des Langues, Op. Vol. I, 
pp. 98-104.
Part 3. Conclusions.
A comparison of the four theories gives some indication 
of the wide variations which can occur within the concept of 
universal or general grammar, even if this concept is considered 
only within the specifically French tradition of the phenomenon. 
Though having some features in common, the four accounts of 
the nature of thought and the way in which thought is expressed 
in language show marked differences, which are most pronounced 
if one compares the rationalist Port-Royal theory and the 
sensation based theory of Condillac.
Andre Joly, taking account of such differences, contends
that the grammairien-philosophes of the eighteenth century
cannot be regarded as the heirs of P o r t - R o y a l ^ . On the other
hand, the facts considered in Part 2 of this study support
Auroux1 view of an evolution in thinking about the concept,
(2)rather than a rupture
In comparing the four theories, a certain progression in 
thinking can be detected, with that of Port-Royal playing an 
initiating role. Though these four theories do not of course 
in themselves provide a historically complete picture of 
general grammar in France, either in relation to the total
1. "... surun certain nombre de questions importantes, les
grammairiens-philosophes du dix-huitieme siecle sont en 
disaccord avec Port-Royal et qu'on ne saurait voir en eux 
les heritiers d'Arnauld et Lancelot."
(La Linguistique Cartesienne: Une Erreur Memorable, in 
La Grammaire Generale Des Modistes aux Ideologues, Andre 
Joly et Jean Stefanini, 1977, pp. 187-188).
2. " ... Mais les ruptures proviennent toujours d'un developpe-
ment interne; en ce sens, elles correspondent toujours a
la poursuite d'un projet initial. La grammaire generale 
n'est pas au XVIIIe siecle un champ morcele; c'est un 
champ en travail, et ce qui travaille en lui c'est encore
le projet de Port-Royal; ..... " (La semiotique des encyclo-
pedistes, pp. 213-214). This is also referred to in Pt. 2, 
Section I, p. 29.
span of the concept, or to the period over which the four 
theories extend, they are sufficiently dominant for this 
progression to be indicative of important features in the 
evolution of thinking about the subject.
The stimulus given by Port-Royal to such thinking must 
also be considered against the large debt it owes in turn to 
antecedents, a debt which has been amply illustrated by the 
various commentators on this matter.
Port-Royal had provided a precedent for a theory of grammar 
which relied for its main principles on the operations of 
mind themselves. The broad theme of a psychologically based 
general grammar persisted in later theories, but the con­
ception of the nature of thought, and of the mental processes 
underlying grammar, underwent certain transformations, with 
repercussions on grammatical theory. The transformations 
reflected the impact of the prevailing philosophy on the 
thinking of Du Marsais, Beauzee and Condillac, but also relevant 
were the respective authors1 own initiatives, and the further 
development of some specific aspects of Port-Royal theory.
It does not always appear possible to identify the part played 
by each factor since to some extent they appear to interact.
Important in the progression in thinking was the transition 
from the Port-Royal authors' view of thought as a sequence of 
logical operations which condition the form of language, to 
that, common to the theories of Du Marsais, Beauzee and 
Condillac, of thought as simultaneous and indivisible. This 
transition was concomitant with the dependency of thought on 
the senses, postulated in the later theories, and with the 
increasing emphasis on the analytical role of language. It 
is, however, interesting to note that Port-Royal's theory of 
the sign could also encourage a view that language has analytical 
powers, in that it implies that the need to represent thought 
by words obliges the mind to regard its own actions
1. Section 1, Chapter 7, p. 106.
The view of thought as a sequence of logical operations, 
exemplified in the Port-Royal Logique, maintained, however, 
a certain influence on the later theories. As the rules for 
thinking contained in the Logique were so important to 
Port-Royal linguistic theory, and as this publication con­
tinued to be a point of reference during the entire period 
of general grammar in France, it is not surprising that certain 
issues raised in it featured in the subsequent views about 
language and its relationship with thought. Of particular 
interest is the central position of the 'idea1 in each of 
the four theories, and the changing interpretations of i t ^  .
The changing conceptual approach to general grammar can be 
illustrated by comparing the successive versions of the nature 
of thought and its processes, and the effects of these on the 
respective accounts of the relationship of thought to language 
and grammar.
In each of the theories, the soul, or mind, is regarded as 
the source of the capacity to think, and is accepted as 
spiritual, as against material body. But, although the 
description is Cartesian, after Port-Royal, the views of the 
nature of thought move away from the Augustinian conception of 
pure spirituality, generating clear and distinct ideas, which 
are independent of the senses. For Du Marsais, influenced 
•by Locke, all ideas have their origin in external impressions, 
with reflection on these 'idees adventices' providing 'idees 
factices'. Beauzee similarly concedes the derivation of 
ideas through the senses, and Condillac's postulation that all 
the mental operations have their source in sensation indicates 
a complete departure from the Port-Royal conception of thought, 
though evidence suggests that Condillac maintained that the 
capacity for thought is innate.
1. The importance of the 'idea' and its position in logic is 
reflected in Auroux' suggestion that there is a theory of 
ideas in the Eighteenth century, which 'is not only due to 
the nature of such and such a philosophy, but constitutes 
a part of the history of logic, conceived as a theoretical 
discipline. (La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 116) .
The inclusion in the Encyclopedie of the Port-Royal
definition of the s i g n ^ ,  a definition dictated by the Soli-
(2 )
taires1 Augustinian conception of thought and the idea
might lead to an assumption that Du Marsais, Beauzee and
Condillac subscribed to the same theory of the sign as Port-
Royal, But, as Auroux points out, the application of the
concept of the artificial sign was affected by the change from
the dualist Cartesian doctrine to the sensation based doctrine.
The additional Port-Royal stage of the idea of the object,
stimulated by the idea of the sign, became irrelevant to
Condillac's theory, where the association of the idea is
(3)already with sensation itself .
Although Du Marsais, consistent with acknowledging the
duality of mind and body, subscribed to the Port-Royal defin-
(4)ition of the sign , his acceptance that all ideas have their 
origin through the senses, though with reflection producing 
further ideas, indicates a modification to the .Port-Royal 
version. While Beauzee does not appear to indicate his 
adherence to any specific version of the sign, it is clear 
that if he endorsed the inclusion of the Port-Royal definition 
in the Encyclopedie, it was not through conviction on its 
Augustinian origin, for he considers that the object is
represented by the sign, not in its capacity as an idea, but
, . (5)as a being
Although, after Port-Royal, the importance of the logical 
operations as a factor influencing language diminishes, they 
continue to feature in each of the theories. Du Marsais 
identifies them as being of particular importance, but his 
view of the first operation, conception, is affected by his 
belief that the first origin of ideas is through the senses.
1. Section 4, Chapter 7, p. 24 7.
2. Section 1, Chapter 7, p. 101.
3. Section 2, Chapter 6, p. 161.
4. Ibid., p. 160.
5. Section 3, Chapter 4, p. 189.
Conception nevertheless seems to' retain for him the impli­
cation of 1 understanding*, and it is interesting to note 
Rickenfs view that Du Marsais1 adherence to the concept of 
natural order, with its sequence of the logical operations, 
could draw on Locked theory that reflection existed along­
side sensation, and that language would therefore be an 
ultimate product of the faculty of lconcevoirl, regarded as 
equivalent to Locke's r e f l e c t i o n ^ .
Beauzee1s reference to thought being in some way analysed 
by logic with the help of abstraction appears to depart from 
the logical sequence. But his postulation that logic achieves 
this analysis by considering separately the different ideas* 
which are the object of thought, and the relations which the 
mind perceives between them,implies a certain interpretation 
of the logical operations. The 'ideas' could be related to 
the operation of concevoir; the relations between them to 
judgment.
Condillac's theory, which, of the.four, provides the most
detailed and precise analysis of the thought processes, differs
i-n explicitly postulating perception, the impression made on
the mind through the senses, as the first operation. The
subsequent operations of reflection, judgment and reasoning
(2)
have their source in this first operation . It is noteworthy 
that it is at the stage of reflection, which may be regarded 
on a level with the 'conception' of Port-Royal and Du Marsais, 
at which language becomes important, and the liaison of ideas 
becomes possible. In the earlier theories, conception is the 
stage which produces ideas, which are, for needs of communi­
cation, given artificial signs.
Despite the variations in the conceptions of the nature of 
thought, its form in each of the theories, even where thought 
is regarded initially as simultaneous and indivisible, is rel­
ated to a version of the judgment, and also, in each case, 
the specific version of the judgment influences the interpret­
ation of, the. relationship, of. thought, with. the. expression.
1. Grammaire et Philosophfe au siecle des Lumieres, p. 86.
2. , Section 4, Chapter 2, p. 22 3.
Port-Royal*s judgment involves a specific action of mind 
in affirming one idea of another. Unrestricted by the Port- 
Royal type of formula, which represents the mental operations 
directly in the expression, Du Marsais1 judgment is an abstract 
term for the mind's operation, whereby we think that an object 
is or is not of such a manner, the mind also regarding the 
object and what is judged of it as forming a whole. Whether 
or not Beauzee's formulation of the judgment owes something 
to this idea of the additional mental act of observation, it 
expresses the notion of the mind observing its own actions.
For Beauzee, knowledge is nothing more than the intellectual 
recognition of things with their attributes, the act whereby 
the mind perceives in itself the existence of a being with 
such and such an attribute.
Although Condillac's version of judgment is reminiscent
of that of Port-Royal in that it allows for the action of the
mind in affirming one thing of another, in conception it is
markedly different^, not least because for Condillac,
language is thought analysed, for Port-Royal the mental
processes can function without language. Of interest, however,
is Condillac's view of the judgment as the same operation as
perception but viewed differently. This appears to reconcile
his theory that perception is at the origin of all mental
operations, with the view of judgment as a logical operation.
It is also possible to discern in it a means of avoiding a
possible anomaly, such as that apparent in Port-Royal's theory,
whereby the conception of the components of a complex term
(2 )could apparently also be regarded as a judgment .
Of the mental operations, that of abstraction, the process
described in the Port-Royal Logique in relation to the formation
(3)of general ideas , /becomes increasingly important in the 
later theories. Whereas Port-Royal omitted to explain how a
1. Section 4, Chapter 8, p. 256.
2. Section I, Chapter 4, p. 60.
3. Section 1, Chapter 4, p. 66.
judgment becomes possible, for Du Marsais it is as a result
of abstraction that the mind is able to compare two ideas
and to judge whether or not they are alike Abstraction
was also to feature prominently in the development of the
epistemological aspects of the theories, for through being
instrumental in explaining the genesis of ideas it facilit-
(2)
ates the attainment of knowledge .
With Du Marsais, possibly also by analogy with Locke's
use of abstraction, it enables a system of general ideas to
be developed against which new ideas can be compared.
Beauzee envisages such a system as providing the necessary
mechanism for memory and intelligence to use in the processes
(3)of acquiring knowledge, and in communicating ideas .
Condillac sees abstraction in conjunction with language, as '
(A)
the means of providing a system of all knowledge .
The relationship of the thought processes with the express­
ion, in the respective theories, is affected by the transition 
from the belief, held by Port-Royal, that language is only 
needed for communication. . This, view was also shared by Du 
Marsais, though he conceded an additional role for language 
in that he considered that it is the need to communicate which 
forces the mind to distinguish the content of simultaneous
(5)
thought . Although, with Beauzee, a form of thought appears 
possible without language, language appears as a necessary 
accompaniment to developed thought. For Condillac, not only 
are the higher forms of thought impossible without language, 
but it is language that makes possible the advance of knowledge, 
the' most important feature and one which is overlooked if 
language is regarded as'merely a means of communication^.
1. Section 2, Chapter 3, p. 134.
2. "... on retrouve dans la Logique de Port-Royal les lineaments 
. de la thdorie de 1 'abstraction qui permet aux empiristes
d'expliquer la genese de nos idees..." (Auroux, La semiotique 
des encyclopedistes, pp. 115-116).
3. Section 3, Chapter 3, p. 183.
4. Section 4, Chapter 2, p. 22 6.
5. Section 2, Chapter 3, p. 139.
6. Joly, La Grammaire Generale Des Modistes aux Ideologues, p.182.
While it would have been difficult for Port-Royal to refer 
to thought as an 'acte indivisible' and at the same time 
represent, as they did, the processes of mind directly in the 
expression, the postulation in the later theories that thought 
is simultaneous and indivisible paved the way for a more 
flexible relationship between thought and the expression.
Whether or not the three later philosopher grammarians 
consciously took note of the rigidity inherent in the Port- 
Royal theory, it certainly appears that since their respective 
versions of the judgment were not made directly dependent on 
the logical operations, certain advances in distinguishing 
between the form of thought and that of the expression became 
possible.
The expression in each of the theories takes the form of 
the proposition, and apart from Du Marsais' more liberal view 
of it as a collection of words signifying a judgment or some 
particular view of the mind, the role of the proposition 
remains limited to the judgment, though definitions of it 
vary according to the respective interpretation of the judgment
To the Port-Royal authors is attributed an initiating role 
both in establishing the idea of the proposition in French 
grammar and in endowing it with the role of a formative nucleus 
In this respect they may be regarded as having contributed to 
the emphasis on it as a cohesive unit.
In the theories of Du Marsais and Beauzee, the importance 
attached to the total meaning of an expression, which appears 
to be due, at least partly, to the conception of thought as 
'une et indivisible', further re-inforced the view of the 
proposition as a meaningful whole. The consequent recognition 
by Du Marsais and Beauzee of a logical proposition representing 
the semantic content, and a grammatical proposition, analysed 
according to grammatical categories, presented an improvement 
over Port-Royal's lack of explicit distinction between the two 
levels. The increased emphasis on relations between words was
conducive to advances in syntax. The notion of complement 
appears to have been prompted by the view of subject and 
attribute, each as a total idea within the logical proposit­
ion > being represented in the grammatical proposition by 
subject, attribute, and their respective complements.
The proposition was therefore no longer conditioned by the 
rigid Port-Royal form of 'la terre est ronde', and a propensity 
for distinguishing between semantic and grammatical content 
was introduced, though stiH influenced by the elements forming 
a judgment, the subject and attribute.
The Port-Royal classification of the content of the express­
ion between words which represent objects of thought and those 
which represent form of thought features also in the theories 
of Du Marsais and Beauzee though not with the same force as 
in the Port-Royal theory which relates them directly to the 
operations of mind. With Du Marsais the distinction is 
attributed to the manner in which the mind considers the 
o b j e c t ^ , In Beauzee's theory, the application of the concepts 
is even further removed from that of Port-Royal. Auroux, 
referring to the differences between Du Marsais and Beauzee, 
comments that while Du Marsais' analysis of the proposition 
remains related in some way to the form and substance of
content, for Beauzee, the substance only of the content is 
(2)relevant . I n  Beauzee's theory, the distinction is applied 
to the elements of the expression which correspond to external 
reality on the one hand, and on the other, to those, such as 
quantifiers and connectors, which have no such counterpart.
1. J. M. Blanchard emphasises the difference between the two 
interpretations, commenting in relation to that of Du 
Marsais, " ... un code qui n'est plus celui du langage 
philosophique, mais de la langue quotidienne, les manieres 
.... de considerer un objet, les aspects de cet objet." 
(Grammaire d'ancien regime, Studies in Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century, Vol. 106, 1973, p. 9).
2. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, p. 96.
The copulative pr affirmative role of the verb, which, for 
Port-Royal was the principal manner of thought, disappears 
with the change in e mp h a s i s i n conformity with Beauzee's 
view that the essence of language is a liaison of elements 
to express the unity of thought Also noteworthy in
Beauzee*s interpretation is his explicit acknowledgement of 
the separate existence of reality.
With the evolution in thinking on the relationship of 
language to thought, there was a change in emphasis on the 
universal aspects of language. For Port-Royal, the vital 
principles’ were the mental operations themselves, reflected 
in the universal categories of words. For Du Marsais and 
Beauzee, with the importance attached to the relations between 
ideas and the total meaning of thought, the emphasis was on 
1syntaxe necessaire* and 'ordre analytique' respectively.
For Condillac the universality lay in the function of language, 
the analysis of thought, whose guiding princip.. was the 
liaison of ideas.
The differing approaches brought about changes in the con-
»
cept of general grammar. Auroux regards Port-Royal's 1'art
de parler', the reasons for what is common to all languages
and the principal, differences which occur, as the concept from
(2)
which general grammar in the eighteenth century was re-thought. .
For Port-Royal, general grammar could be constructed a priori
(3 Vor from one language or a few languages 7. This appears to 
be consistent with a view of. universal mental operations 
being represented directly in the expression. Whatever 
figurative form this should take, and however the habit of 
usage might have affected the basic form, the mental operations 
could still be deduced.
1. Ibid.
2. La semiotique des encyclopedistes, pp. 214-215.
3. Ibid., p. 221-222.
In contrast, the Encyclopedie definition of a particular
grammar did not accord to it any universal value The
later theories, more specifically Beauzee*s, defined general
grammar as a science which pre-existed all languages,and
with Beauzee, this materialised into abstract possibilities
which particular grammars could not apply. Auroux comments
that Beauzee recognised that to be general, grammar must study
(2)linguistic forms not found in each language .
With Condillac, the science is associated with the analysis 
of thought by language. Grammar is the science which teaches 
the principles and rules of this analytic method. It is 
general if it teaches rules applicable to all languages,
(3)particular if the method is applicable in specific languages . 
It is not difficult to see in this definition an encouragement 
towards interest in particular grammars.
As the theories were largely directed at accounting for 
existing facts of grammar, they may be regarded as explicative, 
rather than descriptive. Much of their substance is related 
to the processes which occur prior to the expression, and 
since the accounts of these processes are themselves con­
strained by grammatical features of the French language, it 
may be expected that the theories themselves had relatively 
little lasting impact on formal grammar.
1. Ibid., p. 224. La Grammaire particuliere n*a par definition 
aucune valeur universelle, ses regies n'ont "qu'une verite 
hypothetique et ddpendante de conventions libres et muables, 
et ne sont d'usage que chez les peuples qui les ont adopters 
librement, ...". Auroux, La semiotique des encyclopedistes, 
p. 234. The quotes are from E.R.M. article 'grammaire*.
2. Ibid., pp. 229-230.
3. Section 4, Chapter 8 , p. 3.-5 3.
The extent of the discussions, by the respective authors,
on the definitions of the various grammatical categories
suggest a theoretical interest, rather than a practical
application^. As all the authors were much concerned with
education, their influence in the field of formal grammar
was related more to their methods of instruction. Although
application of principles of general grammar in this field
(2)do not appear to have always met with success ' , there 
appear to have been some durable effects. Sahlin refers to 
the doctrine of general grammar in France, initiated by 
Port-Royal, continuing to influence grammatical studies in 
France during the whole of the eighteenth century, a large 
part of the nineteenth century and even the modern period, 
the two latter periods being characterised by a prolonging 
of the reign of general grammar and the long effort to free
(3)
grammatical studies from its yoke .
The leading innovations relative to formal. French grammar 
appear to be in the field of syntax, with the Port-Royal 
theory directing attention to the proposition to an extent 
not previously evident in French grammar, and the further 
contributions of Du Marsais and Beauzee, culminating in the 
notion of complement.
In spite of the differences between the four theories, they 
have in common a priori views on the nature of thought, a. 
concept of the word as artificial sign of its referent, a
1. " ... il serait faux d'imputer a cette doctrine (grammaire 
generale) toutes les erreurs de la grammaire traditionnelle: 
seulement comme c fest a cette epoque qu'on a raisonne sur
la terminologie et les definitions grammaticales, on peut 
dire que la grammaire generale, ayant etabli la plus 
grande partie du cadre theorique de la grammaire, est 
indirectement responsable de ce qu'elle a laisse intact." 
(Sahlin, Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. vi).
2. The introduction of general grammar into school studies
at the period of the Revolution was not a success. (Part I, 
Chapter 3).
3. Cesar Chesnau Du Marsais, p. vi.
view of the proposition as the structure of the expression, 
and the application of ellipsis in restoring expressions to 
their ideal form, though in Condillac*s theory, ellipsis 
does not retain the same importance.
Of these features, the role of the proposition is the 
most notable, since, in effect, it constrains the various 
explanations of the nature and form of thought by obliging 
them to be channelled into a mould which follows the pattern 
of the traditional logical proposition, and which, moreover, 
identifies particularly with the French language Though
the interpretations vary in detail, the proposition in each 
case is said to consist of a subject and attribute, with' 
the verb variously described. Thought, even though initially 
indivisible and simultaneous, has within it the potential 
to be analysed into the components of a judgment and thence 
represented in the proposition. Of the four theories,
Beauzee*s explicit formulation of the different stages, with 
optional means of realisation, shows the greatest propensity 
for flexibility. But in practice the framework of the 
expression remains the subject and attribute, as with the 
other theories. The authors* definitions of the proposition 
are moreover affected by the respective philosophical 
opinions on the relation between the subject and attribute, 
to the extent that grammatical and philosophical aspects 
are combined. Also, as with the theories of the Modistae, 
the question is prompted as to whether the theories are 
circular, philosophical concepts of the relationship of 
subject and attribute owing something to language, grammatical 
theory on the proposition in turn reflecting philosophical 
views.
1. Charles Fillmore suggests that there are reasons for
questioning the deep structure validity of the traditional 
division between subject and predicate, and refers to 
Tesniere, who holds that the subject/predicate division 
is an importation into linguistic theory from formal logic 
of a concept which is not supported by the facts of 
language. The division furthermore obscures the many 
structural parallels between *subjects* and ’objects*.
(The Case for Case, in Universals in Linguistic Theory, 
Bach and Harms, p. 17).
Ellipsis is used in each of the theories as an explan­
ation for deviations in ayparticular language from universal 
principles. Reasons given for such deviations include the 
tendency to shorten speech to attain the cohesion of thought; 
variations due to usage; and the exigencies of style.
While such reasons may appear plausible in relation to the 
postulation of an ideal surface structure, they are less 
convincing as explanations of deviations from innate and 
universal principles, which are said to govern the form of 
thought, and of language. Once such principles are stipulated, 
one might expect them to apply to any utterance, without 
the need to account for deviations in terms which may be 
described as expedient. To have recourse to such explan­
ations appears to be tantamount to saying that certain 
universal rules apply only up to a certain point, when 
external factors, such as usage, become dominant. As a 
device for relating surface utterances to innate principles, 
ellipsis is, moreover, unreliable, in that the elements said 
to be omitted are open to speculation.’ It may be argued 
that the restoration of e.lided elements is part of a trans­
formational procedure, but, against this, the very reasons 
given for its occurrence are not rule governed. Recourse 
to ellipsis appears to be due not so much to the need to 
explain how principles apply in any language, but rather 
to a wish to account for deviations from the stipulated 
universal principles for whatever reasons. Moreover, the 
validity of the reconstructions appears to depend, in the 
last resort, on meaning, which argues against the universal 
principles being reflected in purely structural reconstruct­
ions. The weakness seems to rest in the fact that the 
authors are attempting to equate what appears to be simply 
the restoration of figurative expressions to formal gramm­
atical structures, which have themselves evolved, with a 
reconciliation of the expressions to innate and constant ! 
•principles. *
Whether or not the fact that the theories encompassed 
a wide range of subjects owed something to the precedent 
set by Port-Royal of ignoring discipline boundaries, each 
covers a range of disciplines which would nowadays be 
studied separately, though of course to much more advanced 
and specialised standards^under formal grammar, the various 
branches of linguistics,philosophy of language and philo­
sophy. At that period this may have been an advantage in 
that the scope of thinking was uninhibited by rigid 
boundaries. On the other hand, the lack of discrimination 
made it difficult to identify purely linguistic from extra- 
linguistic features, though Beauzee's theory showed more 
promise in this respect.
In addition to this multi-disciplinary flavour, the 
a priori versions of thought postulated by the authors as 
the bases of their theories distinguish them sharply from 
modern approaches. These versions were not so much 
suggested as hypotheses, as accepted as valid fundamentals 
underlying language.
The lack of familiarity with a wide range of languages 
also contributed to limiting the vision and scope of the 
theories. Though intended to be universal in principle 
each of the theories was related to the French language and 
the authors lacked knowledge of the completely different 
families of languages from those of Western Europe.
It is difficult to speak in terms of relevance of the 
theories to modern linguistics, beyond pointing to 
similarities in certain of their features. Apart from the 
much-discussed comparison by Chomsky of aspects of the 
theories of Port-Royal, Du Marsais and Beauzee with those 
of transformational generative grammar, there have been 
various references to other similarities, some of which are 
noted in the foregoing text, but none of these indicates a 
fundamental analogy with modern theories.
The features of the theories which appear to present
particular interest for further thought are those which are
related more to their semantic aspects. With each of the
theories, meaning plays an important role, both in regard
to the process of signification and in association with
questions of grammatical structure and categories. The
modern relevance of Beauzee*s semantic criteria for
determining incidental explicative and determinative phrases
is recognised by A u r o u x ^ . Also noteworthy is the question,
particularly important with Beauzee and Du Marsais, of
relations between words, and the contribution of these
(2)relations to total meaning .The relevance of a further aspect 
of Beauzee*s theory to modern linguistics is noted by 
Auroux* comment that Beauzee*s view of the semantic con­
sequences of adjacent terms, notably in relation to the
(3)preposition, supports an intentional theory of relations 
It is noteworthy that although these features developed 
from the authors * a priori conceptions of the nature of 
thought, they are not necessarily dependent on such con­
ceptions. It seems to be possible to regard them as autono­
mous linguistic phenomena.
The importance of semantic aspects in the theories 
discussed constitutes a major point of difference from 
Chomsky*s thinking, with its "emphasis on the syntactic basis 
of transformational generative grammar. However, although 
Chomsky appears to maintain his view of an autonomous
1. Section 3, Chapter 6, p. 206.
2. Robins refers to the question of the semantic relation
between a sentence and its component words as being far 
from solved today. (Short History of Linguistics, 1979, 
p. 138). Lest it should appear that the philosopher 
grammarians* consideration of the question of semantic
unity of a sentence was novel, it should also be noted
that Robins refers to Indian linguists having debated
the whole question of the primacy of the word as against
that of the sentence. Of particular interest is the view
of one Indian author (c. seventh century A.D.) of the 
sentence as a single undivided utterance conveying its 
meaning *in a flash*. (Ibid., p. 139).
3. Section 3, Chapter 6, p. 210.
grammatical system^^, he regards it as "a coherent and 
perhaps correct proposal that the language faculty con­
structs a grammar only in conjunction with other faculties 
(2)of mind" . One might read into this an implication of 
a broad similarity with the theories of the philosopher 
grammarians in so far as they relate the linguistic faculty 
to all the mental processes, and merge linguistic consider­
ations with other fields of knowledge.
But here, as in the case of the earlier comparison of 
their theories with that of transformational generative 
grammar, there is a marked difference between Chomsky*s 
speculation on faculties of mind and the a priori conceptions 
postulated in the theories described in the foregoing text.
If modern speculation were to result in hypotheses which 
attempt to formulate the inter-action of linguistic with 
other mental faculties, at least such hypotheses would have 
the advantage of a much more advanced stage of thinking on 
the subject. By comparison with modern theories, it is not 
difficult to detect shortcomings in those which form the 
subject of this study. They provide far from convincing 
accounts of the relationship of language and thought, and 
these accounts are, moreover, much conditioned by the 
prevailing religious and philosophical influences. But for 
their time, they present an impressive and stimulating 
corpus of thinking on the subject, and embrace a wide range 
of aspects relevant to linguistic theory.
1. "My own quite tentative belief is that there is an auton­
omous system of formal grammar determined in principle 
by the language faculty and its component UG. This 
formal grammar generates abstract structures that are 
associated with "logical forms" .. by further principles of 
grammar. But beyond.this, it may well be impossible to 
distinguish sharply between linguistic and non-linguistic 
components of knowledge and belief.0." (Reflections on 
Language, 1976, p. 43).
Jarold Katz, more recently, comments "On balance, the 
spirit of Chomsky*s over-all thinking about meaning seems 
to be basic agreement with Putnam*s and Quine's concept 
of meaning as part.of a homogeneous cognitive fabric of 
extra grammatical beliefs about the world." (Chomsky on 
meaning, Language, Vol. 56, March, 1980, p. 33).
20 Reflections on language, 1976, p. 41.
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